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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS:
PERSPECrIVE ON DERIVATIVES AND RISK M ANAGEMENT

PROFESSOR FELSENFELD:* Good morning. On behalf
of the Institute on Law and Financial Services, the sponsor of this
conference, I want to extend the welcome of the Law School and
the Institute to you this morning. This is our third symposium on
the subject of derivatives, and I think it is now time to call it the
Third Annual Symposium on the subject of derivatives. We
anticipate that this will be a regular event at the Law School. I am
pleased to see you here today, and I hope to see you here in the
future.
We have sensed a growing interest in the subject of derivatives
over the years, and for that reason we have what I think you will
find to be a very exciting program over the next two days. It is
appropriate that the program exists. It is appropriate that you are
here. It is appropriate that the interest is growing. Trade in
derivatives has been increasing at a very rapid rate in recent years,
and indeed even in recent months. Bank derivatives activities
alone, I learned, increased $2.7 trillion in the third quarter of 1999
to a record $35 trillion. We are talking about a lot of money in this
industry.
With trade in derivatives comes, of course, risk. Risk is
unavoidable, and that is what this symposium is all about. The
more the volume increases, in all probability, the greater the
opportunity for risk. We see this in part because the derivatives
market is, so far, an immature one. It needs probably a greater
definition to give us more of a sense of what we are dealing with
and who is dealing with it, because even today we can see various
kinds of transactions that probably should be approached in
different ways. There are transactions between the institutions: the
banks, the brokerage activities, the insurance companies, and their
customers who want to invest more in derivative obligations. On
the other hand, we also see the trading of derivatives by these
institutions for themselves-banks for themselves and insurance
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Institute on Law
and Financial Services.
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companies for themselves, as well as companies and corporations
trading for their own purposes-to hedge risk, perhaps to increase
risk, and to engage in the opportunity for greater profit, all going
on at the same time.
While we deal with these different methods of trading in
derivatives, there is actually very little definition of a derivative.
Everybody knows that a derivative is a financial product that is
based upon something else. But when we are pressed into saying
that, and we recognize the look of confusion or bafflement in the
person to whom we give that definition, where do we go from
there? How do we tie it down so that we can deal with it? Is it, for
example, the major daily trade of financial institutions in
currencies around the world-trade that extends in the trillions of
dollars per day in the purchase and sale of currencies? Currencies
are traditional derivatives. Is this something that ought to be dealt
with? Is it something that ought to be measured as a derivative? Is
it something that ought to be regulated?
Put that along with the speed with which these transactions are
being processed-the speed or the regularity. Those who want to
trade in derivatives can forget about going to sleep. Sleep is no
longer a possibility, because this is a twenty-four-hour-a-day
system around the world. If you decide to get what has been your
traditional hours of sleep, you will miss something. In missing
something, the consequences can be expensive.
The speed with which transactions occur and their
international scope is well reflected in the insolvency and failure of
Barings Bank, one of the major international institutions. One of
their traders, as you know, was perhaps a little too over-extended,
perhaps a little careless, perhaps a little over-ambitious, perhaps
acting on the orders of Barings-one doesn't know-in Singapore,
and the consequences were felt immediately in London. This is the
kind of thing that can and does easily happen.
While we talk about the possible regulation of the derivatives
market, one of the other considerations we have is that the nature
of the market, its transactions, the nature of the transactions, and
their growing complexity are probably growing faster than the
ability to regulate. If you have a group of smart people sitting
down in Washington, in New York, in London, or in Basel,
working out a regulatory structure for perceived problems, the
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problems are going to get worse before the regulatory structure
hits the press and can be commented upon. How do we deal with
this? One doesn't know.
Conferences like this one are an effort to address the problems
and see what we can do about them. We hope to address the
problems in various ways. We will see what programs have
developed. We have people here who are aware of what is going
on in Washington and around the world and who are prepared to
discuss it. We will have a major segment dealing with the lawsuits
that have developed. How are lawyers handling the problems?
How do we decide whether a loss should be imposed in these
transactions? This will be addressed by a group of prominent
lawyers who are deeply involved in derivatives transactions. This
will then be commented upon by judges who wll be here, who will
hear the lawyers, who will hear their presentations, and will say
how this looks to them from the judicial side, and we will learn
from them.
So I look forward to this program. I hope you will learn from
it. Here, to monitor and control the program is the person who
created it, Alan Rechtschaffen. Alan is an Adjunct Professor here
at the Fordham Law School; he teaches a course in derivatives. He
is also in the real world, out in the world of trading, dealing in
derivative products. Alan, the floor is yours.
PROFESSOR RECHTSCHAFFEN:** Good morning. I
want to thank Carl and his Institute for bringing the Risk
Management and Derivatives Symposium 2000 to Fordham Law
School.
You have already heard a lot about derivatives from Carl.
Three years ago, this would have been called the "derivatives
conference," since the industry was all about derivatives. I think
that has changed to a certain extent; this is now more of a risk
management conference. We have litigators here who are going to
talk about where the liability lies for derivatives trading,
derivatives sales practices. But at the end of the day, if you look at
these cases we will discuss, and you study the complaints, you vill
see that people say, "Look, I lost money; why did I lose money?"
**Adjunct Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Chairman and

Founder, Fordham Derivatives and Risk Management Symposium.

6

FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE
& FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. V

Some of these problems could have been avoided with appropriate
risk management techniques.
So, for the rest of the day at least, I am going to call this the
"Derivatives and Risk Management Symposium," because risk
management is a part of the picture now. People are looking at the
stories of Barings, Procter & Gamble and Bankers Trust, and all
the other exciting headlines, and saying, "What do we do now?"
The regulators are saying that. Shareholders are saying that.
There is a quote which I got from a book on derivatives'
written by a new friend of mine, Bob McLaughlin, who is here.
Bob has told me that he has had to remain in hiding for the last
two years because this book took so long to compile.
Unfortunately, we all know how fast this industry is moving. He
will have to go into hiding for the next two years and rewrite the
book. This is a quote I read in his derivatives publication, and I
wanted to read it to you: "Panics, in some cases have their uses;
they produce as much good as hurt. Their duration is always short;
the mind soon grows through them and acquires a firmer habit
than before." The firmer habit? Risk management. This was
taken from Bob's book, but I want you to know that this was
originally said in 1776 in a book by a man named Thomas Paine in
his writings on Common Sense. A lot of what we are going to talk
about here is common sense.
What do we do? We know the problems. We have
derivatives. We know that it is a twenty-four-hour-a-day trading
environment. We know that there are a great deal of lawsuits out
there, and we know that directors and officers are nervous about
these lawsuits. We also know that certain states are now
permitting new investments for insurance companies, so we think
about Orange County. All of the headlines have become the
prologue to the risk management environment, the risk
management landscape in which we live today.
With us today are a number of people from the Office of the
Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York. We have
asked them to come here, and they have enthusiastically decided to
1.
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participate, because New York is changing its laws. It has changed
its legislation on permissible investments by insurance companies.
The landscape is changing. The participants are growing. As such,
we have to get a firmer habit-risk management practices that will
control the use of derivatives.
This symposium focuses on the risks and legal ramifications
associated with capital markets trading-not just derivatives, but
anything involving the capital markets. But the most volatile of
these capital market trading products are the derivatives. They are
highly leveraged, generally. They are not inherently value-driven,
but their leverage makes them incredibly volatile, and we have to
figure out how to rein in the risk of using these derivative products.
As Professor Felsenfeld alluded to, derivatives, and all capital
market trading activities, are used for one of two purposes:
managing risk or increasing yield. Banks and brokerage firms want
to sell derivatives to facilitate this two-pronged process with their
customers or their counterparties. Hedge fund failures, corporate
headlines, and the "rogue" trader scandals have all alerted
directors and officers to the need of having prudent risk
management practices at their firms. Directors, officers, and
regulators want to keep the funds out of the headlines. What I
want to do today is talk to you about some of the guidelines and
the attention that we can pay to putting into force these firmer
habits that Thomas Paine talked about in 1776 to control capital
market trading activities.
Now, if you were listening earlier, you may be wondering,
"Why did I bother to come here? I could have spent the day
somewhere else, and I don't need to hear the risk management
lecture." But what is interesting about the evolution of the laws
governing risk management, and where the regulators can come in,
is that these failures, these headlines and scandals and rogue
traders, all could have been avoided if-well, I shouldn't say all of
them-a lot of them could have been avoided, had there been
appropriate risk management tools in place.
Regulators and shareholders use operational risk techniques
to describe prudent behavior and to encourage the implementation
of risk management strategies. Susan Phillips was one of our first
speakers at this symposium three years ago. She was a member of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and is now
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the Dean of the George Washington University School of
Business. She is a good friend of mine. She and I were talking
about the role of risk management in the regulatory process. She
observed that the regulatory structures of the future are much
more likely to emphasize trading parameters, stress testing,
process, and internal controls.
This emphasis on process and controls will have a profound
effect on director and officer liability for corporations and
successful theories of recovery for litigators. Shareholders and
regulators increasingly expect that those responsible for the capital
markets trading activity and derivatives trading will make prudent
decisions in managing firm liability. Now, if you look at the case
law-and there isn't much out there-and the regulatory
guidelines that are around or the Basel documents, there is a great
deal of uncertainty as to what senior management and board
members must do to limit their liability, and what a firm can do so
that a party who has been hurt cannot get into their pockets.
The answer, I think-and this is why I am so enthusiastic
about the next couple of days-is education and implementation of
best practices. Consider this symposium the first step, because
everybody here should go back to their governmental agencies, to
their corporations, to their law firms, and understand that
education will have a huge role in the risk management and
derivatives marketplace over the next five years. We are here at
this symposium taking the important step of beginning the
education process. Regulators focus on encouraging responsible
risk management. By encouraging education in the area of
operational risk, regulators and shareholders can encourage best
practices.
Firms on the London Stock Exchange are now required to
issue statements explaining whether or not they are in compliance
with standards of best practices for risk management. Directors
and officers will sometimes have no idea about their company's
derivatives trading activity and their capital markets activity.
There needs to be an education process, one similar to this
symposium, but tailored to individual entities. In our audience, we
have directors and officers of public corporations and financial
institutions, legislators and regulators, and representatives from
the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the

2000]

DERIVATIVES & RISK MANAGEMENT

Currency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Office
of the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York, all of
whom are here because they recognize the role that education
plays in managing risk.
You are probably familiar with the business judgment rule,
which essentially says that a court will not look into a decision
made by a director because we want to let directors have the ability
to make decisions without the court inquiring into the correctness
of that decision. Directors can make mistakes, but the caveat is
that they can make mistakes so long as their decisions are
informed. By making informed decisions, you can limit your
liability. In limiting that liability, education will play a key role.
Regulatory structures emphasizing education, stress testing and
parameters, and the successful principles of risk management will
not only limit liability but will also limit the headlines, and the
lawsuits.
Fordham University School of Law has played an instrumental
part in the evolution of education in the field of risk management.
For four years we have offered a course that should have originally
been called "Derivatives Trading" and now should be called "Risk
Management and Derivatives Trading." It is a vital step in
Fordham's evolution that the important regulators are using our
educational forum as the venue for their education and for the
exchange of ideas. In this exchange of ideas, I encourage people to
talk to each other and to network at this symposium.
Professor Felsenfeld and I were in the hallway and we met one
of the top regulators who is here today. He said, "I am looking
forward to hearing from the others who are here on derivatives
and risk management." The regulators want to hear from you.
The regulators want to hear from the litigators. They want to hear
what the litigators are looking at because they have to form policy.
The litigators are paid-and they make more money if they win
their cases-to figure out where people went wrong and what
caused the problems.
So our symposium focuses on four areas, and throughout the
symposium each of the subjects being discussed will fall into one of
four areas:
- First, utilization: the use of derivatives, the end-users, and
where the end-users stand right now in terms of using derivatives
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products in capital markets trading.
* Second, litigation: the case law, including the recovery, when
derivatives or derivatives trading or sales practices lead to lawsuits.
* The third area which will be discussed is regulation, the
reaction of market regulators to utilization and litigation. In the
wake of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, we have insurance
regulators and banking regulators discussing the same subject: how
do we regulate this marketplace; how do we regulate the firmer
habit, and force directors and officers to implement the firmer
habit at their firms; how do we force risk management?
* The fourth area is education. The education process cannot
end with the end of this symposium. The education process must
continue onward.
I started out by saying that this is the perfect starting place for
looking at the derivatives marketplace and over-the-counter
derivatives. The advent of new regulations and new marketplaces
is a start. But we have to continue to become informed, continue
to come to symposia, continue to go online and find new
information, and continue to supplement it with books like Bob's
and other books and articles on what is happening.
Two of my students have offered to help me put together an
open exchange of educational resources on the Internet? You
have some information about that. This open exchange of
educational resources is really where the market has to head. We
have to explain to people where the risk lies in capital markets
trading activities. These risks rise to the level of the chairman, the
board of directors, and every senior officer, for they will be held
responsible by regulators and shareholders.
I have asked a couple of people to help me with this
symposium process over the next two days, one of whom is a
former student of mine. It is interesting to be able to call Carolyn
Jackson a former student because she has vast experience in the
area of derivatives and risk management. In fact, 1981 was when
2.

The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to §§ 16, 20,

21, 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, and 377-378 (1994 & Supp.
II 1997). Recently, the Glass-Steagall Act was constructively repealed by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
3. Risk and Derivatives Consulting Board, Inc., Riskandderivatives.com, at
http://www.riskandderivatives.com (last visited May 15, 2000).
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the first big derivatives transaction took place, the 1981 swap
transaction between the World Bank and the IMF. A year later,
Carolyn Jackson, who is a Vice-Chair of this Symposium, was
heading the derivatives trading desk for fixed-income dollar-based
securities at The Chase Manhattan Bank. Her experience has
evolved with the industry, culminating in her service as the
Executive Director of ISDA, the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, from 1995 to 1997. I am very proud that
she is a former student of mine and is willing to come here today to
tell you a little bit about where the industry is headed, where the
utilization is going, and what happens when things go wrong.
We will begin with Carolyn Jackson, who is a good friend, a
very important person in the industry, and my running partner. I
am going to ask Carolyn to explain what the role of ISDA is in the
marketplace, how it evolved, and who the members are. I think it
might be helpful as a background to Ruth Ainslie's talk. So if I
could, I would ask you, Carolyn, to speak a little bit about ISDA
and what the ISDA documentation looks like.
By the way, Carolyn, in addition to being a former student, has
also served as a co-faculty member for my class, so I know that she
is well versed in this area, and this is not as off-the-cuff as it sounds.
Carolyn, if you don't mind, please come up and take over the
podium.
CAROLYN H. JACKSON:*** Good morning. ISDA was
formed in 1985. I don't know if you all know that, because now
we take it for granted that there is standard swap documentation.
But back in the early days-as Alan mentioned, the first big swap
transaction was done in 1981-almost everybody totally reinvented
the wheel when it came to documentation. Even after people did a
trade and went to do the next trade, instead of getting the
document out and saying "oh well, three-month LIBOR, six-month
LIBOR, Swiss francs, deutsche marks," they started from scratch
on what was generally a thirty five page document.
Even over things such as LIBOR, the London Inter Bank
Offer Rate, the standard floating rate term, there was huge debate.
If I were at Chase, I would say, "Oh, it should be Chase LIBOR."
***Former Executive

Director,

International

Swaps

and Derivatives

Association, Inc.; .D, Fordham University School of Law, 2000.

12

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE
& FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. V

If somebody were at Citibank, he or she would say, "Oh, it should
be Citibank LIBOR." And so, needless to say, there was tons and
tons of time wasted with people arguing back and forth about the
most minute terms.
Following the Salomon Brothers deal, a group of industry
people began to talk to each other informally, saying, "Gee,
wouldn't it be really nice if we could just standardize the
terminology?" That is actually how the trade association began.
The document was yet a dream.
People just said, "Let's
understand what it basically means, a 'business day?' What does it
mean, a 'floating rate?' What happens if LIBOR doesn't become
available? Where do you go for a rate? What newspaper do you
go to?"
So, in 1985, ISDA was created. The first thing the group put
out was a Standard Code of Language. For example, if you were
Chase, they would have their own document and attach the Code,
and that clarified all the legal terms and all the language. And
then, with time, it evolved to where people wanted to go one step
forward and actually standardize the document.
When ISDA was first formed, there were about ten members.
Now I think there are roughly 450. The way ISDA started was
really totally around documentation. But, as Alan alluded to, the
industry has greatly evolved. First, documentation was one of the
hottest issues. Then, new trading and risk management became a
hot issue; then eventually a lot of policy issues, especially as the
industry became more and more the focus of the press and
regulatory agencies.
ISDA exists with about twenty working committees all around
the world. When I was Executive Director in 1995 and 1996, we
opened a London office. I believe there is going to be an office in
Tokyo in April, and in Singapore next year. Initially people saw
ISDA as a U.S.-based organization, and the reality is that more of
its members are from Europe. It has definitely become the "I" in
international.
ISDA runs through various committees; for example, when
things heated up about the CFTC reauthorization and the
influence of the Commodity Exchange Act over the derivatives
industry, ISDA formed a working committee to try to address
those issues and decide what the policy of the industry should be.
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And similarly, with the Basel proposals, the capital requirements, a
group of ISDA members would get together and write an industry
response detailing the appropriate amount of capital to be set aside
for various capital and market risks.
Likewise, essentially around 1994, with all the derivatives
litigation and the concern about suitability issues, the industry
worked together with other trade associations to put out a policy
statement called "Principles and Practices," which basically
clarified that derivatives transactions were done on an arm's-length
basis.
I have the ISDA expert with me now, and so I would like to
take this opportunity to introduce Ruth Ainslie. Ruth has a very
interesting background because she has been a lawyer at Bankers
Trust for the past seventeen years and just joined ISDA this
January. She has a very responsible position, in terms of being the
Senior Director for Policy of the Americas, as well as in charge of
all the press relations. I can remember from my days at ISDA, the
constant media calls, especially when something hot was going on
in Washington. So it is a very, very important position, and it is
very interesting to see somebody go from the legal side to the
business side, since I am doing the reverse.
My main purpose right now is to introduce someone I have
had the pleasure of working with, Ruth Ainslie, who is the ISDA
Senior Director for Policy of the Americas. With that, I would like
to turn it over to Ruth and give her a warm welcome.
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INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE

RUTH W. AINSLIE:* ISDA is very pleased to be at
Fordham today and to work with Carolyn, and we would, of
course, like to thank Carolyn, who, as she told you, is IDSA's
former Executive Director. I am going to talk today about what
swaps are, how they are documented, and the regulatory
environment around swaps.
You may have seen this or heard this particular bank
advertisement on the radio: "Our bank has no junk bonds; our
bank has no derivatives." That ad is supposed to entice you to
deposit money with that bank. From our perspective, we probably
agree with them that junk bonds may be a very risky investment
for a bank. It is a credit concern, and it may not be appropriate.
But we would like to talk further about a bank investing in
derivatives.
Let's talk about risk activity. Which entails more risk, hedging
or not hedging? Banks tend to have liabilities on the floating-rate
side. They do their funding and their borrowing through floatingrate instruments, like three-month CDs. On the asset side, they
generally have more fixed-rate instruments. Not hedging this type
of interest rate mismatch is probably very risky for most banks.
Who faces the types of risk that OTC derivatives address?
First, financial institutions. We just talked about banks, but all
forms of financial institutions face many different kinds of rate
risks; and the more global an institution is, the larger the variety of
risks faced. Second, corporations are exposed to interest rate risks
and currency risks as soon as they cross a border and have income
coming in another country or payrolls going out to another
country. They may also have commodity risk, depending on the
nature of their business. Third, governmental entities are subject to
risks as well. Large governments have larger risks, but small
governments have lots of risk too, as do small agencies.
The types of risk that OTC derivatives address are interest
*
Senior Director for Policy in the Americas and Media Relations,
International Swaps and Derivatives Association. Ms. Ainslie collaborated with
Rick Grove, Chief Executive Officer of the ISDA, in preparing her presentation.
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rate, currency, equity, commodity, and credit risks. All of these
are fairly self-explanatory in concept. In detail they can be really
complicated.
Diagram1: Interest Rate Swap
Floating

Diagram 1 shows how an interest rate swap works. A bank is
paying a floating rate to its depositors. It is receiving a fixed rate
from homeowners, like us. What the bank can easily do to manage
the fact that it is receiving a different rate than it is paying out, is
go to a swap counterparty, and swap the fixed amount it receives
from the homeowner for the floating amount it needs to pay to the
depositor. It has then matched those risks.
Diaeram2: Currency Swan
US. Dollar Cash

Euro Cash Flow

We can talk about derivatives as risk management tools in
terms of currencies as well, as seen in Diagram 2. A very typical
situation is a U.S. corporation that has a subsidiary in Europe and

16

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE
& FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. V

has revenues from Europe. The corporation is going to have Euro
cash flow coming in. Now, in the United States, it has to pay its
bondholders, and servicing its bondholders is always going to be in
dollars. So the corporation will swap those European revenues
with a swap counterparty, and get dollars. The dollars then go to
the bondholders and the corporation has matched those risks.
What are the principal benefits of OTC derivatives to usersusers being corporations, governments, smaller banks-entities
that are not dealers in derivatives? They can hedge the risks that
they would otherwise not be very well equipped to manage.
Hedging risk is not their business. Hedging risk is not what they
do. McDonald's sells burgers; GM sells cars. They do not really
hedge interest rate risks in the same way that they sell burgers or
sell cars. But engaging in these kinds of transactions, entering into
derivatives, is in fact a way for them to manage these kinds of risks.
And it gives them far more time to focus on their principal
businesses, which is what we want them to do in terms of the
economics of the United States. It is much better for the economy,
in general, for entities to focus on what they do well-on what
their specialties are.
What are the principal characteristics of OTC derivatives?
The first one, a very important one that we will discuss further
when we talk about regulatory issues, is that they are bilateral in
nature. Two parties, called counterparties, transact with each
other in one of the derivative transactions that we have described:
interest rate, equity, commodity, credit, or currency-based
transactions.
Counterparties are generally institutions. For the most part,
derivatives are transacted between very sophisticated partiesbanks, corporations, governmental agencies. Generally, there are
two-way credit exposures: I pay you fixed, you pay me floating.
There are some exceptions. There are some option transactions in
which, once the initial payment has been made, there is no risk to
that payor anymore in terms of what he has to pay, just in what he
has to receive. But generally, derivatives are two-way credit
exposure transactions, very different from a bank loan. A bank
lends money to a company and waits to be paid back. Derivatives
transactions are different.
There are two-way flows. The
economic terms are a contractual agreement between two
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counterparties to exchange cash flows on a notional principal
amount for a stated period of time.
The notional principal amount is something that we should
talk about. If you have a $300 million swap transaction, the
notional principal is $300 million. $300 million is not at risk. Let's
say there are semi-annual payments and they are triggered into two
different kinds of interest rates-whether they are Treasury-based
or LIBOR-based or some other kind of interest rate base, prime
base-and on those days Party A and Party B pay each other an
interest amount that is calculated against the notional amount. But
it is an interest amount. So the $300 million does not go from one
party to the other party; that is not exchanged. The cash flow is
exchanged, and these payments are linked in some way to the
value of some other market price or instrument-like prime, like
LIBOR. The maturity just means how long this contract is
outstanding.
There are periodic cash flow payments, so the notional
number of global outstanding derivative transactions, which is the
number that gives people some pause-an $81 trillion market per
the Bank for International Settlements' June 1999 survey,' is a
huge number. That is not the number at risk.
It is broken up as follows:
* Foreign exchange represents almost $15 trillion. That
number is going down. Partially it is going down because there
used to be many currencies in Europe and now there is one EU
currency. So, a lot of transactions that used to go on between the
mark and the franc do not happen anymore.
e Interest rates represent approximately $54 trillion. This
number is increasing.
Equities represent about $1.5 trillion. Although they are
increasing dramatically, they are still a very small part of the
market.
* Commodities represent $0.4 trillion.
* And "Other," like credit, is a very small, but very growing,
$10.5 trillion.
1. Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, The Global OTC
Derivatives Market at End-June 1999 (November 1999), available at
http://www.bisorg (last visited Nov. 15, 2000).
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The total is over $81 trillion. Credit derivatives are the fastest
growing segment, in terms of notional amount. On a market value
basis, if you were to take every one of those transactions that is out
there and say, "Okay, close that transaction out today," the value
that would be exchanged on that day would be $2.6 trillion. That is
a significantly lower number than the $81 trillion.
Now, if we consider netting, in which if I owe you $100 and
you owe me $102, because the values have changed, the $2
differential would be paid, nothing else. So instead of my paying
$100 and your paying $102, only $2 is exchanged. That brings the
aggregate value of all these transactions down to $1.1 trillion.
What we haven't even factored in is credit support or
collateral. If you add collateral, which again brings down the risk
amount, you are under $1 trillion of global risk exposure on
outstanding OTC derivatives transactions. So if you look at the
market, you see that it is a huge market; it is a vast market, but the
amount at risk is much less than the notional amount. That is
really a pretty important piece of what this market is all about.
I am going to turn now to the documentation piece of this
market. Derivatives are less than twenty years old, which I am
sure Carolyn or someone prior to me has said.
The
documentation, however, which is of course much less than twenty
years old, has become a global industry standard.
The
documents-generally ISDA documents, but there are some
others as well-are fairly well accepted just about everywhere in
the world. With the growth of emerging markets transactions, they
have become accepted in emerging market countries by emerging
market counterparties.
These documents provide the opportunity (i) to tailor credit
terms between the counterparties after evaluating the
creditworthiness of each party; (ii) to make sure that the economic
terms of each particular transaction are set forth very accurately
for that transaction; and (iii) to include credit support terms based
on the creditworthiness or the market conditions or some other
reason why having collateral would help you manage your risk.
Those terms can be varied on a changing and evolving basis as is
necessary for the transaction.
The Master Agreement itself is an interesting concept, and the
first of its nature. It is a single bilateral contract between two
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counterparties; it contains credit terms as negotiated between the
counterparties, and it governs multiple transactions, all of which
form a single agreement. You could have under a single ISDA
Master Agreement one transaction or 406 transactions. In each
case, you would be talking about a single agreement.
Under that agreement there are certain provisions that are
very standard. You have the option in the agreement to require
payment netting. Payment netting is the example I gave you
before: on the 30th of June I owe you $100 and you owe me $102,
and we only exchange the $2. So for a particular transaction on a
particular day we exchange a net amount. This is operationally
intensive. Institutions have to be able to handle this and recognize
it on computer systems, but it is a very good way to manage risk.
This risk is called "settlement risk." If I were to pay you the $100
and you were never to pay me the $102, I am either out $100 or
$202, depending on how you count. Settlement risk is a very big
risk.
The other form of netting, and the one which the Agreement
originally targeted, is close-out netting. In the event that there
were an event of default, the counterparty who did not default has
the option to close out every single transaction covered by the
Master Agreement on a net basis, calculating what is owed under
each transaction on a net basis and then netting all of those net
amounts. Finally, one single net payment is owed. You could start
out with transactions worth, say, $500 million on each side, and the
net payment owed at the end-and it could be owed to either
party-could be $60,000. That is not an irrational result here. So
that is a very important concept that the agreement contemplates.
Events of default are triggers to alert the other party that
something has gone wrong. They are related to the condition or
the actions of counterparties. Conditions include whether the
counterparty is properly incorporated, has it paid its taxes, and is it
authorized to enter into and perform the transactions under the
agreement in accordance with the terms of those transactions. By
actions I mean: has the counterparty defaulted on debt to other
parties, or has the counterparty failed to provide financial
statements when asked to? These are defaults over which the
counterparty has some kind of control. As a result, if such a
default happens, the other party then has the option to close out
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and liquidate, but it must close out and liquidate all but not less
than all of the transactions because it is a single agreement.
Termination events are events that are beyond the control of
the counterparty-an illegality, a supervening illegality; a law is
changed so that it is no longer legal for the counterparty to enter
into or to perform a particular contract; credit event upon merger,
two entities merge and the rules around what they can do after that
change. The difference between a termination event and an event
of default, or how it is treated in the document, is that in
termination events you sometimes just get rid of the offending
transactions. Let's say certain transactions are now subject to tax
but others are not. You can close out just those transactions that
are subject to tax; you do not have to close out all but not less than
all. That also makes a big difference.
Also, the methodology for close-out changes. If you have an
event of default, the close-out calculation is highly documented.
There are two methods. First is market quotation; where you go in
a specified way to market sources, get prices for transactions, and
then go through the methodology to get to what is the price to
close out this transaction. This could be done by going to the midmarket, by throwing out the high and the low-or any number of
ways. And, by the way, getting to the price can sometimes be fairly
complex. Loss is the other methodology. It is one that is growing
in its acceptance. Loss is replacement cost. If I were to get rid of
this transaction by replacing it, what would it cost?
One of the most important parts of the document is the
schedule to the document. The schedule to the document allows
flexibility. Parties can choose which events of default they want to
apply, whether they want netting to apply, whether they want to
bring in collateral, certain time periods, and certain other kinds of
agreements between them. These are always based on the relative
credit positions of the two counterparties or the relative status of
the two counterparties.
Obviously, banks are free to do an awful lot of things in
financial markets. Certain other kinds of entities may not be so
authorized. Insurance companies may be more constrained to
enter into certain kinds of transactions than banks. Corporations
may have certain kinds of internal rules, as opposed to regulations,
that surround what they can do. So the schedule gives a great deal
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of flexibility.
Interestingly, schedules can be very difficult to negotiate.
About ten years ago, when I was at Bankers Trust, I negotiated the
Bankers Trust/Chemical ISDA Agreement. That was the "old"
Chemical, before its mergers. It took two years to negotiate the
agreement. We are talking about two institutions that were very
similar in a much simpler time, and that was a very typical time
period.
Negotiation has advanced a great deal. A lot of issues that we
thought might be issues are not issues, and new issues have come
up. Many things have changed a great deal. To give you a sense of
how prevalent the ISDA document is, Bankers Trust had, as of last
year, 4,000 ISDAs outstanding. It merged with Deutsche Bank,
which had 6,000 ISDAs outstanding. So this is a very, very widely
used document.
The Confirmation is the key to each transaction. It sets forth
the economic terms. If you have a series of transactions under an
agreement, you have a Confirmation for each one. Again, taken
together with the Master Agreement, it forms a single agreement.
The economic terms that have to be included are the notional
amount, the maturity, the currency, the price source, the product
type, and other things that would be critical to dealing with each
other through the course of one of these transactions.
Swap transactions have varying lengths. A foreign exchange
spot transaction is generally two days. It is very common now to
have ten-year swap transactions. If you are going to enter into a
transaction that is going to last for ten years, you are going to make
sure that you have tied up most of the loose ends because it is
much harder to renegotiate when one entity is in bad shape later
on.
The representative products that can be covered by these
kinds of Master Agreements include: interest rate swaps, caps,
collars, floors, and options; currency swaps and other FX
transactions; equity swaps and options; credit default swaps,
forwards, and options; commodity forwards and options; energy
derivatives; bullion spot forward swaps and options; and all kinds
of governmental bond transactions.
Through the years, ISDA has created definition booklets.
These booklets give you a great deal of market knowledge about
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where the price sources are, how the price sources work, and they
also give you a common language for a specific kind of transaction.
The commodity definition booklet allows parties to know they are
talking about the same thing because the defined terms explain to
them that if you are talking about a particular kind of transaction, I
am talking about the same one if I put it under the same terms.
Some of these definitional books are self-evolving. The 1998
FX and Currency Option Definitions booklet permits rate changes.
The booklet was completed and published in 1998, and deals with a
lot of emerging markets issues. Emerging markets are evolving
markets, and because they are evolving markets, things change all
the time, including rate sources, rate methodologies, what the
governmental bond structure is. So that is a flexible definition
booklet. It has an annex that can be changed. Other definition
booklets, which are set for a time period, get reviewed and revised
from time to time.
I think we will turn now to the Credit Support Annexes. The
use of collateral to support documents is growing incredibly
quickly. There are a variety of reasons for requiring collateral.
First, is there a credit standard for collateral? If you are
dealing with someone from a financial institution perspective, you
are dealing with a company whose financials you are not
completely comfortable with, either because they are not doing
well or because they are in a circumstance, like a hedge fund,
where their earnings are extremely volatile. They could have this
kind [indicating extreme peaks and valleys] of income stream at
any point. You may wish to have collateral pledged to support the
obligations between you.
In addition, there could be market reasons for having
collateral pledged. The transactions could be in markets that are
very, very volatile, and you would want to make sure that,
notwithstanding what happens to the underlying rates that are part
of the transaction, you still have a comfort and security level that
the obligations will be met on a timely basis. The ISDA Credit
Support Annex, which is something that is always being reviewed
and revised, and is actually being revised right now-ISDA has
done an enormous amount of work with collateral, different kinds
of collateral, different jurisdictions- supports many types of
collateral.
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Until very recently, the safest way to make sure you had
secured something was to use some kind of U.S. Treasury or U.S.
cash. Now, the reason had as much to do with how wonderful U.S.
Treasuries and cash were as that the legal system supported it. If
you gave collateral in a particular way, you would be able to realize
the benefit of it at the right time.
Every single type of collateral is subject to its own local legal
system. In order to be confident that the collateral given can be
used in the way you want to use it, you have to be assured that as a
legal matter that is true as well. We will talk more later about the
efforts that have been made to make sure that that is true.
The mechanics for posting and managing collateral,
interestingly, have become an entire industry.
Collateral
management is a very important part of risk management in major
institutions. It is supported by practitioners who are very highlevel, well-educated, and valued people within institutions. It is
not a clerical position. Collateral management is risk management,
like credit risk management or market risk management. And as
more and more collateral is pledged, and is pledged more and
more on a global basis, collateral management has become
incredibly important.
Going back to the legal opinions, there has been a huge
initiative on the part of ISDA and other industry organizations to
obtain opinions supporting the documents. The opinions for the
Master Agreement have been opinions on the enforceability of the
netting, primarily the close-out netting that we talked about
earlier.
Payment netting, incidentally, is a contractual agreement
between two parties, and no one has ever found a single
jurisdiction where that is unenforceable, since it is just two parties
agreeing to do it. Now, netting after default can be subject to all
kinds of local regimes, specifically insolvency laws, because as soon
as one of the parties becomes insolvent, that party is now subject to
a court or a referee or a trustee in every single jurisdiction in the
world.
So the question you ask is, "If my counterparty becomes
insolvent, will I be able to close out this transaction and do it in
accordance with the terms, and obtain the value that is owed to
me?" And another question may be, "Will I be able to enforce it
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on a timely basis?"-because you may be okay with it if you know
it is just going to be held up for a while but you will get it back.
But these issues have been very complex to think about and to
resolve.
ISDA now has legal opinions in thirty-four jurisdictions. What
is important to realize is in quite a few of those jurisdictions,
lobbying by ISDA, by local regulators from our country and some
of the other countries, by industry groups, by individual
institutions, has caused an enormous amount of legislative change.
There has been an enormous amount of legislative change in this
country to ensure that the environment for netting is secure.
Those initiatives are still going on-they are going on in Latin
America, they are going on in Eastern Europe, they are going on
in the Caribbean-in order to ensure that the documentation will
protect the transacting parties in the way that it is intended to.
Now, why would you net? First, you could net for credit
reasons, because you know that would give comfort that you would
be able to realize on your value, and that you would not lose
money. Second, you could net for capital reduction reasons. The
Bank for International Settlements ("BIS") allows institutions to
look at their exposure on a net basis if they, BIS, have met a
certain number of criteria including; looking in the jurisdiction
where both counterparties are and where all the transactions are,
and at the laws, and obtaining a recent legal opinion on the fact
that you will be able to realize it. This makes a big difference in
the capital funding for banks. In other institutions, it is moving as
well to investment banks. Third, you could net for financial
reporting. You may also net balance sheet items related to
derivatives if you are certain about enforceability and you can
determine net closeout amounts.
The standards are different for all three, but they are there.
Annual updates are required by the BIS, so each of these opinions
is updated annually to ensure that nothing has changed to make
them less enforceable. Collateral is a similar issue. So far there is
no capital requirement for collateral, but we have now obtained at
ISDA, twelve opinions in twelve jurisdictions, fifteen more
underway, and annual updating will commence in 2002.
We turn now to the regulatory environment. The difficulty
here is that these are new products in new jurisdictions and new
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structures and they do not fit squarely into old rules. As we have
discussed, derivatives are really pretty new in the structure of
financial products and they are evolving quickly. They are not the
simple interest rate product, the simple currency swap product, or
the simple foreign exchange transactions that they once were.
In the United States, there has been pretty much a status quo
on the regulatory side. The rights and obligations are pretty much
governed by the contractual agreement. Parties can contract with
each other to handle their own financial management in the way
they wish. There is no specific regulation of OTC derivatives
transactions. As a general matter, that is true.
It is unlike securities and futures. Under the securities laws
and the commodities laws, participants in the securities markets
and in the futures markets are subject to a great deal of regulation.
They are subject to reporting requirements. There are penalties
for not transacting exactly in accordance with the rules and
regulations. This is more like bank loans. Although banks are
regulated, the loans they make are not, and you do not need to get
any regulator's permission in order to enter into a bank loan.
Corporations do not need permission to obtain a bank loan.
What are the reasons for this lack of specific regulation? Well,
policy concerns are not implicated in the same way. Investor
protection is not deemed to be nearly as important a consideration
when you are talking about derivatives. Generally, it is an
institution-to-institution market. The securities laws are consumer
protection statutes; they protect individuals. Institutions are not
the target of consumer protection statutes. This was entirely an
institutional market. It has become not entirely an institutional
market; the nature of the institutions has changed, but it is still
institution-to-institution for the most part, so we do not have the
investor protection statutory scheme that we have in other
products.
Price discovery is not the same kind of issue. Nobody goes to
the currency swap to find out what the Euro is trading at; you go to
the foreign exchange markets. Nobody goes to the interest rate
swap market to find out what LIBOR is or what the prime rate is.
So the price discovery mechanism is very different. If you are
trading West Texas Intermediate or Brent Crude, you are not
going to look at the swap to see what the price is.

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE
& FINANCIAL LAW

26

[Vol. V

For these reasons, and because of the incredible depth of the
markets and the incredible liquidity of most of these markets-it is
very difficult to fathom in fact the size of the Treasury marketmanipulation is not as likely. It is very hard to corner the market
in yen or dollars or Treasury bills. So for those policy reasons,
historically there has not been the same kind of regulatory overlay.
In addition, the costs are very significant. Every time you put
in a new legislative/regulatory initiative, it is costly to the
government that does it. It is costly to the participants who have to
manage it, and it is costly to the system, because it has a chilling
effect on whether you do those kinds of transactions.
The third reason is the nature of the participants. The
participants are ones who do not naturally need to be taken care of
because they are supposed to be very sophisticated and they
understand their markets.
The relationship between the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA),2 which governs transactions in commodities, and the swaps
market has been under discussion for a long time. In 1989, a Swaps
Policy Statement was issued-this was the first one; swaps were
very new then-saying that swaps should not be regulated as
futures. The CFTC is concerned with futures. Futures are traded
on exchanges. Trading a future off-exchange is illegal under the
Commodity Exchange Act. If swaps are not futures, then they do
not need to be regulated as though they are.
In the early 1990s, there was congressional action, and the
Swaps Exemption3 came into place, which gave rules around which
you could enter into swaps and be sure that your swap would be a
valid transaction neither void nor voidable. In 1998, the CFTC
issued a Concept Release.' The Concept Release put immediate
uncertainty for all swaps based on security prices. It led to other
uncertainties as well. It raised questions about where the CFTC
was heading in terms of the whole derivatives market. This
became such a major issue that, in September, 1998, a
congressional moratorium went into place to hold off on the
2.
3.
4.

7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1994 & Supp. 111995).
17 C.F.R. § 35.1 (2000).
CFTC, Concept Release, Over-the-counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg.

26,114 (May 12, 1998).
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implementation of the Concept Release until such time as this
could be reviewed
In 1999, a President's Working Group, which was composed of
the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, the CFTC, and the SEC, issued
their report.' In this report, which was unprecedented for its
unanimous agreement, Chairman Greenspan, Chairman Levitt,
Secretary Summers, and Chairman (by this point) Rainer of the
CFTC agreed that legal certainty for the swaps markets under the
CEA was something that had to be dealt with, that it was
extremely important to address the issues of legal certainty so that
the markets were not disrupted, and from the regulators'
perspective as well, so that the markets did not go offshore. The
Commodity Exchange Act could potentially provide regulation
that is absent in virtually every other country in which commodities
are transacted, and that would drive a great deal of U.S. business
offshore if it became too onerous to do those kinds of transactions
onshore.
Now let's talk about the regulation of institutions. Banks,
security firms, and insurance firms are regulated because of the
public policy interest in protecting depositors, account holders, and
policyholders, and it is very important to prevent systemic risk. It
is very important that the failure of one or more institution does
not cause a domino effect and cause massive systemic risk.
Through regulation, supervision, and examination, there is a
comfort level that this is less likely to happen. In this way, most of
the dealers of OTC derivatives are in fact regulated, but not
because they deal in derivatives. Other dealers in OTC derivatives
are not regulated either, and that is because the public policy issues
that are present in so many other products are not present in the
derivatives market. Self-regulation has really been the way the
market has developed. There has been a very strong development

5. See
Omnibus
Consolidated
and
Emergency
Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1999 § 760(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2631
(prohibiting CFrC rulemaking proceedings, interpretation releases, and policy
statements with respect to swaps and hybrid instruments until April 1,1999).
6. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRouP ON FINANCIAL MARKEIs, OVER-THECouNTER DERivATiVEs MARKETs AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE Acr (Nov.

1999).
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of a risk management approach following the 1993 G-30 Report,' a
global report investigating what derivatives are, how they work,
and how we manage them.
There are some key elements to internal regulation. First,
there should be sound corporate governance. Companies should
establish parameters under which all their financial market
transactions are undertaken.
Second are risk management procedures; establishment of
independent procedures and systems to monitor adherence to
these parameters. Interestingly, risk management has turned into
a whole industry. There are credit risk professionals, market risk
professionals, collateral management professionals, and now
operations risk professionals. These are all different kinds of risks
that can be managed and can make transacting in derivatives a
safe, viable, and excellent tool for risk management.
The credit risk management side has to do with evaluating
counterparties. It also has to do with evaluating countries and
their structures and their instruments. The market risk side
obviously has to do with markets, and that goes for countries and
instruments as well, and the way in which markets evolve and
develop and how they are regulated. The collateral management
side is about what collateral you take, what are the processes, when
do you pay it out, when do you take it back, how do you account
for it, how do you record it, who values it, and who handles
disputes. These are the kinds of issues that run through all of
them.
Operations risk is concerned with what happens if there is a
computer failure, or what happens if Citibank can't make a single
payment tomorrow. What are your back-ups for that, how does
that work, what is an error in a claim based on an operational risk,
and what is really a credit issue that has not been managed?
Major institutions increasingly have put together policies and
procedures that enable them to work better. When Carolyn
referred to the Principles and Practices initiative that came out in
1995, which talked about arm's-length dealing between
counterparties, there was a huge section on risk management and
7.
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what you could do to improve your risk management and how to
make it more effective.
Basically, these are some of the major issues in the OTC
markets, how you document them and how they are regulated. I
would be happy to take any questions.
QUESTION: Are people starting to use the ISDA for
repurchase agreements?
MS. AINSLIE: It is interesting you asked that. That is about
the only two-way arrangement that is not typically put under an
ISDA agreement. There are, as you probably know, standard
agreements-the Bond Market Association (BMA) in the United
States; Organizzazione Sammoarinese del lavora autonomo
(OSLA) and International Securities Market Association (ISMA),
outside of the United States. So far, repurchase agreements
generally are not put under ISDAs. It is hard to do.
QUESTION [PROF. RECHTSCHAFFEN]: A number of the
people who are here today are litigators. I wanted to ask you a
question because you focused over and over again on the nature of
the participants. My question really stems from successful claims
in the area of derivatives and derivative trades when there is a loss.
You, as a representative of ISDA, said numerous times, as did
each of the participants, that this is a dealer's marketplace?
MS. AINSLIE: Generally, yes.
QUESTIONER: It is for the big people, it's not for the little
people?
MS. AINSLIE: Generally.
QUESTIONER: Do you think as an attorney that it is prima
facie evidence, on its face evidence, that a transaction is unsuitable
for a non-institutional client or counterparty, even if it is an arm'slength transaction?
MS. AINSLIE: The swaps exemption of the Commodity
Exchange Act has described and defined an eligible swap
participant, and there are individuals included in that. A lot of this
has to do with the combination of financial wherewithal, but also
sophistication-knowing what you are doing and knowing what
your risk is. So an eligible swap participant goes all the way from
Citibank to an individual who has a certain net worth available for
the transaction. So I think it is not a very simple question. Are
there people who should be protected? Sure, but that is not even
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my opinion, that's everybody's opinion. But I think you have to
look at the facts of each case.
Is that what you are asking? I mean, clearly, one of the
primary goals of the Commodity Exchange Act, and a very good
goal, was to punish fraudulent transactions, and people who
manipulate markets. So if you are referring to counterparties for
whom this is unsuitable, they should have remedies. They should
have remedies if they are under the Commodity Exchange Act,
and they should have remedies under the common law. But it is
not an easy question.
Darcy knows, because she was at Bankers Trust when I was,
that we had a huge new client approval process. Every institution
does. You do a credit review, but then you ask "is this a suitable
transaction for this person, and is it appropriate for the institution
to engage with them?" Obviously, it doesn't always work.
QUESTIONER: One of the cases, which falls into what you
are speaking about, is the case of a doctor named Tauber,8 who is
an incredibly wealthy individual.
MS. AINSLIE: The largest landholder in Washington?
QUESTIONER: Yes. This level of sophistication has really
become the touchstone for liability to a certain extent. Who the
counterparty is, and the nature of the participants doesn't just go to
the size of the company, but the level of sophistication and the
experience of the individual trader.
MS. AINSLIE: He at one point lost $24 million in his trading
at Salomon. Now he had lots of trades with lots of other people, so
you can imagine the financial wherewithal of someone who loses
$24 million and continues trading at the same rate. Is that who we
are talking about?
QUESTION: Do you think that the growing use of collateral,
and perhaps daily marked-to-market instant collateral, presents a
challenge to the exemption?
MS. AINSLIE: In what way?
QUESTIONER: Well, it makes an over-the-counter swap
often look an awful lot like a futures contract if you have that
collateral and you have daily marks against that collateral.
8. Solomon Forex, Inc. v Tauber, 8 F.3d 966 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1540 (1994).
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MS. AINSLIE: That is one of the questions that have been
raised and obviously there is not an answer to this yet. As long as
it is a bilaterally negotiated contract with tailored terms based on
the creditworthiness of the counterparty, it looks a good bit
different than the requisite margining for a standard contract that
you can only get in X amount for X period of time. I think that is
an issue that gets discussed. But there are bilaterally negotiated
terms for collateral as well as for economics.
QUESTION: When you pointed to the lack of a public policy
concern as a fundamental basis for not regulating over-the-counter
derivatives, how does that dovetail with the Long-Term Capital
Management situation, where you have an unregulated entity that
presented a-perceived, anyway-systemic risk to the economy?
MS. AINSLIE: That is an interesting question. A group of
hedge funds got together and, about two weeks ago, released a
paper-I don't know how many of you are aware of this-which
talks about risk management within hedge funds and things that
they should do, in effect, to self-regulate."
Long-Term Capital was a very unusual circumstance. There
was a lot of talk about systemic risk. I was recently at meetings
with a number of people in Washington where they were saying
that none of the fourteen or so counterparties were at risk for more
than $300 million, and in not one of those cases would a $300
million loss have presented a severe material impediment to that
particular institution, let alone to the system. So while the issues
are all correct, it is a very unusual circumstance. Long-Term
Capital was clearly one of the most sophisticated counterparties
anybody could work with.
Thank you.

-

FUND MANAGERS (February 2000),
availableat http-/wvrvwi.hfmsoundpractices.com/Fund.htm.
10. See Press Release, Hedge Funds Publish Sound Practices
Recommendations
(February 2000), available at <http'J/www.hfmsoundpractices.com> (last visited
Nov. 15, 2000).
9.

SOUND PRACTICES FOR HEDG
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THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP REPORT
AND OTHER INITIATIVES

PROF. RECHTSCHAFFEN: Professor Felsenfeld will
navigate us through the rest of the morning session and then we
will break for lunch. I am going to ask Professor Felsenfeld to
return and lead us through the rest of the morning.
Are there any questions about what we have talked about so
far? It has been pretty straightforward. We have gone through
some of the utilization concepts in derivatives and capital markets
trading, and some of the ways that risk management is
superimposed on top of that. Now we will move into some of the
government's reactions to derivatives and capital markets trading
and to certain risk management issues with two of the leaders in
the field.
PROF. FELSENFELD: During the next hour we will deal
with matters being taken up in Washington relative to the control
of derivative risks. We have two leading experts here to talk about
this.
Michael Brosnan, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, is a
career Examiner who was most recently moved to a policy-making
position. He deals generally with trading activities, largely in
national banks which the Comptroller supervises, which means
that he looks at the asset and liability side of national banks in
order to help control their risks.
We are also very happy to have Darcy Bradbury. Darcy is out
of Washington. She was an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
one of the creators of the President's Working Group on Financial
Markets, and was a leader in that field and is very aware of what is
occurring in that field. She joined Deutsche Bank and recently
left, I don't mind saying, for a maternity leave to take care of her
six-month-old child. We are very happy that you took the time to
come here. Darcy Bradbury.
DARCY BRADBURY:* Thank you and good morning. I am
going to try to give you an overview of some of the current
* Managing Director, Bankers Trust/Deutsche Bank, Strategy and New
Business Development for Global Investor Services.
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regulatory and legislative efforts from more of a political policy
perspective. This will hopefully ease you into your afternoon,
which is a little more practical, applied litigation, and may give you
some idea of where I think the regulators and the legislators may
be going in the coming months.
Ruth Ainslie gave a very good overview of where things are,
but also highlighted some of the risks that exist in the current
market for derivatives. While the litigators are busy helping clients
take advantage of some of those risks, I think the goal in
Washington is obviously to reduce risks in order to help the
financial markets prosper and help our economy.
Let me start with a little bit of background on the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets. It is made up of the
Secretary of the Treasury, who chairs it, and the Chairs of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the SEC, and
the CFTC. It also includes, on a de facto basis, the heads of the
OCC, Mike Brosnan's boss, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and
the New York Federal Reserve Bank, who are the eyes and ears
both for the Treasury and for the Federal Reserve in the financial
markets based largely in New York. The group was created by
Presidential Order after the 1987 market crash. That was the first
time Washington figured out that there was an actual link between
the cash markets and the futures markets and that the various
regulators really needed to talk to each other to figure out how
they could better coordinate things so that there wasn't a total
meltdown of the financial system.
If you look back to when we started using it again, it was at the
beginning of the Clinton Administration, in 1993, and you had a
whole new group of regulators. In many cases, some of these
positions were still unfilled or had holdover people. There was a
lot of uncertainty and legislative pressure to do something about
derivatives. Then-Chairman Gonzales of the House Banking
Committee, and even the ranking Republican, Mr. Leach, who is
now of course the Chairman, were very concerned about
derivatives.
And on the securities side as well, you had
Representative Ed Markey very concerned about the growth in
derivatives and this unregulated marketplace.
Sheila Bair, who was then the Acting Chair of the CFTC, put
out a congressionally mandated report about the derivatives
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market in October of 1993.' In that report, she recommended that
we revive the Working Group. Frank Newman, who was then at
the Treasury under Secretary Bentsen, recommended that we do
this as well.
So we went forward. It is truly a working group, and that is
important to remember. It is not a regulatory body. It doesn't
take any authority away from any of the regulators. That is the
main reason why it works. Each of these regulatory agencies is
quite particular about protecting their prerogatives, and their
markets, maybe at times even slightly favoring their market
participants over others in terms of new developments and how
things should be handled. They did not want and would rebel
against any kind of super-regulator put in place.
The Working Group creates a mechanism for communication
and for coordination. It works on two levels. One, is that the
principals actually meet. We used to have a meeting roughly every
six weeks. In this big board room around a large table you have
the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman Greenspan, Chairman
Levitt, and a couple of different CFTC Chairs over the years, the
Comptroller of the Currency, and it is a pretty significant, weighty
group, and they actually do talk about issues.
We had an agenda. But I will tell you, the meetings are very
private, very limited in attendance, and it is an opportunity for
them to talk about issues that worry them, whether it's settlement
risk or Russia or Mexico or whatever the issues were, not just
derivatives. But derivatives were a primary focus at the end of
1993 going through 1994.
You will recall that the first big challenge came in the 1994
interest rate break, when in the spring of 1994 the Fed raised
interest rates and the market reacted much more dramatically than
anyone expected. A number of highly leveraged situations began
to unravel. The market had been largely betting on stable interest
rates, and suddenly rates were not stable. You had things like the
David Askin/Granite Partners situation. Later that year, you had
Orange County, which, as a major public institution dominated by
Republicans, attracted a lot of interest on Capitol Hill.
1. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, OTC Derivative Markets and
Their Regulation, (Oct. 1993).
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The Working Group and each of the individual regulators
were under enormous pressure from Congress to do something
about derivatives. What the Working Group enabled them to do
was basically to all hold hands and present a united front to
Capitol Hill to prevent what they viewed as unnecessary
legislation.
It sort of climaxed when Senator Alfonz D'Amato, who in
early 1995 was the Chairman of Senate Banking, sponsored
hearings on Orange County and the need for legislation, and each
one of these Chairs was able to sit at the table in front of the
Senate Committee and say "No, we don't need more legislation.
We are using what we have and we are adapting it to changes in
the marketplace." We were able to put out reports, which we have
since updated regularly, showing all of the actions that the various
regulators had taken to give Congress, the public, and others
interested in this area a sense that a lot of things were being done
and that no further legislation was necessary.
That was pretty important because I think there is a general
sense that this market evolves so quickly that legislation is not
always the best alternative. Legislation takes a long time to come
to fruition, and once it is there, you have a lot of confusing words
and phrases, which might be very good for lawsuits but are not
really good for the market participants. And so the more we used
existing legislation and, through examinations or supervision in the
case of the banks, or through regulatory actions that can be more
promptly amended by the SEC and the CFTC, the better off we all
thought the markets were.
That leads us into the current Working Group's legislative
proposal. In your packets you got a summary of Secretary
Summers' testimony on February 10th before the Agriculture
Committee! By the way, if you are really interested in any of this,
you should go to these government agency Web sites, which are
quite good, and print all of this testimony and different reports.
You can download everything and look really smart when you
write your next brief, quoting from one or another.
2.

U.S. Treasury, Treasury News-Treasury Secretary Summers, Senate

Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (Feb. 10, 2000) available at
<http'Jviw.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ps385.htm>.
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This legislative proposal, I would characterize as the first
Washington monument ever proposed to a former CFTC Chair.
That comes about as the result of a very controversial CFTC Chair
who took a number of actions that undid a lot of the cooperative
approach to this marketplace. These actions made the regulators
and the market participants fear legislation less than they feared
the potential for a single person or a single agency to undo years of
hard work.
The derivatives regulation, and the legislation and statutes that
govern, are sort of a mixture of actual statutory language, various
agreements, exemptions that have been given, and sometimes
agreements which have then been codified. It's a bit of a
patchwork kind of system, which has worked by and large. There
has, however, been ambiguity.
The industry has, in the past, asked for legislative clarity. In
particular, there was a case regarding the Treasury Amendment on
foreign exchange transactions, which was referred to in the
question-and-answer period before, which went all the way up to
the Supreme Court,3 and essentially had to do with how one should
interpret various prepositions such as "unless," "in," and "on." It
was kind of remarkable. You would think that the Supreme Court
would have slightly better things to do with their time.
The Treasury Amendment was designed to keep the CFTC
out of the markets for government securities and foreign exchange,
which were deemed to be global markets between very large
sophisticated participants. Nonetheless, they were trying to tackle
an issue of retail fraud, and so they were unwilling to cede their
authority, and there was this big tug of war going back and forth.
Then, in 1998, the then-Chair of the CFTC took two actions
which pretty much electrified the regulatory community, if such a
thing is possible. One was a Comment Letter to the SEC on some
proposal the SEC was considering.' The other was a Concept
3. Solomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966 (1993), cerL denied, 114 S.Ct.
1540 (1994).
4. See Nikki Tait, US Futures Watchdog Says SEC Exceeding Authority,
Fin. Times, February 27, 1998, at 25 (reporting that in a letter to the SEC, the
CFTC stated that the SEC proposal "would attempt to regulate a large number
of OTC derivatives transactions beyond its jurisdiction, many of which are
subject to the exclusive statutory jurisdiction of the CFTC").
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Release which indicated that the CFTC was considering a very
fundamental change, where the CFTC was really going to start
regulating the OTC derivatives market.'
I have never really seen anything like it in my years of
watching Washington. Within the afternoon, there was a joint
press statement signed by Secretary Rubin, Chairman Greenspan,
Chairman Levitt, and I believe the New York Federal Reserve
Bank President William McDonough, as well.6 The statement
basically lambasted the idea, saying that the CFTC was injecting an
enormous amount of legal uncertainty into the market for OTC
derivatives that could have a devastating effect on that market, by
suggesting that they were subject to oversight by the CFTC and,
therefore, that they were potentially illegal because they had been
done off-exchange.
They requested legislation, and promptly got it, which
basically put a moratorium on the CFTC until March of 1999, at
which time there was a new CFTC Chair.7 So I think it was pretty
clear what they were trying to accomplish. They wanted to reign in
what they viewed as a "rogue" regulator trying to change the
whole scheme that had been worked out.
I can say these things. Mike can't because he is a current
regulator. But it was quite extraordinary. You really don't see this
sort of thing happen. And the meetings, I gather, were quite
heated.
Then they were asked by Congress as part of this moratorium
to put out a report saying, "All right, what legislation would you
propose?" In November of 1999, they put out the Working Group
Legislative Proposal.' They testified before the Senate Agriculture
5.

CFTC, Concept Release, Over-the-counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg.

26,114 (May 12,1998).
6. See CFTC Seeks Public Comment as it Reexamines Oversight of OTC
Market, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 721 (May 8, 1998) (discussing the
CFTC Concept Release and the reaction to it from the Treasury, Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission).
Supplemental
7. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Appropriations Act of 1999 § 760(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998) (imposing a "restraint period" to expire March 30,1999).
8.

THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETs, OVER-

38

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE
& FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. V

Committee and the House Agriculture Committee, both of which
have jurisdiction over the Commodity Exchange Act, about two
weeks ago, and summarized the proposals. I am going to go briefly
through those.
Before I do that, I want to just read one paragraph of this
testimony because I actually think it sort of summarizes where the
regulators stand from a policy perspective. It is in Secretary
Summers' testimony. It says:
The [Commodities Exchange Act] is designed primarily to
address issues of fraud, manipulation, and price discovery.
Sophisticated participants can protect themselves against fraud
or can seek legal redress if they are defrauded. There is little
evidence to suggest that markets for financial OTC derivatives
are readily susceptible to manipulation. And, in the case of
derivatives based on securities, existing securities laws would in
any event be applicable to any attempts to manipulate security

prices. In addition, financial OTC derivatives do not yet serve a
primary price discovery function. And the activities of most
OTC derivative dealers are already subject to direct or indirect
federal oversight. 9

So that starts with "what's your question, what problem are you
trying to solve here, and why would you want to propose any kind
of regulation or any kind of legislation over these markets?"
It is pretty clear that the whole point of government
involvement in financial markets is to protect people who cannot
protect themselves and to prevent manipulation which might have
a broader impact on the economy. So if corn prices were
manipulated extraordinarily through the futures market, that
would have a fundamental impact on the American grain
economy. So you have to think back to why the government is
involved and what is the point.
The last point is also very important, and that has particularly
been brought to bear with the developments in the last ten years in
the derivatives markets; that is, you can regulate the participants or

THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE Acr

(1999) available at <http:l/www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/otcact.pdf> (last
visited Apr. 15, 2000).
9. U.S. Treasury, supranote 2.
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supervise the participants much easier and much more effectively
than you can regulate any particular instrument, because these
instruments and these markets are morphing. So, one day it's a
security, the next day it's a bond contract, then it's a swap, and
then it's an insurance product-because insurance is the new
unregulated industry as far as they are concerned. So Washington
has sort of figured out that it is much easier to try to work with
institutions, to think about their role in the economy and to only
do the things you need to do to keep the financial markets working
safely. We don't need to get involved in each and every thing.
Now let me very briefly go through these proposals because I
think they are going to make a lot of sense, given what you learned
from Ruth's presentation.
The main purpose is reducing
uncertainty and confusion.
The first thing is to codify the exclusion from the Commodity
Exchange Act for most swap agreements. That goes back to the
Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, which said that the CFTC
could issue an exemptive order. They did, but the actions in 1998
proved that what they give they can also take away. Nobody was
comfortable with that, so they want to codify that exemption.
Exempted transactions have to be between eligible
counterparties, sophisticated participants, as they were defined.
The only exceptions are for non-financial commodities with a finite
supply, once again getting back to this issue of markets that could
be manipulated or where there are some price discovery issues that
have a broader policy implication.
Although the proposal excludes energy, agriculture, metals,
and those kind of things, I also think politically, that there is likely
to be some attention given to energy before a bill actually makes it
out of Congress. This is because with all of the deregulation going
on in the energy field at the state level and with parties, such as
Enron playing such a large role, I can't believe they are not going
to want to also have some ability to conduct transactions without
CFTC oversight. That is an opinion. But it wouldn't surprise me,
and a couple of people I have talked to suggested that that is a
likely outcome. However, this Working Group didn't feel they
could opine on the energy market, because it is not being their
jurisdiction.
The key thing is equity swaps. In particular, there has been
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some confusion because the CFTC and the SEC both have some
jurisdiction in these markets. Codification will help a lot and will
get rid of this ability of the CFTC to take back the exemptions.
The second thing that is kind of interesting, is an exclusion
from the Commodity Exchange Act for electronic trading systems.
What is interesting is that the report also says "but at a later stage
we may need regulation." What they are basically saying is that
they do not want the CFTC to regulate these markets in particular,
and they want to let a few flowers bloom before they figure out
what is going on with these electronic trading systems. They
specifically said that the existing regulated exchanges in Chicago,
the futures exchanges, can create unregulated electronic trading
systems. So they are really trying to open the doors to what they
believe will be a very growing market.
There are certain requirements for what qualifies, but they did
put an important caveat at the end that maybe in the future there
might be some regulation or statutory authority needed, but not
the CFTC and not now. So that is an interesting perspective.
I think that is also a recognition that these trading systems are
going to develop. They are the easiest things to take offshore and
to operate through your London subsidiary or through an
insurance subsidiary or a company in Bermuda. So there is really
no point in the United States trying to regulate what would then
become an ever-shrinking part of this market.
The third thing is to permit use of regulated clearing systems
as they connect to these electronic systems. They still want those
regulated, and I think they still see an important policy issue
around clearing systems different from trading systems. The
Working Group likes clearing systems, and they generally like
netting. As Ruth was pointing out, netting has the ability to reduce
the risk enormously. Instead of me having to pay you 100 and you
pay me 102, we are looking at a risk of two, and that is a very
different kind of perspective.
So they want to encourage clearing systems. Clearing systems
reduce systemic risk, and they would help these electronic trading
systems by getting rid of credit issues. But clearing systems that
are poorly done can also concentrate risk, so there is a feeling that
they do have to be regulated.
If you look at the report, they are all over the place about who
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should regulate them-the SEC could regulate it; the CFTC could
do it; they could be part of a bank, in which case they would be
regulated maybe by Michael Brosnan (OCC) or someone else. So
they are not saying there should be one regulator, but they are
saying someone needs to oversee the clearing systems. I think that
is also very consistent with international developments, where
regulators in other countries are looking at clearing systems and
looking at global clearing systems. I think they would be unwilling
to accept an unregulated clearing system. So I think that is an
interesting exception.
The fourth thing is to clarify the Treasury Amendment to
absolutely exclude the CFTC from derivatives that relate to
exempted instruments, like government securities or foreign
exchange. You would think the Treasury Amendment would have
done that. It was drafted and put into law in 1974. However,
because the language was not that helpful, they are going to clarify
that and make it very clear that the CFTC has no authority in this
area.
As a sort of consolation to the CFTC, they are going to give
them explicit authority to go after retail fraud in foreign exchange
markets, or I guess in these exempted markets generally. They are
going to define that very clearly to make it obvious that it does not
stem from their broader powers under the CEA, and that it is
really a very specific power provided by this statute.
I do not know if any of you commute to work by car, but if you
do, you hear these advertisements on drive-time radio for "come
make your fortune in the futures exchange." There can be fraud, I
think, in those markets at the retail level, so it is good to have
someone looking out for that. The industry opposed it for a
number of years, saying the state regulators could take care of it,
but the reality is that it is very hard for them to do that.
The last two things the testimony categorized as technical. I
think they are also a little political, so I do want to comment on
them briefly. They have to do with jurisdictional fights.
Hybrid securities, which are ones that the CFTC claims
jurisdiction over and the SEC claims jurisdiction over, can be
exempted. That is clear, and they are going to limit the exclusive
jurisdiction clause of the CEA, so that, basically, it will give other
regulators a fair fight.
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It is quite extraordinary that they propose these things. I
really think it shows you the fact that this Administration and this
Federal Reserve are very pro-industry, and very anti-regulation of
the financial markets. Despite all of the problems, despite LongTerm Capital Management and those other issues, I think they
basically want to stay hands-off. They want to get involved where
there are particular situations, whether it is Bankers Trust, Procter
& Gamble, or Long-Term Capital, but they do not want broad
regulatory schemes that are going to really drive the business
offshore. That is a pretty bold thing for regulators to do, to be
honest, and I think they deserve some credit for taking that kind of
perspective.
I think Congress would be perfectly happy to meddle, to be
honest. They pass laws, that's what they do for a living, and so
telling them that you don't need a law passed is actually a pretty
rough thing to do when you are a regulator, because then if
something goes wrong, you can be held responsible.
Interestingly, I think there is another issue that is related to
derivatives but is of much greater interest to the regulators right
now. Mike is going to talk a lot more about that. That is the issue
of leverage. I think if you read the report on Long-Term Capital,
or if you look at some of the things the BIS is doing, or even recent
statements by Chairman Greenspan in his Humphrey-Hawkins
testimony, or Chairman Levitt, they are all looking at leverage. So
it will be very interesting to see how efforts to reduce the amount
of leverage in the economy play through various regulatory
schemes.
If I were to give you a tip of something to watch for out of
Washington, look for things that relate to leverage and how they
can try to decrease leverage in the market. So far, they are mainly
using their bully pulpit, but they have other tools at their disposal,
and I think it will be quite interesting to see if they start to use
those to deal with what they probably see as the major threat to
smoothly functioning financial markets in the future.
I am going to turn it over to Mike now and his PowerPoint
presentation.
MICHAEL L. BROSNAN:** Thank you, Darcy. She has
**Deputy Comptroller for Risk Evaluation, OCC.
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been away from Washington for a little bit, but she certainly knows
what the real issues are and she is able to give you a little more
detail than I would about some of the politics and the personality
issues.
As Darcy indicated, leverage is the issue. We can look at
LTCM or hedge funds on a micro basis, or you can look at
derivatives. But when you pull back and see what the issue really
is, it really has to do with the amount of debt and how much
leverage is in a marketplace and how some very large firms have
grown up and are very heavily leveraged. If something happens to
one of them, what are the implications in the marketplace?
I am going to walk through some numbers to put some
tangibility to this concept of leverage, and then I will very quickly
give you a Reader'sDigestversion of the two reports that came out
last year.
I have tried to slice and dice this a lot of different ways for the
CEO of my organization and other senior people, and it is tough.
So how do you get people to understand? When you talk about
leverage, it's a multi-syllable word and it sounds fancy and you
know you are supposed to have high respect for it.
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I think the best way to do it is in dollars. We can do it as a
percentage of GDP or year-on-year growth, but people relate to
dollars. Figure 1 represents borrowing by sector. The scale on the
left which is in billions, so we are looking at many trillions of
dollars of debt.
This is not like looking at notionals. As Ruth was saying this
morning, you look at notional amounts from derivatives. Well,
how much risk is that? Well, it depends on the term of the
contract. You know, a three-day FRA is the same as a thirty-year
interest rate swap as far as notionals go.
So here we are looking at real debt. This is what people are
borrowing in the marketplace in order to conduct their operations
go. The big line on the top is household debt. There are some
mixed reactions as to how big and how important that is, because it
includes secured debt in addition to unsecured credit card loans,
unsecured second advances on your homes, things like that. This is
easily the biggest number.
Something I didn't think I would see in my lifetime,
particularly when I was coming out of school and going to work in
a financial environment, is that the Federal Government would
have less debt outstanding than corporate America. Sure enough,
miracles happen, and we have it. It seems like this trend where
one goes down and the other one goes up could keep going.
Figure 2 represents nonfinancial
corporate capital
expenditures and cash flow. Why is corporate debt growing? The
top line for the most recent period is capital expenditures. The
bottom line is cash flow from operations. So as productive and
with as much revenues and success as U.S. corporations are having
in the aggregate, their cash flow from operations is short of what
they need to expend in terms of new plants, technology, and things
like that, to keep up and be productive. It is extremely competitive
broadly across the system, and all this debt and all these
expenditures on new plants and equipment have created a huge
amount of capacity. So there is not much room to raise prices
because everyone has a lot of capacity to produce product and sell.
With this shortfall between cash flow from operations and what
they are spending on plant and equipment companies have to issue
debt. That is why this line is going up, almost on a 45-degree angle.
It is real money; it's not like you're going from $100 to $200-we
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are talking trillions here.

-4--Cash Flow -O-Captal Expenditures

Fig. 2: Nonfinancial CorporateCapitalExpendituresand Cash Flow
Source: Flow of Funds: Accounts of the U.S.

The other thing that is causing corporate America to need to
issue more debt and leverage itself up higher is this very strange
pressure to have the March 31st earnings per share number be a
good number that appeases not just the analysts, but whatever the
so-called "whisper number" group is. This pressure has always
existed, but never to this degree in my short lifetime. One of the
ways you can do that is to sell products and achieve profit margin,
and get net income from that, or you can somehow change the
denominator, which would be the number of shares or your equity
base. So they buy back stock in part, and it's a mix. You are
looking at revenues, expenses, and buying back stock. You need
to issue debt to buy back stock, so leverage goes up.
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Here I just have U.S. numbers, but you know that the United
States is not the only country in the world that is feeling this.
Certainly we have it more than anywhere else, I believe, but it
exists elsewhere around the world.
Figure 3 shows the total amount of security credit in billions of
dollars. This is a smaller number than the actual present amount.
I know the real number was north of $200 billion around the
holidays when it was released, but we don't have the official report
so I can't put it in my graph. So it is only $200-something billion,
which with the numbers we are talking about here doesn't seem
like a lot, but to me $200 billion is a lot.
This is a psychological barometer, I think, where people are
willing to borrow to buy equity. So you are looking at equity as a
leverage play. You borrow to buy equities. Clearly, anyone who
has done this over the last decade, a much smarter person than I,
made a killing just by having a diversified portfolio. They didn't
have to be able to pick Microsoft or Cisco. But someday if the
market tips down, you've got to pay this back, and the cascading
effect that results is out there. So, in a nutshell, this is cash
leverage, things that are real tangible. It's not a notional amount.
It's real debt that is out there.
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Figure 4 shows a number I've got to be very careful in
explaining. This is what Carl was talking about earlier. This is the
$35 trillion of notional amount of derivatives that existed in the
U.S. banking system as of September 30, 1999. That is the thin
line. The thick line is the notional amount for dealer transactions.
That is where Merck comes into Citibank-I'm just making this
up-and they do a transaction where Citibank goes out on the
other side and lays off that transaction to capture the spread. They
lay it off with, let's say, Barclay's.
The bottom line is a really curious number. It represents enduser transactions. I wouldn't have mentioned this, but Ruth
brought it up. I think that the story behind this may be as much or
more risk than the big notional amount of derivatives. You see a
very small amount of all the notional amount of derivatives in the
banking system is actually used for their own positions-that is, to
hedge liabilities, assets, or other off-balance-sheet positions. So it
is just a sliver.
The real concern I have is that only 5 percent of the 9,500
banks in the United States use any derivatives at all. So they will
go ahead and take three-month and six-month deposits, make you
a five-year/seven-year/fifteen-year/thirty-year mortgage loan, but
they are afraid to buy a cap because it is a derivative. And there is
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this fear about derivatives, because if you lose $10 on derivatives, it
has about the same press and internal Board of Directors
implications as losing $100 on loans. So obviously you just scale
that up by thousands or millions. I don't know why it is like that,
and it is not fair, but it is.
You can also have leverage through derivatives. The vast
majority of these transactions are no money down, so you have an
asymmetrical payoff. You can get a good return or you can feel
some loss if currencies or interest rates or the price of oil move,
depending on whatever this contract is based on.
So we are very sensitive to these 45-degree angles, and it is a
growing trend now. Of course, we are in great economic times and
you expect things to move. The fact that derivative notionals move
up is not really all that meaningful in terms of risk, though. It does
not tell me how much risk is out there.
Something I can tell you, for whatever informational benefit it
has to you, is that U.S. banks do not, and certainly the national
banks do not make much money on proprietary trading of this
dealer amount. They have very little of their desks bet on that, and
they are just not willing to make or lose a lot of money.
The biggest value at risk (VAR) of any national bank is about
$100 million. That is their biggest corporate worldwide limit.
What does that mean in real terms, because $100 million again
remains a big number to me? It means about 1 percent of their
capital base. I have never seen a national bank lose that much in
any given day, no matter what happened in 1997 or 1998. If you
were going to take a bet during that time, you were either going to
win big or lose big. So it just does not happen that you lose 1% of
your capital base in a single day. They do mostly dealer-tocustomer transactions, principal-to-principal. So you get leverage
from this.
Let me put a number on this. How big is the risk from
derivatives to U.S. commercial banks? For the top seven banks, it
is anywhere from two-to-three times their capital base, as shown in
Figure 5. This is a big number. That is from credit risk. It is not
from having unhedged positions, which they all have, which are
small. It is from taking credit risk, the principal-to-principal
activity that takes place.
When Citibank does that transaction with Merck and with
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Barclay's, those are two independent transactions and they are
vulnerable to the risk that either party might not make its payment.
That is how Citibank is going to earn its pay, or Chase, or any
other bank that is in the derivatives business.
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Fig. 5: Top 7 Banks % Credit Exposure to Risk-Based Capital
Q2 99 = $363 billion in total credit exposure from all commercial banks
Q3 99 = $387 billion in total credit exposure from all commercial banks
Source: Flow of Funds: Accounts of the U.S.
So this is real money. We calculate the credit risk equivalent
amount at about $350 to 356 billion as of March. This amount has
remained pretty stable. Of course this graph moves around, but it
is on a scale of 250 percent or so, plus or minus ten. So this is a big
number and this is what leverage is all about.
If someone enters into a contract and he expects to be able to
net and the other person expects to be able to net, we think that it
is important that there be legal certainty in the marketplace. In the
United States, you have pretty good legal certainty. All the court
decisions, for the most part, have tended to provide that. But there
was this specter out there, which Darcy spoke so gracefully about,
that can introduce an unwinding of things that seemed to be good.
This can have a big numerical impact. If the worst scenario
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occurred in the Dunn case,"0 for example, it could have trickled out
to these over-the-counter transactions being off-exchange futures.
If the forces of darkness were able to prevail with that type of
ruling and interpretation, then it is possible-not likely, but
possible-that customers of banks would have said, "These are
illegal contracts; I don't have to pay you." None of this money
here has to do with exchange-traded contracts; it is all over-thecounter. That would have been a very bad thing for the banking
system. I certainly would be unemployed had that occurred.
In a nutshell, the President's Working Group Hedge Fund
Report recently came out. We had this little problem where a very
highly leveraged firm, with a very large dollar asset base to boot,
got into some trouble, and it had creditors who were exposed to
that risk. At the end of the day-we never come out and say it's a
unanimous conclusion-but the consensus, if not outright
unanimous conclusion, is that the creditors failed to do their job
there. Do we need to regulate LTCM? No. Do we need to make
sure that banks, broker-dealers, and others who are providing
credit whom we regulate do their job when providing credit? Yes.
Did they do a good job there? In some cases, no. The people who
had a lot of exposure to that highly leveraged firm without
collateral and, in hindsight, without great financial information,
probably will not repeat that mistake in the near term, at least if
the same people are still employed. You need that institutional
knowledge to keep this going, though.
What does the report say? The bottom line of the report is
that it stresses the importance of market discipline. That is what is
going to make this work or not. When we say market discipline, it
is in the form of creditors making the right decisions on who they
are going to do business with, in what size, and on what terms.
How much money is involved? What are the terms? How do they
make that decision? What do they know about their clients?
There is also an emphasis that the customers out there have a
responsibility. Even if they are unregulated and not subject to
SEC disclosure, they certainly have a responsibility to inform their
investors and creditors of their financial situation and plans and
strategies. But I don't blame LTCM. I blame the banks who did
10.

Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 117 S. Ct. 913 (1997).
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transactions with LTCM on terms that, with 20/20 hindsight, were
probably not the best calls. So we also look for creditors to do
better on risk management, particularly in how they measure risk.
When you look at this $35 trillion notional amount, all you have to
do is a series of calculations on how much credit risk there is, to
actually make a prudent decision. That requires you to have
reasonable estimates of what can happen to currencies, interest
rates, commodities, et cetera; and not just based on the last ninety
days. What if history is unkind and the last ninety days don't occur
but yet you have a break? That is where you find out if you have
enough collateral and if you actually had too big of a credit
exposure.
We confess that we need to have more effective, sharper
supervision going forward-not that we don't understand what is
going on. I think this is not nearly as sophisticated or complicated
as certainly the U.S.A. Today would play it out. But this is big, and
it is all over the world, and it happens very quickly. It happens
while I am asleep. What we need to do is to be very sharp in terms
of how we allocate people, and what rules we put on banks. It is
not in the form of laws or statutes or regulations, because they are
inflexible and difficult to change. Instead we must consider what
policy expectations do we have to which we then hold the bank
responsible? So we have to be smart in how we do that.
We also have to be smart in how we change capital rules. The
risk-based capital process provides a great incentive to either skew
business one way or another or out of certain things. So we've got
a great window-and Bill McDonough from the New York Fed is
chairing this process now-to actually raise our standards and do
things a little bit more prospective and proactive.
The bottom line in this report, which bleeds over into the next
one, is that in 1998, the Secretary of the Treasury provided draft
language that Congress could use to enact laws that would enhance
legal certainty for derivatives. So in this Hedge Fund Report, we
take the opportunity to remind Congress that this is a good thing to
enact. And there are actions toward that end, which I will talk
about in a second.
The latest report, which Darcy just covered, is all about
enhancing legal certainty, looking at the definitions of the contracts
that we are talking about, and where we can, broadening them.
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The whole idea is to have certainty regarding close-out netting and
how collateral can be liquidated under difficult times. The LTCM
situation brought some uncertainty, but what would have
happened if they had filed for bankruptcy in the Caymans? Their
main place of business is here in the United States, and we do not
have various languages in place that would codify that you could in
fact do certain things in the United States if you are a U.S. creditor
with U.S. based collateral.
Part of legal certainty involves the electronic-trading systems.
The existing legal scheme or regime has been an impediment to
entities like EBS and Blackbird from not just developing and
improving their transactions, but actually doing them with U.S.
customers, and, certainly in my case, with U.S. banks. In some
cases, this type of technology makes the banks safer, more
efficient, and easier to examine. But the way that we have our
rules structured, they are not sure if they can implement their
systems, at least prior to our unanimous agreement on this report,
because somebody might be able to come out and say "you are
operating an illegal exchange there," and then invalidate all their
contracts. None of the banks want to fall victim to that. So some
of these things-we are looking down the road-can improve the
way that our markets and our banks operate.
Impediments to the over-the-counter derivative clearing
system should be eliminated. It is unclear to me how we would
actually do this, but the banks actually see a significant interest in
doing this, and they will come up with ways. In the past, we have
had MultiNet and other systems proposed. They just have not
gone the full length as we would have hoped, but now that we are
trying to remove these impediments, hopefully we will get there.
Last but not least, I would like to clarify the Treasury
Amendment. Again, how do you minimize vulnerability in a Dunn
case? The bottom line is leverage. And what will happen if a big
firm that is highly leveraged fails? How can it affect the
marketplace? How can we make sure that you in fact have netting
and that you can liquidate collateral so there is a more orderly
process, rather than having to wait around and have your exposure
grow, so the cost would build from that?
Appropriately, the responsibility is, at least at this time,
focused on those who supervise and the creditors who are actually
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making this credit available. I think it is not only the easiest thing
for us to do, because we can go out and do it without creating laws
or regulations. But it is also probably, far and away, the most
effective way to do it, and it makes sense.
And then, what are we using the law for now? While the folks
in charge can use the law to be more draconian and precise in
imposing limits on what you can and cannot do, right now the law
is being used to enhance certainty, which we think is a good thing.
Since these reports have come out, Congressman Baker,
Congressman Markey, and Senator Dorgan-I think Markey and
Dorgan are together on this-have come up with proposals on how
to get better disclosures from so-called highly leveraged
institutions or hedge funds." Congressman Baker has proposed
2
language that would do the same for hedge funds on his side.
The Markey-Dorgan legislation also seeks ways to improve or
enhance the ability of the securities regulators to cover brokerdealers, because they have what I think of as non-regulated
affiliates, or at least affiliates that are less regulated than the
broker-dealers themselves. 3
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has processes
going forward which are very parallel and consistent with what we
are doing in the United States. IOSCO has the same thing. And
then, there is this Group of Seven, where Ted Truman represents
the Treasury and the United States on that panel, trying to
encourage harmony and collective thinking that is hopefully
similar, if not identical, to what we did in the President's Working
Group on these various issues.
I think that is pretty much the best I can do in twenty minutes.

1 See Conrad G. Bahlke, Update on Proposalsto Regudate Financial
Institutions' Derivatives Activities and Hedge Funds, BANKING POLICY REPORT,

May 15,2000, at 1 (discussing Rep. Edward J. Markey and Sen. Byron Dorgan's
introduction of H.R. 3483 and S. 1968, respectively, to enact the Derivatives
Market Reform Act of 1999).
172See id. (discussing Rep. Richard Baker's introduction of H.R. 2924, the
proposed Hedge Fund Disclosure Act).

See i. (reporting that the Markey/Dorgan bill would "Grant the SEC
authority to regulate non-bank derivatives dealers, including the power to
establish capital standards, record keeping and reporting requirements, anti13

fraud, and sales practice rules").
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We will take questions.
QUESTION [PROF. RECHTSCHAFFEN]: Several people in
the audience today are from the Superintendent of Insurance
Office of the State of New York. The area of derivatives and risk
management is an area that they are beginning to focus on. Before
you arrived, I mentioned that Susan Phillips, who you probably
both know, who is a Federal Reserve Governor, said that
regulatory structures in the future are likely to emphasize trading
parameters, stress testing, process, and internal controls.
In light of what happened at Long-Term Capital Management,
it seems that the conclusions seem to be going in the direction that
the counter-parties have a real responsibility. Given the fact that
we have regulators here who are looking to the next level of
regulation that we should be imposing on these over-the-counter
derivatives transactions, at least so far as to encourage best
practices, what advice could you give the regulators who are here?
Where do you see the ability to regulate best practices on a goingforward basis to prevent Long Term Capital's and Barings Bank's
and whatever other exciting things the future might hold?
MS. BRADBURY: I will make one comment, once again
using my fortunate position of not being a current regulator. Then
I will let Mike talk about some of the excellent work the OCC has
done in terms of looking at systems that institutions have in place.
Insurance is the "new frontier," and this is because
fundamentally derivatives are either about making things more
efficient or they are about regulatory arbitrage, and there are
different derivatives for different circumstances. Insurance is
viewed as an area where there is enormous ability to do regulatory
arbitrage right now, because (1) you can go offshore very easily,
(2) you have different state regimes, (3) there is, I think we would
all agree, probably not very sophisticated insurance regulation of
very complex instruments right now, and (4) in particular,
insurance forms give you an ability to do tax avoidance, which is
very popular.
So I think that if you talk to people who are kind of on the
cutting edge of what's new, what's hot, it is all in the insurance
area. How can we create an insurance product which is really a
way to invest in the equities market but avoid taxation, or to do it
offshore? So insurance is really just a very booming area. God
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speed to the insurance regulators, because I think it is going to be
very hard to keep up with some of the developments in this area.
Do you want to talk a little bit about some of the things you
are doing?
MR. BROSNAN: Okay. I will just try to focus back on your
question of what sort of counsel would we give to the insurance
regulators that are here based on our experiences. I have always
understood, and I believe, that the insurance industry not only is
regulated, it's probably highly regulated. I would emphasize
supervision by a risk-type of approach.
The best template that came out early on was the G-30
standards. It was really "motherhood and apple pie," a series of
almost Biblical truisms, of things that people ought to do. Yet, I
assure you, there wasn't a single firm in the world at that time that
did all those things. I am totally unaware of anybody that could do
all the things that they were saying in that report.
But the people who wrote that report took a very high,
honorable approach, and they wrote things like "this is what you
ought to do if you are going to control your risk properly." So they
set a high bar. That is what people ought to meet just to actually do
their job properly and prudently.
The OCC put out a document, which we labeled Banking
Circular 277,14 which is largely similar to the G-30 Report.
Obviously we can implement those things with national banks by
saying "we expect you to do this, this, and this." If they are not
doing it, then we go meet with the CEO or the Board of Directors
and the appropriate things tend to happen-largely before we get
to that point. Certainly once we are there, they do occur.
There are differences in our Banking Circular 277. We do not
believe that this is a suitability issue. We believe that it is an
appropriateness issue.
There are principal-to-principal
transactions here. When the dealer talks to the customer, they are
not calling up and saying, "Boy, I recommend that you do these
twenty-three swaps." There is a negotiation or an understanding
that is going on, where the customer says, "I've got this series of
14.

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CmrC. BC-

277, RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIvATIvEs (1993) available in 1993

WL 640326.
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transactions, I'm buying or selling goods or I'm issuing this debt;
how can I swap it back to get either my best fixed or floating rate?"
So then they present them with alternatives. I think that there is a
difference.
We revolve our credit risk assessment around this
appropriateness issue. First, you want to make sure that you can
get paid back; but also, that you have a marketing and sales force
in-house that is engaged in transactions with the customers, that
make sure that the transaction is appropriate for clients. Why do
you want to do that? You want to do it because, if they do an
inappropriate transaction, the client could get blown up and perish
and not be able to pay you back, which is not good for anybody.
And then, on the other hand, you might do an inappropriate
transaction with a client and they find out about it later on when
they tend to owe money. It's almost always the case that they find
out about it when they owe money. When they are owed money, it
just doesn't come up. But when that happens, then the bank ends
up in the right-hand column of The Wall Street Journal and there
are shareholder problems and other matters that go on, which
often have career implications there.
Let me see what else. We also issued, on the heels of LTCM,
upgraded guidance in the beginning of 1999, basically all tailored
to where we had three or more banks that had a problem in a
certain area. We wrote "here was what the problem was and here
is what the reaction was in-house, usually at the senior
management or board of directors level, and here is how you can
prevent this from happening again." And then, we put steps in for
examiners to go look for these problems, so that banks would take
appropriate steps.
Now, we are talking about a very confined pool of banks that
do business with hedge funds and also do derivatives dealing, so it
is easy for us to skew our resources there. My guess is that it is the
same thing for the insurance regulators; just carve out sharp rules,
set a high bar that your guys can use at a select group of firms,
whether it's AIG or whoever, that is going to do this business.
The other thing I would comment on is risk-based capital. I
have learned-I am not an attorney and I am not unhappy about
that, but sometimes I wish I was- that we write these rules, as we
did this in the mid-1980s, made them effective in 1988, and now we
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are trying to fix them in the year 2000, not fix them, but you have
got to upgrade constantly. It is a very difficult process to go

through.
One of the things is if you still have a fresh pen and can do this
going forward, when you do risk-based capital, you realize that this
market moves, and it moves fast. Under our Rules, when we
compute a capital charge for a credit risk, we look at how much
current net exposure exists there after you take into effect
netting-you know, you've got to start there-and then what's the
possible risk down the road. The add-ons that we use, pretty much
stop at five years, so we don't have any discrimination between a
five-year, a one-day, and a thirty-year contract, which didn't exist
when we were first writing these rules.
We also do not discriminate based on quality of counterparty,
so you can have a AA or AAA counterparty and they are charged
the same capital charge as somebody who is a B quality
counterparty, so that is not the best thing we could do.
So I would say two things. Tier your capital charges or reward
business with better counterparties and then you hold higher
capital for less credit worthy counterparties. And then, charge
more capital for the longer dated transactions. You are going to
find that that is where your credit risk is and that is where they are
going to have a harder time hedging on the dealer side.
Also, collateral-while I don't see a lot of it in the banking
system, it is growing, so it is going from a very small amount to
something that is important. You want to give some incentive for
institutions to take collateral. The people who owe money don't
want to post collateral because it is expensive, but if you are a
regulator, you like collateral and you like cash and you like T-bills.
It's great to get Kingdom of Spain bonds, things like that, but your
T-bills or Treasury notes are a beautiful thing to have, particularly
when trouble comes.
We also did something that we have had for a few years, this
market-risk-based capital, which we base on a value at risk
calculation. We have our own answer to what time horizon and
basically how many standard deviations you use. That has been
somewhat successful, but I assure you that you better have
something in addition to that, because the value at risk calculation
is usually pretty good as long as whatever happens tomorrow or
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the next day isn't that far out of whack with whatever happened in
that historical period that you are using as the basis for your
calculation and the source of volatilities and correlations.
So I would say that I think that it makes sense to use
something like that because you reduce risk to common
denominators, which anyone can understand, and you demystify it
on that basis. However, it makes sense to have, not only that, but
other parameters out there. We watch banks, how they manage
their risk. They still use a variety of other methods, including in
some cases when they are in less liquid transactions they use
maturity limits-"we won't have more than X amount over this
amount"-and they will use old-fashioned things, fuddy-duddy
things, like notional amounts. That is because these statistical
calculations work the vast majority of times-and they are very
helpful for all the reasons that these textbooks are written for-but
in a time of crunch you want to have other things that are there to
kind of circle the amount of risk that is out there.
That is probably not enough advice, but probably more than
you were hoping for.
QUESTION: Michael, are your risk-based capital standards
established by law or are they established by regulation, and can
you convince the banks if you have a concern that they should have
more than risk-based capital? Can you make them carry more
capital?
MR. BROSNAN: In the United States we do it by regulation.
The Basel Accord comes out, the Basel Accord is there, and we
actually create regulations to implement these things here in the
United States. Therefore, when we go to change them, we go
through the whole process: propose a change, get comments in,
perhaps modify the original proposal, and finally implement final
regulations. We usually do not just come out and dictatorially
change things because we are not so arrogant as to think that we
can think of something and it will be right before getting
thoughtful comments from a variety of parties. You would be
surprised how many parties are for the industry and against it, so
we get a pretty good balance.
So we do it by regulation. If we think a bank does not have
enough capital, can we require more? And do we do that? Yes. It
is just easier, because a lot of times you think they do not have
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enough capital because you just have a bad feeling about it. You
see a lower concentration. Suppose you are in 1996 and you saw
somebody with a lot of Southeast Asian currency transactions that
are not wholly hedged-you know, if you had the foresight to say,
"What if there is a break there; then these guys could be out of
water if they are expecting any of that hard currency back to the
bank." So we can ask for more capital, and we do do that on
occasion.
Sometimes we have to use formal agreements to get it, but for
the most part if we do go to a Board of Directors and say, "We
have concerns about this, this, and this; you only have 10 percent
capital now; we think you ought to have 12 or 13 percent," we can
get that.
The challenge that I find, though, is when sometimes there is a
financial person on the Board who says, "Well, how do you get that
extra 300 basis points?" Then it is tough to say, "Here are my
calculations." It is more just a sense that you have-"You really
need 30 percent more than your peer group," and so on.
I think you need to have both of those. You always want to
leave room in whatever codified level you have to add on more. In
that way you can reward your better-managed institutions by not
charging them more, at least officially. And then if you've got the
outliers, you can charge them more.
QUESTION: In the financially modernized world, you are
increasingly going to be bumping the federal regulatory structure
against the state insurance regulatory structure. Under the state
regulatory structure, the insurance regulatory structure, you tend
to have more product regulation; you also have different
accounting rules. You have these different sort of philosophies
coming up against each other.
I guess my question is, where do you see the role of the state
regulator in formulating policy towards the way risk management
evolves and derivatives are regulated specifically?
MR. BROSNAN: That is a tough question. I'm hoping that
you don't work for The Wall Street Journal.
While I work for the OCC-and I am very proud of the
approach we take, and I buy into and believe in it, and in fact I am
a party to actually writing how we do this stuff, so I am not totally
objective on this-I think that nobody could say with complete
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certainty that our way is the best way and everyone should do it
that way.
Professor Felsenfeld, in his opening comments, was talking
about what I think of as the "joint forum"-I forget what he called
it. But for years we have had working groups going out
internationally, to determine how we can oversee these what I will
call conglomerates. But really, you are talking about entities that
are domiciled and doing the business of banking or securities or
insurance all across the world, and how do you deal with folks in
Singapore where, until recently, it was difficult to get in there and
see what the firm had? We have had discussions on how to best do
that internationally.
Tomorrow you will have Christine Cumming here. My
observation is that she is probably the most knowledgeable person
in the world on how that process has gone because she went
through that for many years. It would be a good thing to ask her
how that went. But this is also happening domestically because,
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 5 ("GLBA"), this is what we
are going to have. We are not going to have just a bank or just a
securities house. It is going to happen one way or another. But
now the law in fact tells us "don't meddle."
Historically, as an OCC employee, the law not only will let me
do it, but also made me responsible for examining and
understanding anything that was affiliated through a national bank.
I will give you an example: before Chase was eaten by Chemical, if

Chase had a Laundromat, for example-and they couldn't, but if
they did-then I could go over and examine that laundromat,
whatever that means. But now under GLBA, the way it is going to
work is that the insurance industry regulates the insurance side, the
securities folks regulate the broker-dealer side, and the other
people just have to rely on reports.
But what I think is going to happen through these joint forums
and the discussions that go on is that we will-not steal from one
another-we will borrow from one another rather liberally the
things that work well. Hopefully, we will drop things that are less
efficient and less effective, because not only is there a shortage of
resources on the regulatory side, notwithstanding what any
15.

Public Law 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
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bankers in here would say, at the end of the day, this business is
getting to be so big and the transactions themselves are so large.
With the number of customers that exist and the number of things
that can go right as well as go wrong, it is a totally different scene
than what it was in, let's say, 1992. In less than ten years, this
whole thing has moved very fast. So we need to get sharper and
better.
MS. BRADBURY: Also, I would add that you have to think
about what your role is as an insurance regulator. What are you
trying to stop? You know, the CFTC, the SEC, they are very
focused on fraud; that is one of their big things. I think the Federal
Reserve is much more focused on the smooth functioning of the
financial markets. And so they focus their regulation or their
supervision on the issues that are of critical importance.
I think the insurance regulators have a real challenge because
of the fifty-state thing, to say nothing of offshore insurers that can
operate here. So you would be wise to pick what you are trying to
accomplish and focus on that and not say you are in charge of all
those other things, whether the joint forum may give you an ability
to do that.
I thought the Citigroup merger was quite striking. I don't
think that Sandy Weill wanted to keep the insurance piece just
because he wants to sell insurance policies retail. I think he
wanted it because of the connection with this brokerage business,
of the connection with all the financial products. You know, there
are a lot of things that insurance companies are allowed to do that
other financial entities are not, so there is also going to be
regulatory arbitrage, and that says you have to step back and look
at some bigger issues in these conglomerate firms.
That is almost going to require a two-tier approach for an
insurance regulator to tackle, not unlike-you know, in Mike's
organization there are people who go out and examine lots of little
banks. They are looking at totally different issues than the people
who go out and examine the big global banks, and they have to
tailor what they are doing appropriately. But you've got to pick
and choose what you are going to accomplish.
COMMENT: I think the regulatory arbitrage project is going
to be a big one in determining who is looking at which of the
perspectives, with the various regulators, with all the acronyms,
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that have some state implications on these joint committees.
MS. BRADBURY: I think certain state regulators can also be
lead regulators, because if you have an entity that works across the
country, you are going to have to work out some agreements just
for your own sanity. So you are not only torturing them but also
being ineffective, and you will have to decide who is the lead
regulator for a particular company, or maybe for particular
activities.
There is no doubt that New York has taken the lead in certain
areas in securities fraud, for example, that have helped in other
states, and maybe you will see that develop in the insurance
industry as well.
QUESTIONER: Actually what I wanted to say was that now
that both of the industries are going to cross over into each other's
business-and certainly a big issue in implementing GrammLeach-Bliley is going to be the definition of insurance issue, and if
you have a bank doing something and an insurance company doing
the same or a similar thing which could be considered insurance,
the state structure over the bank on the insurance side will become
a big issue that needs to be worked out among the regulators.
PROF. RECHTSCHAFFEN: We have one more question and
then we will adjourn to lunch.
QUESTION: Can I ask Michael to go back and look at the
chart, the very interesting one, derivatives notionals by type of
users, where the end-user amount is flat but the dealer amount
keeps increasing? Two questions.
One, do you include derivatives used by insurance companies
and hedge funds in the end-user column or the dealer column?
The second question is, regardless of how you define end-user,
if you see that the end-user amount is staying flat but the dealer
amount keeps increasing, what does that mean, because who is
laying off the risk? Can I not make an argument that by using
derivatives a dealer is not diversifying risk, but really is
concentrating risk within the same pool of its fellow dealers? I find
that chart fascinating and interesting.
MR. BROSNAN: I have used this chart for many years. First,
this notional amount and this data solely applies to U.S. banks. It
is only what U.S. banks had on September 30th. So I don't go out
and get insurance companies and put them in there.
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Now, the U.S. banks may well do transactions with insurance
companies, and I assure you that AIG and others are major
counterparties and the hedge fund community is a huge client of
several of the large dealer banks. So those transactions are in
there, but they are always at the origin of how the U.S. bank has
gone out and done those.
This number goes up because the activity is increasing in
general as the world grows. As you see all this debt growing,
people issue debt and they say, "What is the sweetest spot in the
market, floating or fixed?" But that may well not be what they
want for their firm, so they issue fixed and they will convert it back
into floating. And so, as the world grows, you are going to see this
number grow. So activity is up, and it is up because you have
growth in the world in general.
The other thing that is happening, and as I was talking about
in my suggestions on being careful with risk-based capital if you
don't already have it, is that the tenors are growing out. So you do
have a lot of short-term transactions that just tend to roll over.
Anything under ninety days just rolls on and rolls off, so it tends to
be self-feeding. So for a $100 trade, it insures it for another $100,
that sort of thing. But with the tenors going out as they are, the
longer-term deals stay there, and then all the new ones are just
added on top of that. But also, the bank takes a long position and
they offset it with a short position, so you are doubling up. So
every time you do a $500 million trade, this thing goes up $1
billion. If it is for five years, this stays on that chart for a long time,
and then all the new ones get added on too.
The issue about the end-user positions being flat, that bothers
me, you bet. My number one concern is that only five percent of
banks are using derivatives, so we do not have a lot of banks that
use all the tools available to hedge. We do not encourage people
to use derivatives. It is just curious to me, though, that you are
willing to take such a pronounced interest risk back that you only
have the cash markets available to you and you don't buy caps or
floors. When rates go up, and should they stay up, you can only
hide behind GAAP accounting for so long. You can just look at
the thrift industry in the 1980s to see what happened there. So it
concerns me that there are so few institutions using derivatives.
The end-user line being flat, I think that speaks to that: (1) not
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many banks use them, and, (2) they are hedging the short term and
rolling it over. The prospect of FASB 13316 coming out does not
bode well for either of those two concerns that I have: (1) longterm hedging, and (2) getting more firms to better manage their
risk through all tools available, including caps and floors.

16.

ACCOUNTING

FOR

DERIVATIVE

INSTRUMENTS

AND

HEDGING

AcrIvrTIEs, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (Financial
Accounting Standards Bd. 1998) [hereinafter FASB 133].
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DERIVATIVE LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RiESOLUTION

PROF. FELSENFELD: The next, and the longest, portion of
our program has to do with derivatives litigation. I am very proud
to introduce the next speaker, who will manage this afternoon's
program. He is one of the acknowledged stars of the field of
derivatives, helped create it in the 1970s, and now stands at its
head.
Denis Forster, a New York lawyer, has been involved in some
of the major derivative lawsuits. He served as lead counsel to the
Kingdom of Belgium Ministry of Finance in its dispute with Merrill
Lynch and advised Procter & Gamble in its highly publicized
litigation with Bankers Trust.
He participated in the drafting and development of the 1987
and 1992 ISDA Master Agreements, and coordinated the
amendment in 1994 of the New York Statute of Frauds making
oral derivative trades enforceable. He established a practice in
New York in which he largely consults and advises derivative endusers in resolving their disputes with dealers.
Denis, we are very happy to have you here and I turn the
afternoon session over to you.
DENIS M. FORSTER:* Thank you very much, Carl. As you
can see from your program, after my comments we are going to
have the benefit of three different panels. We are very fortunate
to have leading attorneys from the top firms here in New York
who worked on recent derivative litigation cases, and they will be
able to share with all of us their insights.
Just to keep them honest, we have Carolyn Jackson, who spent
a number of years in the industry-in fact, I have known Carolyn
for about twelve to thirteen years. After rising to the heights of
being Executive Director of the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, Carolyn got religion and is now going to
law school, as you may know. The real good news for Carolyn is
that she has already landed a job with the prestigious firm of Allen
& Overy over in London, so she is going to carry on her career.
And then, what is really going to be unique about this program
*

Partner, Law Offices of Denis M. Forster.
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is that we are going to have the benefit of hearing from the people
who really count, the judges-Justice Ramos and Judge
Hellerstein.
After my remarks, Martin Bienenstock and his panel will
discuss unique issues of OTC derivative disputes. Then John Lovi
and his panel will delve into litigation surrounding the sale of
derivatives to funds.
Finally the judges will share their
perspectives.
I appreciate that there may be some here who do not have a
whole lot of familiarity with derivatives, and it might be helpful if I
start by identifying what part of the derivative world we will be
speaking about this afternoon.
I guess, if you are going to divide up the universe, one way of
doing it is to look at those instruments that are exchange-traded
compared to those that are traded over-the-counter. Examples of
exchange traded instruments are futures and options. In the
United States, that is principally in Chicago. These are basically
standardized contracts with margin requirements, a clearinghouse,
and thus a lot less credit risk-almost no credit risk.
In sharp contrast with that, we have the over-the-counter
("OTC") derivatives. These would be swaps and options on a
variety of different things, such as interest rates, currencies,
commodities, equities, and now credit derivatives and others.
These products are individually tailored and very, very innovative.
There is no clearinghouse and often no security. They have the
potential for a lot of risk, and therefore a lot of loss. Their trade
association is the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
that I just mentioned with respect to Carolyn.
We will be talking about OTC derivatives. In that context, the
world can be divided with respect to participants into two different
groups. On the one hand, we have those top-tier banks around the
world, both commercial and investment banks, with a few affiliates
of top-tier insurance companies, who have created a market in
these products. We call them, as you may well know, in industry
parlance "dealers." They sell products to those who can use them
for purposes of risk and asset management. This might be
corporations or it could be other banks, regional and community
banks, pension funds, perhaps a whole host of other types of
entities, including now individuals. We call them "end-users." So
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just to keep it clear, I will try to use that terminology throughout.
By the way, as Carl in his generous comments at the outset
mentioned, and I should mention to you up-front so that you can
properly discount whatever I have to say because of my biases, I do
exclusively represent end-users. I appreciate that there may be
some out there in the dealer community that basically equate any
lawyer who represents an end-user as equivalent to the lawyer who
might represent a child molester-or maybe even worse, the child
molester himself. I appreciate that, because a lot of times these
issues are real hot-button types. It's the one thing that I have seen
people, particularly on the dealer side, actually get quite emotional
about. We are going to try to keep it real dispassionate here, of
course.
I should mention in this regard two things. I am not going to
try to say that even end-users deserve legal representation, because
I am sure you all would agree with that. But what I want to say is
that there are indeed end-users out there who, with their eyes wide
open, go out and bet on black and it comes up red; then they go
groping around trying to find a legal excuse to wiggle off the hook,
a legal loophole. Since this is what I do exclusively, I do get calls
from those types of end-users, and they are usually not those that
have been in the market for a long time. I think that I know the
right questions to ask and I am pretty well able to screen them out
quickly. I decline much more business than I accept. Believe it or
not, there are some end-users out there that have a meritorious
case, and that is what I want to talk about today.
But also, as a second point, I want to mention that it is difficult
in many respects to represent the end-user. In a sense, the deck is
stacked against you. I have been trying to remember that
expression that John McCain has been using-and over-usingwhich has to do with "Star Wars" and he is battling against all
these "known evils." Anyway, it is some figure from "Star Wars."
I am not going to suggest to you that representing the end-user
is that difficult, but there are a lot of forces that you have to reckon
with. The main one is that we are a Johnny-come-lately. When as
a lawyer you get involved in a dispute, the die has already been
cast, in a sense. The deal has been done, the documentation has
been done, the end-user has signed on the dotted line, and the
documentation may be very disadvantageous, and there may be a
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number of other things that are going against you. I will talk later
about how one could help balance the playing field, an opportunity
that counsel for the end-user does have to balance the playing
field. But starting off, it is definitely tilting against you.
In terms of putting some kind of perspective on this thing, we
have the end-users and the dealers, and I am very, very happy to
say that, in general, they live in harmony. When you look at it, it is
only a small fraction of one percent of the deals that end up being
disputed. Usually, however, the amounts are so enormous, the
losses so huge, that it overshadows the positive contribution being
made by dealers with these instruments. But it is a reality that in
fact it is a very, very small fraction. It is that fraction of deals that
go awry that have given the industry some pretty tough times.
What I would like to do is talk about a couple of cases that
were high profile, and try to put them into some kind of
perspective. What impact have they had on the industry and the
industry's way of thinking? Then I would like to go through a
number of causes of action, or theories of recovery, that end-users'
counsel should have on their checklist.
Perhaps counsel
representing the dealers will want to have on their checklist in
terms of structuring deals properly and documenting them
properly at the outset. Finally, I would like to talk about some
strategic considerations that end-users' counsel should use.
Now, the date was September 12, 1994. That was a date that
an event occurred that rocked the OTC derivative markets, and
things have really never been the same since. On that day, a
lawyer named Cliff Craig, of the Cincinnati law firm of Taft,
Stettinius & Hollister, walked into Federal Court in Cincinnati and
filed a complaint against Bankers Trust on behalf of his client,
Gibson Greeting Cards.!
I remember the date quite well and the immediate aftermath.
The reaction of the industry was furious. The basic thought was,
"How can they do this? How can people who enter into a trade
seek to unwind it by getting lawyers involved using legal
loopholes?" Gibson Greetings was asking to basically void a
1. In re BT Securities Corp., Securities Act Release No. 33-7124, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-35136 (Dec. 22, 1994) (concerning a "Treasury-Linked
Swap" between Gibson Greetings and BT Securities Corporation).
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number of trades with a marked-to-market value of $23 million.
Then the all-important facts started to seep out. The SEC got
involved, they investigated, and they got hold of some tapes. The
pattern and the facts that emerged were that Bankers Trust had
gone in and entered into a series of increasingly sophisticated,
increasingly complex, increasingly risky transactions with Gibson
Greetings, culminating in a LIBOR-squared swap. Nobody had
ever heard of a LIBOR-squared swap before.
When you looked at it, really what had happened was that
Gibson Greetings, a gift-wrap and greeting cards maker, in
Cincinnati, Ohio, had written an option in favor of Bankers Trust
to pay Bankers Trust LIBOR-squared times the notional principal
amount if LIBOR breached a certain barrier. Again, I have never
heard anybody who could economically justify such a trade, except
perhaps to earn premium income for Bankers Trust.
And then there were the tapes. It became quite clear from the
tapes that Bankers Trust had identified a pigeon at Gibson
Greetings and were feeding him some erroneous information with
regard to value.
The reaction of the industry was, "Well, maybe in this
particular instance one of our own crossed the line. Maybe
Bankers Trust shouldn't have sold a LIBOR-squared swap to this
greeting cards maker in Ohio." That was on September 12th.
Meanwhile, back in Cincinnati, cross-town swap loser Procter
& Gamble finds that it is sitting on top of trades which amount to
$200 million marked-to-market engaged in with the same crowd
from Bankers Trust. As you might imagine, the Cincinnati
Inquirerand all other papers had headlines about what happened
to Gibson Greetings, so Procter & Gamble filed its suit in Federal
Court in Cincinnati, Ohio.2
Gibson Greetings alleged a number of counts, including
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and Procter & Gamble did
essentially the same thing. Later they also alleged a RICO count.
There were some sixteen different counts that Procter & Gamble
alleged in that particular case.
The case eventually settled about eighteen months later, in
2.

Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.

Ohio 1996).
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May of 1996, and simultaneously two things happened. First,
Judge Feikens issued an order and a reasoned decision dealing
with a whole host of counts raised by Procter & Gamble. But,
before that order had been delivered by Federal Express to the
parties, the parties settled the case, and they settled the case in a
manner very favorable to Procter & Gamble. Basically, the $200
million liability, more or less, to Bankers Trust was reduced to $35
million and there were some adjustments made on swaps. In other
words, a very, very positive settlement for Procter & Gamble.
What was important there was that Judge Feikens went
through and he slammed the door shut on about thirteen different
counts that Procter & Gamble was trying to get to the jury. But he
left one door open, and all you need is one door. That door was
the concept that if one party has superior knowledge not readily
available to the other party and the first party knows that the
second party is acting on a mistaken belief, then that first partyread that Bankers Trust-has a duty to disclose material facts, and
a failure to do so with intent and the other elements necessary for
fraud, constitute a fraudulent omission. I wrote an article which
goes through the decision by Judge Feikens and focuses on a
number of the different things that he said that may be of some
interest to you at some point in time.3
Now, what was different about these two cases? Why did I say
that this rocked the OTC derivatives world? Well, before this
happened, most of the cases involving OTC derivatives involved an
insolvency. In fact, people that talked about derivative litigation
didn't have too much to talk about; you could get it done in about
a half-hour.
There were two cases involving California thrifts, there were a
couple of cases involving Drexel, and then there was the
Hammersmith and Fulham case in England that I will talk about
shortly. However, in each of those cases the common denominator
was that you were dealing with an insolvency, or if the trades were
upheld, you would have had an insolvency.
People at that point in time looked at the two major risks in
3. DENIS M. FORSTER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDINGS IN PROCTER &
GAMBLE V. BANKERS TRUST (2000) (on file with the Fordham Journal of

Corporate& FinancialLaw).
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derivatives. First, let's say we enter into a trade and the market
moves against us. The market is either going to move for us or
against us, and the market moves against us. Well, we call that
market risk.
But what if the market moves in our favor? That is the good
news. But what's the bad news? The bad news is our counterparty doesn't pay us. So we had counter-party risk. Prior to 1994,
most people in this business equated counter-party risk with credit
risk, credit risk being the financial inability of your counter-party
to perform, because it is insolvent for instance, or near insolvent.
That makes sense. That is credit risk.
But people really didn't focus on this other thing, called legal
risk. When Gibson Greetings and Procter & Gamble filed, what
they were saying is, "We've got the financial ability to pay, but we
are mad as hell and we've got a legal reason not to pay, so we are
not going to pay." And there is the difference. Now people
started to say, "Hey, you know, there is this thing out there called
legal risk. We really never focused on it, but maybe we should
start focusing on it."
Now there is so much derivative litigation out there that
Andrews even has a Derivative Litigation Reporter." You know
that your field has arrived when Andrews trots out a Litigation
Reporter. So there is a lot of litigation. We have people here
appearing on the panel dealing with these issues, but some years
ago people really didn't focus on these points.
I would like to take a brief trip through the different causes of
action that have been used, alleged, and talk about the legal risks
associated with those. I think they ought to be on a checklist for
end-users' counsel, and even for counsel representing the dealers.
The first, in terms of a logical sequence, would be to deal with
capacity, because after all, what we are usually talking about here
is trying to enforce a contract. In basic Contracts 101, we learned
4. In 1970, Andrews Publications created the first Litigation Reporter and
revolutionized the delivery of timely and accurate litigation information.
Currently, Andrews publishes over 50 Reporters covering key legal niches,

including the Andrews Derivatives Litigation Reporter. The Derivatives
Litigation Reporter, published in 24 issues per year, provides summaries of overthe-counter derivative controversies in cutting-edge cases. See generally
<http-/lwww.andrewspub.com>.
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in the first day that the party with whom we are contracting has to
have the capacity to contract. For instance, a minor does not have
the capacity to contract except for necessities.
We know that, in the United States at least, when we are
talking about corporations, the idea that they can turn around and
claim lack of capacity has pretty much gone by the wayside. In
fact, under Delaware General Corporation Law, there is a specific
provision that says that a corporation cannot use lack of capacity as
a defense except in certain very limited circumstances not relevant
here.
So if you are dealing with a U.S. corporation, you generally do
not have to worry about this one. But there are others you do have
to worry about-particularly, municipalities, pension funds, and
regulated industries. Also if you are dealing with an offshore
entity you may have to worry, because what applies here in the
good old U.S.A. may not apply offshore.
Perhaps the most famous case here was Hazell v.
Hammersmith and Fulham,5 a borough in London. There, from
1983-1989, the borough went out and dealt with some eighty
different commercial banks and put on literally hundreds of trades
all betting that Sterling short-term interest rates would remain low.
They were right until 1989, when Sterling short-term rates spiked.
When they spiked, the borough's auditor took a look and said,
"You know, I'm not so sure that these contracts are enforceable
because I'm not sure we have capacity here." Of course, they had
been accepting the money for some six years.
The long and the short of it is that the case went to the House
of Lords and, in a unanimous decision (5-0) in 1991, the House of
Lords looked at the authorizing statute, which dated back to 1845,
was amended in 1972, and said, "You know, we can't find anything
in here that says that this borough can do swaps and furthermore,
these were not incidental to their borrowing powers; therefore,
commercial banks, these contracts amounting to over $500 million
are void." That got a lot of people's attention. So we had the
capacity issue there. The first thing to do is to check capacity.
Also, the same issue of ultra vires was raised in the Orange
5. Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, 2 All Cas.
1 (1991) (on appeal from Q.B.).
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County case with regard to the reverse repurchase agreements.
Arguably these agreements exceeded the restrictions imposed by
the California Business Code. If so, they would have been
rendered them void.
Then there is the related but distinct issue of authority. In
addition to ultra vires and capacity, we have the issue of authority.
The issue is that the entity has the capacity, but does the particular
individual signing have the authority. In the United States and
other common law jurisdictions, what usually bails us out here as a
failsafe is the doctrine of apparent and ostensible authority. We
have had a lot of rogue traders around the world, such as Nick
Leeson6 and the like. But until recently, I hadn't heard of a bank
or a counterparty or anybody turning around and saying, "You
know, the doctrine of apparent authority doesn't work because you
knew our guy didn't have the authority"-until recently, in the
Sumitomo Copper cases! That is now being alleged by Sumitomo
Copper.
In other words, the idea here is-and this is important in this
business, which is basically done by telephone-that if the
company arms an individual with a telephone and puts him in a
position of ostensible authority, then that entity is going to be
bound regardless of the fact that maybe he or she does not in fact
have authority.
Where this can come up overseas, when you move away from
the common law jurisdictions to civil law jurisdictions, is you have
to fall back on express authority. There can be some pretty bizarre
things out there. In some countries, a person is authorized only if
their name appears on the registry, and the registry may only be
open between 10:00 and 2:00 on Tuesdays, and it is very difficult to
know whether or not you are in fact dealing with someone who is
authorized. I guess, in a couple of instances, counterparties have
6. Nick Leeson is a former derivatives trader with Barings Bank, Britain's
oldest financial institution, who caused its collapse by making certain trades that
exposed Barings to excessive risk. See Richard NV. Stevenson, The Collapse of

Barings: The Overview, Young Traders' $ 29 Billion Bet Brings Down a
Venerable Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at Al. See generally BANK OF
ENGLAND, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING SUPERVISION INQUIRY INTO
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS

PP 1.33-1.70 (1995).

7. In re Sumitomo CopperLitigation,74 F. Supp. 2d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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raised that as a defense. It seems like arguably a low blow, but
there it is, and it is something that people have to be alert to if they
are dealing offshore.
The next issue I would want to bring to your attention is the
Statute of Frauds. Again, we are going back to Contracts 101.
Hopefully, nobody skipped Contracts 101, because there is a lot in
it. You may recall that at the time of Charles II, in order to avoid a
variety of different frauds that were then being perpetrated in
England after the so-called civil war over there, they passed the
Statute of Frauds.
One of the provisions was that an oral contract which by its
terms cannot be performed within one year-sort of archaic
language, which we picked up and have in our statutes today-is
void. So you take a look at a trade, let's say, a swap that goes out
thirteen months that is done orally over the telephone. Do you
have a deal? Well, not unless you have done something about the
Statute of Frauds.
And again, what makes this so important for historical reasons
and for practical reasons in this business is basically "trade now,
document later." The vast majority of these trades are done orally
over the telephone with the expectation, at least by the dealer, that
it's a done deal when they hang up the telephone. Now, in 1994,
New York changed the Statute of Frauds with regard to the oneyear rule.8
Also, I forgot to mention that we have had two cases here in
New York, Intershoe v. Bankers Trust9 and also In re Koreag
8.

In 1994, the NY Legislature added a new subdivision (b) to General

Obligations Law 5-701. This subdivision provides that a qualified financial
contract, defined in subsection (b)(2), would not be subject to requirements that
a writing (as defined in the statute) be present, so long as there was sufficient
evidence of a contract or if the parties agreed by a written contract (before or
after the contract in issues) to be bound by telephonic or electronic messages or
other means of agreement. Generally, the 1994 amendment sought to release
large broker-dealers from the NY Statute of Frauds writing requirement when
they conduct certain types of transactions with qualified institutional investors.
See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 5-701(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
9. 77 N.Y.2d 517 (1991).
10. Koreag Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Associates, Inc. (In re
Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.), 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992) cert. denied, 506
U.S. 865 (1992).
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where courts here in New York took the view, supported by the
official commentary in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
that foreign exchange and foreign currency are goods; therefore, a
sale of a foreign exchange contract is a sale of goods subject to
Article 2. If you follow that and take it just one step further, that
means that any foreign exchange contract for over $500-meaning
99.9 percent of them all-is subject to the Statute of Frauds. In
1994, New York changed that, as well."
But what I think people need to be alert to is that although
New York has changed the application of Article 2, other states
have not. Therefore if, for instance, you have General Re or AIG
up in Connecticut dealing with someone in Texas, or even
someone here in New York dealing with someone in Texas, what is
the applicable law?
There may be a Master Agreement in place-and this sort of
gets intricate-and there are provisions of Master Agreements that
say all agreements have to be in writing. If you follow that, you
sort of block the protection of the Statute of Frauds. In any event,
it is something that I think people need to be alert to.
Moving on, another count frequently raised in these cases is
misrepresentation. This is a fact-intensive inquiry. Basically it is
whether or not the facts of the particular case match up with the
elements for misrepresentation under New York law.
And then, there is the one that has drawn an awful lot of
attention, as I alluded to earlier, which is fraudulent omission, also
known as fraudulent concealment. Here, Judge Feikens in the
Procter & Gamble case, as a Michigan judge sitting by designation
in Ohio in a case in diversity, but applying New York law, looked
at New York law, and said that under New York law there is a duty
to disclose if any of those three conditions that I earlier mentioned
occurred. That is to say that if Bankers Trust had superior
knowledge as to material information not readily available to
Proctor & Gamble and knew that Procter & Gamble was acting on
a mistaken belief about that information, there is a duty to disclose
the information.
If those things come together and coalesce, then a duty to
disclose occurs and the failure to disclose can constitute fraud. The
11.

See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 5-701(b) (McKinmey Supp. 1997).
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benefit from the standpoint of an end-user here is, with either
misrepresentation or fraud, it could lay the basis for entitlement to
punitive damages.
Next is fiduciary duty. That is, admittedly, a difficult one to
establish. In fact, basically Judge Feikens said in P&G, "Hey, you
guys don't need fiduciary duty. Quit coming at me with that one.
You've got superior knowledge and that should get you home."
That is basically what he said, reading between the lines.
But under fiduciary duty what one would have to establish is
that: 1) the dealer invited the trust and confidence of the end-user;
2) the end-user placed his trust and confidence in the dealer; and 3)
because of that trust and confidence being placed, the dealer had a
position of superiority and influence.
When you use the word "fiduciary" it is like using RICO. 2
Sometimes the titles just don't match. We talk about RICO, and
RICO seems to be used against everybody except racketeers. We
are sort of hampered, in a sense, by the label "fiduciary duty"
because it sounds so awesome. But if you ask a dealer and a
salesman, "How do you get the business away from your
competition? How is it that you were able to sell this product and
all the competition trying to get at that end-user couldn't do it?"
They might very well say, "Well, I got the trust of that customer."
A lot of times when you are dealing with explosive products,
such as derivatives, like nitroglycerin, the person buying the
product wants to be able to trust the other party. So whereas at
first blush it sounds like a far stretch to say that the dealer has a
fiduciary duty, when you look at the facts, and you find a great
disparity in knowledge and sophistication between the parties, then
it becomes, I think, much more acceptable.
There are a number of others; I will just mention them:
1) Federal securities laws, in particular, Rule 10b-5. 3 The
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994 & Supp. II 1995).
13. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1999). Rule 10b-5 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, first promulgated in 1942, was adopted in order to

prohibit any person from using or employing any manipulative or deceptive
device in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
It now reads: It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to
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threshold issue there is, whether this particular instrument
constitutes a security for purposes of the federal securities laws.
2) The anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange
Act.' There, the threshold question is, whether the instrument is a
futures contract or a commodity option, so as to bring into play the
protection of the Commodity Exchange Act.
3) You might also want to take a look at state securities laws.
In a particular state, there may well be protection, again if your
instrument constitutes a security.
4) I almost hate to mention this one, and would never run a
case based on this alone, but you might use the gambling and
gaming statutes, particularly offshore. We have pretty much
resolved that problem here in this country, but you may find that
there is some merit there. Again, I would use this as an add-on. I
would never try to use this as the sole basis for a defense of an enduser.
5) There is, as I mentioned, the RICO Act', which some
people use, and I think should be used very, very sparingly and
only if the facts scream out for such a thing, but in some cases
maybe they would.
6) Last but not least, what I suggest should be on people's
checklist are the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding
Company Act' 6, which were adopted in 1970. The provisions are
almost counter-intuitive, basically saying that one cannot tie one
product to another product in a sale. But an aggressive salesman,
the same person who is selling that derivative, may very well
overstep the boundaries here and tie the two products together.
You can also theoretically make out a case under the Sherman
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any

untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact in
order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id.

14.
15.

7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1994).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).

16.

12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1841 (1994).
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Act, but that is a near-impossible task with the requirements for
affecting interstate commerce. But the Bank Holding Company
Act is really fairly easy and streamlined if you have the facts and if
you are dealing with a commercial bank or one of its affiliates.
There may be some others, such as the Unfair Trade Practices
Acts under the states, but those are the major ones.
Now, what do we do about this? I talked earlier about how
the end-user is in this inferior position because of his knowledge of
the product-and by the way, the products we are talking about
are not "plain vanilla." The ones that blow up and cause problems
are the ones that are very, very complex. Marketers do not make a
lot of money by selling "plain vanilla" swaps. They are like
commodities with very, very narrow margins. Where they make
the money is with the complex products, which are difficult to
value, difficult to price, or at least difficult for the end-user to
determine the appropriate price and the actual risk level.
To start off, you are going to find that your client pretty much
has no idea as to the workings of the product, how to model it, how
to price it, what the alternatives were in terms of market practice.
Further, the client will have signed some documentation without
really having even read ISDA.
How many people are out there in, for instance, the oil patch
down in Texas, doing these trades, signing ISDA agreements that
never read those ISDA agreements, much less understand them? I
think you could take 100 and you wouldn't find one.
Now, I have the good fortune of having only one client for
transactional work and I try to reserve the rest of my time for
representing end-users in disputes. That client is Microsoft
Corporation. They are a wonderful client in many, many respects.
They are not a triple-A-rated entity. Despite all of the problems
they are facing right now in terms of legal challenges, they are
nevertheless a very, very attractive counterparty for dealers.
Dealers are very anxious to do business with them, even though
they don't have a triple-A debt rating. The reason they don't have
a triple-A debt rating is they don't have any debt. In fact, they are
sitting on $19 billion of cash. Now, that makes it pretty easy in
dealing with dealers and negotiating with dealers' documentation.
At the end of the day, I think we get some very protective
documentation from dealers.
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Now, the irony of this is that Microsoft's treasury is staffed
with a number of very bright people who probably don't need the
protection that I negotiate for them. But the people that really
need the protection are the ones that are maybe doing one or two
deals. They often do not have the protection.
I am going to turn next to what we do about these things.
What do you do about such a situation? We all look at the world
through a different knothole, and because we stand in different
places we see different things. Here in New York, quite
understandably, finance and commerce is king. To us, the sanctity
of the contract is very, very important. We frequently say, "If you
sign it, you should have read it; if you read it, you should have
understood it; if you didn't understand it, you should have gotten a
lawyer." That makes a lot of sense right here in Manhattan, and
we can understand why the law is the way it is in New York.
But I suggest that if you take that same scenario down to
Texas and ask a judge to look at the situation and say, "Did it
really make sense in this fast-moving environment to ask this
assistant treasurer to go up to New York to try and find somebody
that knows this stuff, that has the time to work on it and figure it all
out and negotiate it and pay him those New York rates that the
lawyers charge up there before doing the deal; or, alternatively,
just accept what the dealer said was standard documentation?" I
think you might find that the Texas judge says, "You know, you
are right. I think I can find an ambiguity in this twenty-four-page
document which will help you out." So it is just a difference in
viewpoint.
So the question here is, how do we balance the playing field? I
think it is through the choice of forum. In the ISDA Agreement
Section 13-b, it basically says that if you select New York law, you
get New York jurisdiction. Nobody ever changes that, or they very
rarely change that. So you can have the emphasis on non-exclusive
jurisdiction.
The alternative-and you look around and you say, "Well,
under the facts of the case, would I have jurisdiction in our home
state?"-let's just use Texas as an example. Then you look at the
long-arm statute in Texas, you find that perhaps the dealer came
down and made calls in Texas and did a number of other things to
satisfy the minimal requirements of the due process clause and the
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long-arm statute. Now you say, "Well, I can sue them in either
Texas or New York." Which way are you going to go on that one?
And if there is any question about it, you might want to think
back to what happened in the Pennzoil v. Texaco17 case back in the
1980s. In that case, Pennzoil did not come up to White Plains to
sue Texaco in New York. They sued them in Houston, in Harris
County. There the jury got hold of this one and came back with a
$10.2 billion judgment against Texaco. Texaco felt it had some
strong grounds for appeal-but guess what? They could not
appeal. The reason they could not appeal is they had to file an
appeal bond. The appeal bond was twice the amount of the
judgment. They could not get anybody to come up with an appeal
bond for $20.4 billion. So what happened? They had to settle.
They actually went into bankruptcy. They were driven into
bankruptcy and eventually settled. As sort of a footnote to that,
plaintiff's counsel down there, Joe Jamail, according to Forbes,8
was compensated for his efforts in that case to the tune of $345
million and is now one of the wealthiest people in America. But
getting back to the forum issue, the interesting point is that initially
somebody from Pennzoil filed up in Delaware. Then they realized
their mistake and, before Texaco responded, they were able to get
a dismissal without prejudice and get it back down into Harris
County.
It is not only the juries that people should give some thought
to. I would like to share with you one story about the late Carl
Rubin, who was the presiding judge in the Procter& Gamble case
in Cincinnati, who very unfortunately died in the midst of that
case. He was a very highly regarded individual. I understand that
he had a canned speech that he would pull out every time a New
York lawyer walked into his court. The thrust of that speech was
he was going to raise that New York lawyer up to the level of a
Cincinnati lawyer. So it is not only the jury, but also maybe the
judge is a bit different and creates a different environment.
So in terms of which way to go, it is hard to imagine, at least
domestically, if you are representing somebody in the United
17.

626 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

18. The Forbes 400: America's Richest People Renegades, FORBES, Oct. 11,
1999, at 362.
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States and you have a choice to sue in Texas versus New York, why
you would ever sue in New York. Now, never say never, and there
may be a reason I just haven't thought of.
Of course, people feel much more comfortable in their own
jurisdiction. Procter & Gamble, as an example, didn't file in New
York. I don't think the thought ever occurred to them. In 1840,
when Cincinnati was just a cow town, two guys named Procter and
Gamble went down to the slaughter yards and took the fat off the
carcasses of the cows, started making soap, and now you have a $31
billion-a-year company. Along the way, they had given a lot of
money to local orphanages and universities and the like, and they
are known as a model corporate citizen. Where are they going to
go? Are they going to look for a jury in New York or in
Cincinnati? That should be pretty easy.
In representing the end-user, I think one should make sure
that they guard and protect the ability to sue in the local forum. If
there is money due under the contract, you want to make
absolutely certain that you don't breach it. You don't want to say
anything that would constitute an anticipatory breach so that you
can retain that.
Now, wanting to close on a positive note, what makes sense in
these cases? Carl and I were talking earlier about all of these cases
settling. These are not about great principles, like abortion and
things like that. This is about money. Also, the reality is that the
dealers are good companies with good culture. A lot of times,
what happened is that a bonus-oriented salesman got off the
reservation and did something that maybe senior management isn't
too happy about. So there should be an opportunity to settle, and
there will be at some point in time.
The question is, when do you settle the case? The time that
seems to make the most sense in these cases is before filing the
complaint. I say that because there is settlement value to be
extracted. The dealer does not want the complaint to be filed for
two reasons:
o One, negative publicity, if indeed you do have a case that
involves negative publicity-and I am assuming all along that
we've got a meritorious case. Publicity is important particularly if
there are tapes and sound bites and things that the press would get
hold of. It is what the federal regulators call reputational risk. So
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the dealer is not going to want that to happen.
* And also, there is the concern in some cases by the dealers of
copy-cat cases. For instance, when Gibson Greetings started with
their case, then you had Procter & Gamble and Air Products and
Federal Fiberboard and Sandoz AG, and everybody is coming out
of the woodwork. So dealers know filing can have that effect, and
this can get worked into the settlement amount that is provided.
On that happy note, I would like to close.

2000]

DERIVATIVES & RISK MANAGEMENT

ISsUES UNIQUE To OTC DERIVATIVE DisPuTFs
MS. JACKSON: It is my great pleasure to introduce the first
panel of lawyers discussing litigation concerning derivatives. In
particular, we are going to be looking at the issues that are unique
to over-the-counter derivatives. As Denis mentioned, there are
generally three broad categories: derivative securities, derivatives
as futures, and then over-the-counter, privately negotiated
transactions.
I also want to introduce the moderator of our panel, Martin
Bienenstock. Martin is a partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges, and
he is in the Business, Finance, and Restructuring Department. He
has represented debtors, creditors, and investors in restructuring
troubled companies in and out of Chapter 11.
Also, I can't really refer to derivatives as cases or losses, so I
want to say that he was representing Merrill Lynch in the Orange
County "derivative situation."' In particular, when he is discussing
over-the-counter derivatives, he is going to be looking primarily at
the issues that are unique to bankruptcy.
Basically Martin, I would like you to say a few words and I
would like my fellow panelists to say a few words as to why they
are here, assuming you know.
MARTIN BIENENSTOCK:* Carolyn, you summed up why I
am here, so why don't I just introduce David Brower and Aaron
Rubenstein? They can say who they are and then you can start
your presentation.
AARON RUBENSTEIN:** I am a partner at Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler. I have been involved in derivatives
litigation for quite some time. I do not like to characterize myself
as a either dealer or end-user champion. I have represented both
sides.
I guess perhaps the case that some of you may be most

1. County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cotnty of Orange), 191
B.R. 1005 (Bankr. C.D. Ca. 1996).
*Partner, Wel, Gotschal & Manges LLP; Counsel for Merrill Lynch & Co. in
County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch.
**Partner, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, LLP.
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familiar with is an end-user representation. It involves a lawsuit
between what is one of the largest state-owned companies in
China, called Minmetals, against Lehman Brothers in connection
with a number of different types of derivative transactions. It
presents some issues that, of course, cover the waterfront that
Denis mentioned-suitability, fiduciary duty, and the like-but
also focuses on issues that are perhaps not as often found in cases,
such as authorization and legality. I will be trying to focus for a
few minutes on those.
DAVID A.P. BROWER:*** My name is David Brower. I am
a partner with the firm of Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman &
Herz. Unlike most of the people on the panel, I represent only
end-users, and those end-users are typically individual investors.
With respect to derivatives, they tend to be very wealthy individual
investors or family accounts, and many of the strategies I have
heard today are ineffective for them.
I am going to be talking about suitability, the paradigm we
have seen over the last ten or fifteen years. We see about one case
a year-or, at least, somebody comes to us about one time a yearin very similar circumstances. About half of the time, they are
foreign investors who have invested with American banks or
multinational banks and have gotten into serious trouble because
of cyclical turns in the underlying securities from which derivatives
were sold. The situations are amazingly similar in each of those
situations. In most of those situations, the investors have been
recompensed, because most litigation settles, as you know. But in
cases involving the sale of derivatives, suitability cases are
somewhat better suits, as are churning cases, than the normal
broker-dealer situation when people are trading stock.
I will be talking about the kind of situations we see and the
kind of things that-I will call them "brokers," rather than
dealers-do, the problems the firms face, and the problems the
investor faces when confronted with them. Specifically, I will talk
about what happens with margin calls: how much time investors
are given, what kind of explanations are given, and then what
happens to their investment portfolios in relatively short periods of
time, usually minutes, when they are left holding the bag.
***Partner, Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman & Herz.
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MS. JACKSON: Thanks. Basically I can give my disclaimers.
I am going to be speaking about a transaction involving a tobacco
company by the name of Soci~te Nationale D'Exploitation
Industrielle des Tabacs et Alumettes (SEITA) and Salomon
Brothers, in particular, Salomon Brothers International Limited

(SBIL) 2
At the time, I was working at Cravath, Swain & Moore. I was
brought in, not because of my legal knowledge, not at all, because
most of you now know that I had just completed my first year of
law school here at Fordham. I was basically looking through the
portfolio.
I wanted to talk about the case because I think it kind of sets
the guidelines here, because the facts are pretty typical and the
story is pretty typical about why a counterparty would sue. In
particular, I am very privileged to have Judge Ramos here, because
he rendered the Supreme Court decision which ruled in favor of
SBIL. The appellate court decision, which also upheld the verdict
for SBIL, came out on January 25th, so it is relatively fresh.
PROF.
RECHTSCHAFFEN:
Carolyn's
PowerPoint
presentation is a handout also. So if we are unable to overcome
the technical difficulties-and, Denis Forster, who is Microsoft's
attorney, take note of this.
MR. FORSTER: I thought we were friends, Alan.
PROF. RECHTSCHAFFEN: If we are unable to overcome
that, you can follow Carolyn's presentation with the handout that
says "PowerPoint Presentation Presented by Carolyn Jackson."
MS. JACKSON: I am very sorry about this, because over the
years of being a derivatives trader I have gotten very good at
PowerPoint presentations, and at having boxes and arrows fly in
and fly out and checkerboards. So you are going to miss that, but I
think we will all live.
Basically, the first slide presents the players. As I mentioned
before, SEITA is a tobacco company in France, but at the timeand this is fairly important to note-it was owned by the
government. Because of the way the tax system works in France,
they were allowed to hold the tax revenues for about a year, which
2.

Societ6 Nationale D'Exploitation Industrielle des Tabacs et Alumettes v.

Salomon Bros. Intern. Ltd., 702 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
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gave them a fairly sizable cash portfolio to manage. Likewise, you
should be aware that SEITA generally bought tobacco in the
United States. Japan was one of the places that they sold their
tobacco products. Furthermore, quite often a lot of SEITA's
borrowings were in Deutsche marks.
Around 1994, they entered into two transactions with Salomon
Brothers. They are basically swaps transactions. And again I am
sorry, as a trader, I cannot even think about doing a swap
transaction without drawing the pictures.
The way the first trade worked is that Salomon Brothers was
to pay a fixed percentage on the notional principal amount to
SEITA for every single day that the Deutsche mark LIBOR ratethe floating rate of LIBOR that is paid in dollars, but it is pegged
to the Deutsche mark Inter Bank Offer Rate, not the U.S. Inter
Bank Offer Rate-remained within a specified range (a cap and a
floor rate). Basically, you would look every day and say, "Gee, did
Deutsche mark LIBOR fall within this band?" If it did, then
Salomon Brothers would make a payment. If it did not, SEITA
would get zero. It is a pay out structure.
Then, at maturity, the number of days that Deutsche mark
LIBOR was in the range would determine the pay out. Now, the
reason why it was in a band-remember, they needed to protect
themselves against Deutsche mark rates rising-but they had a
band because often it is cheaper to get protection if you both buy
and then sell off some of the up side. So you do not get the full
benefit because you sell it off, but it makes your protection on the
downside cheaper.
So basically, Salomon Brothers is paying for every day that the
Deutsche mark LIBOR falls within the range, and then at
maturity, SEITA was to pay $35 million. If you actually did the
math and cranked out the number of days that the Deutsche mark
LIBOR rate could have been within the band, SEITA could have
made a fair bit of money at the end of the trade.
Likewise, on the second trade, it was $15 million that was
going to be paid at maturity, but now instead of pegging the pay
out to the Deutsche mark LIBOR rate, the variable was the U.S.
dollar/yen exchange rate. Again, this made sense for them as a
company because, since they were buying U.S. tobacco, they
needed to protect themselves against an appreciating dollar; and
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because they were selling in Japan, they needed to protect against
a depreciating yen.
Then, unfortunately, life got a little bit more interesting for
SEITA because they decided to privatize and go public. Incoming
management said to all the dealers, "Give us our marked-tomarket value of the trades."
And so, even though before the change in management, there
had been a series of back-and-forth marked-to-market
valuations-sometimes SEITA would call up SBIL and say, "Gee,
where is my trade valued right now? Maybe we can restructure
and move the trade out to a later maturity date." So there was this
ongoing dialogue where various marked-to-market quotes were
given for the two trades. Once the company decided to privatize,
the trades were basically liquidated.
With the privatization, SEITA realized that they would have
to pay roughly $30 million to SBIL. That was fine. They made the
payment. Then, as the company spent more time looking at their
derivatives portfolio, they brought suit in New York questioning
the suitability of the two trades.
I am very glad Denis went through the main allegations that
people generally bring, because there is absolutely nothing new in
this story-breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the good faith
Basically the idea-remember, those
implicit in contracts.
valuations, I was talking about, were going back and forth between
were
that
those
valuations
marked-to-market-was
misrepresented, and also that SEITA could not understand the risk
from the way the trade was presented.
The usual lack of authority-and it was the treasurer of all of
the SEITA dealing room who entered into these transactions.
Since they had a large cash portfolio to manage, he was very active
in the derivatives market.
And again, suitability. I have already gone through the steps
of actually how these were hedges to the global portfolio, or
certainly could be viewed that way.
And then, basically fraud and nondisclosure, the typical things,
saying, "Gee, these trades were more complex, why didn't you
share your models?"
And then, as I am pleased to say, on February 8, 1999, Judge
Ramos ruled in favor of SBIL. But, as the story goes on, SEITA
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appealed. On appeal, they were really trying to get at what was
going on with the valuations of the marked-to-market and some
internal accounting records. One of the reasons for this is that the
live quotes they got did not necessarily agree with the end-ofclosing day marked-to-market valuations in the back office. But
this is like an apple and an orange. SEITA lost the appeal as of
January 25th.
I have already alluded to some of the reasons why accounting
versus marked-to-market numbers can differ. End of day markedto-market prices generally come from the 3:00 o'clock futures close
and then, quite generally, the 5:00 Treasury close. And as you now
know, quite often the Treasury market stays open. So even in your
necessary yield curve, you have a two-hour discrepancy-an
inconsistency along your curve.
The important thing, too, is that end of day prices are dead
prices. Nobody was actually trading at those prices. Also, in terms
of these transactions, they involved interest rate exposure,
exchange rate exposure, and volatility exposure. That meant that
the back office had to go get all these yield curves for the various
variables.
I have to tell you, deriving a perfect volatility curve is like a
nightmare. It can be a weeklong process because the options in
people's portfolios can be so complex that you actually need to go
out and call the brokers and say, "Try to get a price for me on this
trade," and then they reverse-engineer what the implied volatility
was on that price. So I am just saying that in the back office, the
prices are very, very stale; whereas when you are quoting liveespecially people on transactions-you generally have a
spreadsheet all designed, they have live feeds coming from the data
feed sources, they hit a button, and then, hopefully, they check it
out with some internal models, et cetera, to make sure of what they
are quoting. But it is quite a different thing.
Another big consideration is that in general, the back office
marks to market at the mid point. If you are quoting a trade,
hopefully, you are going to be on the bid or the offer side, so there
has to be a discrepancy for that as well.
Also, back office is generally done in a batch at the end-ofday, and you cannot get the fine-tuned structures of the individual
trade, so sometimes a little leg might be left off. And at a big year-
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end or quarter-end valuation date, all that will be reconciled. But
in terms of letting the back office generate the reports about the
overall risk, that level of detail being missed is okay. But if you are
actually quoting on a trade, that can mean millions of dollars. So
again, there is another reason why you just don't look at backoffice numbers if you are quoting a live trade.
And quite often, some people have different models between
the front and the back office. I know the regulators are now trying
to say that we should have the same model for both front and back
office. There used to be a period of time where some regulators
actually preferred firms to use two different models, because it was
a check and balance that kind of alerted you as to when something
might be going wrong.
Also, even within their models, deriving the curves, just the
slightest little change can make a big, big difference. People have
big fights-I mean, I know this isn't something everybody wants to
go home and fight about, but the derivation of the forward-yield
curve: do you start with overnight LIBOR, do you start with oneweek LIBOR, or do you start with one month LIBOR?
And then, we all know that the yield curve has a shape, but it
usually has just two straight-line data points. Do you straight-line
interp or do you cubic spline to kind of approximate the curve?
And then, as I already alluded to, sometimes, on a currency
swap, for example, that probably appears in your back office in
three different areas: one as a U.S. dollar interest rate swap; one
as, let's call it, the Deutsche mark interest rate swap; and then in
the Deutsche mark/U.S. dollar exchange. So basically, I hope I
have made the point that there are a lot of reasons why various
numbers could disagree.
As I look at the case from my very naive position as somebody
who is about to finish law school, I think that the really key points
were: First, SEITA was judged to be a sophisticated institutional
investor. That is definitely in the appellate court opinion. And
also, the record did not support that they could not find
independent valuation. At the time, there were many, many
dealers quoting that type of product, so they were not limited to
just asking Salomon Brothers.
So I am going to be looking very much forward to hearing
what Judge Ramos has to say on this.
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I am going to turn it over to you, Martin.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Our next speaker is going to be Aaron
Rubenstein from Kaye Scholer.
MR. RUBINSTEIN: I will try to be brief and not go over
ground that has already been covered. Denis Forster covered
much of the waterfront of the different types of issues and defenses
that are used in derivatives litigation. I would like to focus on a
couple that are not that typical and that do not exist in every case.
Every case is going to involve issues of suitability, at least they
usually do; they are going to involve issues of what duty exists, how
you create a duty, and whether it is fiduciary duty or otherwise.
Denis covered the cases that really have delved into that, like
Procter& Gamble,3 Gibson Greetings, and other cases.
This morning's lecture was very interesting because the
industry representatives and the regulators tended to use
buzzwords, like most of the transactions in this multi-trillion dollar
industry are for "hedging" purposes, the transactions involve a
"principal," or "counter-party," (the word you heard most often),
and these transactions are usually "transparent" in price.
Of course, that is all true. It is all true because in most of the
transactions that is the case, and in most of the transactions, as
Denis told you, no problem arises and nothing happens. But
derivatives transactions can be used for trading other than for
hedging, and that is where the problems arise. They can be used
for speculative purposes, with or without the overall company's
knowledge and authority.
While the "push the duty away" buzzwords are usually
invoked with "counterparty" and "principal-to-principal,"
sometimes the transaction does not arise that way. As Denis
described to you, often what is happening is that lucrative
derivatives transactions for dealers arise because brokers go out
there, or dealers go out there, and they get clients but do not say,
"I am your counter-party, don't rely on me." Instead they say

3. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.
Ohio 1996).
4. In re BT Securities Corp., Securities Act Release No. 33-7124, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-35136 (Dec. 22, 1994) (concerning a "Treasury-Linked
Swap" between Gibson Greetings and BT Securities Corporation).
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"Trust me." They market themselves with "put yourselves in my
hands, you can trust us, we are smarter than anybody else in this
industry, we can make a profit for you." When that happens,
duties can in fact arise, and the courts have recognized that.
And, of course, the pricing can be anything but transparent.
Stated otherwise, the transaction can be anything but easy to
understand. Sure, most of the transactions can be "plain vanilla"
interest rate swaps or "plain vanilla" transactions, but you heard
about LIBOR-squared formulas. You may or may not be familiar
with things like "guru options," which go on with three-page
formulas using almost every letter in the Greek alphabet. The task
of trying to price some of these transactions is a daunting one
because it involves financial institutions having the most complex
computer formulas for pricing them. And sometimes, not alwaysnot even often-but sometimes, it is virtually impossible for the
end-users to know whether or not they are getting a fair price or a
fair deal unless they just rely on the dealer.
In fact, if I can just touch upon the duty aspect and the
suitability aspect, there is no one rule that applies. There is no rule
that there is no fiduciary duty ever. In fact, Gibson Greetings and
Procter& Gamble may be a good example of this. That is, there is,
in my view, a spectrum out there.
On the one end, I think you may have Procter & Gamble. At
the time, I think it had $27 billion in sales-I am happy to hear it is
up to $31 billion-but it had $27 billion in sales, and perhaps a net
worth of $30 billion, and at the end of the day it came into court
and said, "We really didn't understand these transactions." It had
a financial organization and the financial wherewithal that could
have been equal to Bankers Trust at the time. It is one thing in
that context for Judge Feikens, to say, "We are not going to shift
the onus of a fiduciary duty theory onto the bank to protect you.
You could understand it as well as anybody else."
Gibson Greetings was a very different situation. In that case,
there were LIBOR-squared transactions put into place that
actually put a risk on these transactions for Gibson Greetingsmore
than its net worth. That is a different kind of company, a company
that was worth $60 million, I think, at the time. That is a very
different situation.
In the extreme, you could say there are the Procter &
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Gamble's on one end, and there are the widows and orphans on
the other end. I dare say that no judge is going to deny the widows
and orphans some protection against a Bankers Trust or some
other dealer, and there are going to be very few instances where a
Procter & Gamble is going to walk in pleading ignorance and lack
of knowledge. Where a particular case falls on the spectrum is
really going to determine whether there is a duty or not.
What I would like to talk about now is authority, which is a
very important issue. It doesn't exist in every case, because most
of the time-at least domestically- cases come up where a Procter
& Gamble or a Gibson Greetings does the transaction, and the
issues focus on duties and knowledge and suitability. But there are
situations where dealers go to companies, or they go to individuals
within companies, and they get that individual to trade. Ordealers are not always evil-individuals within a company who are
authorized perhaps to deal with certain kinds of trading, think that
they can make the big kill either for the company or for
themselves, and they start trading in a different kind of a product, a
product that might not be the same kind of hedging product that
they have been trading up until then, and they lose a lot of money.
Then, when it comes time to pay and the company is asked to pay
the dealer, sometimes it says, "I really didn't know anything about
those transactions; I didn't know that this employee was engaged
in those transactions." These cases present some very messy issues
as to whether or not the trades are going to be the responsibility of
the company or whether or not there was some duty, some
obligation, by the dealer to do enough to find out that the
individual was in fact authorized.
The fact is that the name of the game is apparent authority in
most of these cases, although there are other authority concepts.
Apparent authority requires actions and manifestations by the
principal: the company itself that vests the individual with apparent
authority. Often, you find dealers relying on what the individual
himself or herself told the dealer, such as the fact that the
individual provided stationary and letters that he or she created
saying that they could do these kinds of transactions. That is
usually not going to be good enough.
There are a couple of notable cases, and they do not
necessarily arise in the context of derivatives. There are very few
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decided cases yet on derivatives, so you have to borrow concepts
from other areas and try to apply them in the derivatives disputes
that arise.
A recent notable case of the issue of authority or apparent
authority is a case called Anglo Iberia UnderwritingManagement v.
P.T. Jamsestech,5 a Southern District of New York case in 1999. I
don't want to go into the details in any great length, but an
employee of a particular company, who had entered into
reinsurance arrangements with the plaintiffs, was trying to get
money from that employee's own company. In fact, neither that
employee nor the company itself was authorized to engage in
reinsurance business. The plaintiffs claimed that the agent's use of
a company's stationery and the defendant company's failure to
disavow the agent's activity created the appearance of authority.
The defendants moved to dismiss. This was an unusual case,
because almost all questions of authority, particularly apparent
authority, are questions of fact and usually are not decided on
summary judgment, let alone a motion to dismiss. In this case,
though, the defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that the agent
was not authorized, and that any reliance by the plaintiff was
unreasonable. The court granted the motion to dismiss.
A couple of things in the ruling are important for the
derivatives industry. First, the court said that the plaintiff had
asked for proof of authority, didn't get it, but did the transaction
anyway. You would be surprised as to how often that happens in
the telephone world and document-things-later world of
derivatives. That was a critical pitfall. Also, the court said that the
novelty of the transaction for this particular defendant should have
alerted the plaintiff to a danger of fraud. The ease with which a
dealer can confirm authority, particularly when you are dealing
with novel, risky, and new transactions like some derivatives, really
puts a great burden on the dealer to actually do that.
There is a key quote that I think says it all in this case. It says:
"It is beyond peradventure that a simple inquiry into a highranking official or executive of [the company involved there]
would have revealed that [the employee] lacked the authority to
engage in the reinsurance business. However, the plaintiffs made
5. 1999 WL76909 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 16, 1999).
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no contact with any of [the company's] officials and executives." 6
That really says it all in terms of the authority issue in that
particular case. So I want to alert everyone here, end-users and
dealers, that it is going to be a factual issue and authority is not
something that can be taken for granted, particularly when you are
dealing with foreign entities where the issues of authority may be
different than they are domestically.
I now want to talk about one of the items that Denis left off
his list, although it may relate to the gaming type of defense he
mentioned. It is the issue of the illegality or legality defense. It
comes up, not in the Procter& Gamble kind of case or the Gibson
Greetings case, but mostly in foreign cases. We have all heard, and
we all know, that the derivatives industry is a global industry. It is
an international industry. The world is a vast market for dealers.
There are countries-whether they are in Southeast Asia or China
or other parts of the world-that are just being tapped by dealers
and companies, and that are considered to be prime prospects for
the derivatives industry. That is something that raises some unique
issues with respect to derivatives cases.
New York choice of law issues, for example, or a New York
choice of law clause, which, as we heard, is very common in ISDA
Agreements or otherwise in derivatives contracts, may not end any
kind of issue with respect to an illegality defense in a derivatives
contract. The New York choice of law clause does not, in fact,
necessarily govern when the actual conduct engaged in is illegal
under the laws of the foreign country where the particular end-user
is located.
There are particular concepts that you have to be aware of.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws draws a distinction
that is very important in these kinds of disputes between the
existence of illegality in a contract formation or its performance
and the effect of illegality on the rights of the parties. While the
law governing the effect of illegality is usually determined
according to traditional conflict of law concepts-in particular,
great weight is given to a choice of law provision in the contractthe existence of illegality is not. So whether or not something is
illegal is not based on, or should not be based on, for example, the
6.

Id (citations ommitted).
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law of the State of New York.
Under a Restatement of Conflicts analysis, in this case Section
202, ' which New York follows, the existence of illegality is
determined by the law of the place where the acts related to the
contract are performed, irrespective of the presence of a choice of
law clause.
What does that mean? That means that if a bank or a dealer
enters into a derivatives transaction with a foreign company or a
foreign national, and it is taking action in that particular foreign
jurisdiction, the bank has to 1) be aware of what the foreign law is,
2) make sure it complies with it, and 3) make sure its customer is
complies with it. If the transaction violates the law of that
jurisdiction, it may be unenforceable.
Now, there have been cases in the past where the courts, and I
believe rightfully, said, "No, New York is so vital as the center of
the financial world, let alone the U.S. financial community, that
there has to be some certainty in transactions, and so if a New
York financial institution is engaging in something like a
derivatives transaction or a loan transaction with a foreigner, and
they choose New York law, New York law has to govern." But
those cases arose where a foreigner-there were a couple of
notable cases, one involving an Israeli citizen, the other involving a
Greek citizen-where the foreign citizen walks into a bank in New
York, enters into a transaction in New York to guarantee
transactions for his company, and when there are losses and they
try to collect from this individual, that individual says, "You know,
the law where I live says this was illegal." The court in those cases
has said, "Well, you are stuck with New York law."
It is different, though, where a particular financial institution
says, "The world out there is our oyster and we can go and we can
do a tremendous amount of derivatives business in Indonesia,
Malaysia, Brazil, Argentina, China, African countries, or
wherever." Then they go there and they set up meetings, get their
contacts, and put their arms around the people in Brazil, Argentina
or China and they say, "Trust us, you could make money if you
engage in these transactions." If those transactions are illegal
there, it is not unreasonable to hold the bank to the law of that
7.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 202 (1969).
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jurisdiction in terms of the legality of the transaction. That is
where the bank chose to go and that is where the bank chose to do
its business. It should find out whether or not what it is doing or
what its customer is doing is proper. There are a host of cases that
address that point.
Finally, on the legality point, I would like to bring your
attention to the fact that there may be treaties that are implicated
and that may be used by end-users in connection with this legality
point. One particular treaty that I would bring to your attention is
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Agreement.' Article 8 of
that treaty provides that "exchange contracts which involve the
currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange
control regulations of that member maintained or imposed
consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the
territories of any Member."9
What does that mean? That means that if there are foreign
exchange agreements entered into with a foreign customer, and
under the law of the country where that foreign customer is, those
exchange agreements are illegal or they violate the exchange
control laws of that country, it actually is a matter of treaty, which
is the supreme law of the land, that those transactions cannot be
enforced in the United States because the United States is a
signatory to the IMF Treaty. That poses, and will pose, a lot of
interesting questions, particularly as derivatives transactions
spread out into the rest of the world. You are not just dealing with
Deutsche mark transactions with German companies or French
companies or English companies, all of which have uncontrolled
currencies, but you are dealing with foreign countries, developing
countries, where there are exchange control laws that have to be
taken into account.
In ending, I will say that the fact is that the dealers do not need
legislative or regulatory changes. What they need is compliance
and enforcement. They know the pitfalls. The fact is that every
dealer I know of has very specific policy and procedure manuals
that really take all of its brokers and its dealers through step-by8. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (1947) (as amended).
9. Id. art. VIII.
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step what they have to get with respect to proof of authorization,
for example. Every dealer I know of has a policy and procedure
manual that provides that if you are doing business in a foreign
country you are required to find out what the legal requirements
are and what the legal environment is in the foreign country. The
issues for dealers are that they would not have problems if all those
rules are complied with. The problems arise in the one percent of
cases in which the employees of the dealers-sometimes with the
dealer's knowledge, sometimes without the dealer's knowledgeignore those policies and procedures, and where the institution
itself does not do anything, or certainly does not do enough, to
make sure that those policies and procedures are complied with.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Thank you. David Brower is next.
MR. BROWER: Thank you. I am going to speak today about
the little guy. While I agree with my colleague that there is a
difference between widows and orphans-who, by the way, are
rarely trading in derivative products-and Gibson Greeting Cards,
which I think is a $6 billion company. The difference is that large
individual investors or representatives of family funds are being
put into derivatives.
Over the years, we have seen a paradigm of how this occurs. It
occurs both with American large investors-and I call them large
investors because they ultimately wind up putting in a lot of money
and the portfolios at some point become worth even more money,
and ultimately they lose a lot of money, and they lose the kind of
numbers that we are talking about in terms of Bankers Trust.
People can lose $10-20 million and, while they are able to sustain
that loss, that does not necessarily mean they were too
sophisticated to be defrauded. That is simply not the law. I do not
know if Bill Gates knows about derivative transactions, and he
may have no idea what the swap-squared things are, and he can be
as easily defrauded by a broker on the phone as one of the widows
or orphans.
What we see is the following. The relationship between the
dealer and the large investor, both in America and abroadnormally, we see the foreign investors are Middle Eastern, Asian,
or South American investors-is a traditional banking
arrangement. These are usually funds that are kept in the United
States, for various reasons, due to the laws requiring them not to
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take money out of their own country. So money earned in this
country they try to keep here.
Over a period of time, a broker will call them, or their bank
representative will come and knock on their door, make a visit to
Brazil or to Tel Aviv, wherever they live, and they say, "You
know, we also do brokerage work now. Why don't you buy some
stocks from us? We can do a little better on the commissions."
They will go with them. They will then start having a portfolio of
the usual-of IBM and General Motors, and maybe today eBay.
That relationship may go on for months or years.
And then one day, they will get another knock on the door
from that same banker asking them out to lunch, and they will be
introduced to Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones will be from the New York
office of the bank, and -Mr. Jones deals in emerging market
securities, and they can now do better for them in terms of return
than they are doing on their IBM or their General Motors stock.
They are then persuaded that Mr. Jones is an expert in this area.
They are told how much money the bank has made for people in
the past. At this point not a single piece of paper has ever passed
between the client and the bank.
From emerging market debt the derivatives start flowing. The
client is told: "Well, you can sell some puts and get a premium on
those bonds. You can sell some calls and get some premiums on
those bonds."
In the course of these transactions, it is explained to them,
"You know, you need to open up a margin account in London
through either our subsidiary or our affiliate." That is usually
where the dealers cross the line, and it happens all the time. The
reason they go to London is because they can get 90 percent
margin in London and avoid American margin requirements.
As a result, they open it up, they tend not to read the
agreements or do not understand the agreements, because they are
not presented to them in their own languages. As a result is the
client goes on to 80 or 90 percent margin on emerging market debt
where they have sold puts and calls or have open short positions
with puts and calls covering them. Then, lo and behold, there is a
cycle change, the market falls apart, the client receives a call at 2:00
o'clock in the morning their time and is told that they have to put
up or do something. They are given about one minute on the
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phone, and the accounts are closed.
The people wake up the next day in shambles, owing
sometimes nothing, or owing a few million dollars, because the
banks when they are dealing with individual investors do not
extend themselves out so that they have open positions to their
own clients for $10 or $20 million. But during this period of time,
the IBM stock and the General Motors stock and all those
securities have also been sold out to cover the open positions of
the option transactions which were derivatives off of the emerging
market debt.
These are typical situations. We have seen this situation
almost identically perhaps, as I said earlier, once every year in the
last fifteen years. The only thing that changes is the part of the
world that the person who has made the investments-that is, the
client-comes from, because that depends on the economies in the
countries they are in and the desire to have cash in the United
States and to make investments in the United States.
You then look at the client and you look at the papervork.
The paperwork is always terrible for the client. They have signed
five or six arbitration clauses. On a number of occasions, we have
seen the arbitration clauses are inconsistent-one will call for
arbitration in London, one will call for arbitration in New York.
You will see they have signed clauses that say they cannot get
punitive damages in litigation. They have signed clauses waiving
the right to trial by jury. They understand none of these things
because the documentation was never explained to them. The
documentation comes from the bank.
Unlike Bankers Trust or Microsoft, these kind of investors do
not get to negotiate the terms of the underlying agreements
between themselves and the dealers. These are contracts of
adhesion. No different than if one of us-or I assume most of usgoes to Merrill Lynch and wants to open up a regular brokerage
account. They are going to hand us their brokerage contract; and,
if we start negotiating, they will tell you to go down the street to
Bear Stearns. They are not going to negotiate with us. The same is
true of large, non-institutional, wealthy individual customers. They
are not really in a position to negotiate with the banks to change
the terms of those agreements. Institutional investors may be.
When we bring these cases, we bring them based on suitability.
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The basic suitability argument is that no one understands these
transactions, that even the people selling these transactions do not
quite understand them. They never explain the risks associated
with these transactions, and they cannot explain the risks
associated with the transactions. They are financial products that
are created and then handed over to brokers who themselves, you
learn, do not understand the risks associated with them in many
respects.
For instance, many of the brokers or dealers selling those
derivatives sold off of emerging market debt, such as Asian or
South American debt, in the last five or six years, are not really
economists or experts in the emerging markets. Rather they are
the people creating the products and do not understand what the
risks associated with the underlying debt products, the underlying
countries involved, and how quickly those products can go from
being worth $100 face to being worth $10 or $12 face. It has
happened overnight with respect to South American debt, twice in
the last decade.
We have found that there is little reported case law on these
cases because they settle very early. They settle when you have
situations that fit this paradigm, because the brokers do not explain
the risks to people. The tapes that do exist demonstrate that the
people are sold a bill of goods, in essence-not necessarily
misrepresentations made, solid misrepresentations that you would
expect to see under a Section 10(b) claim under the Securities
Exchange Act, but representations that "you will make more
money this way," "this is the way you should do it," or "we know
what we are doing, follow us."
And then, when the book is closed on the situation, you really
hear it because there is usually panic in the voice of the dealer- or
in most cases at that point, the secretary for the dealer, because the
dealer does not want to get on the phone with the customer and
start explaining what has happened. They are told by a secretary
or an assistant, "You have to give us $5 million or we are going to
shut the accounts." The dealers do not even explain at that point
what "shut the accounts" means, because shut the accounts means
"we are also going to liquidate all of your equities we are holding
on the other side of the bank; and, by the way, if you have any cash
in the bank, we are going to grab that too." Generally when
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dealers do that, given the way it is done and the circumstances
under which it is done, you can normally make out a case for
unsuitability.
In order to explain the risks, you would need to give someone
a disclosure statement with respect to these products that was 600
pages long. Now, obviously, you cannot do that with respect to
every individual investor, which leads to the question maybe these
are not products that dealers should be selling to non-institutional
clients that do not have their own analyst departments. The law
may develop that way, that unless those are the kind of clients they
sell to, or they have some demonstration that the client is as
capable as the person creating the product of understanding the
product, the dealers are going to be essentially absolutely liable for
the losses.
I did want to add one more thing. We have spoken today
about lots of causes of action. I think Denis Forster touched on
this point, but I think it is important. Unfair and deceptive trade
practices has not been a cause of action generally used, certainly
not in New York or elsewhere, with respect to securities
transactions. It is a developing area of the law in New York and up
until very recently was not a very profitable area of the law for a
plaintiff to pursue.
The New York Court of Appeals has recently, in a series of
what are called vanishing premium insurance cases, very broadly
interpreted New York's unfair and deceptive trade practice statute
much more in line with what the majority of states now interpret
unfair and deceptive trade practice statutes to be. This may be a
very important line of attack by plaintiffs and a very difficult
defense by dealers in the future, for a number of reasons.
Unlike under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act, even in an
unsuitability claim, you have to show justifiable reliance; you have
to show scienter-that is, conscious intent-on the part of the
dealer to defraud or to breach its other duties.
Unfair and deceptive trade practice claims do not require that
the individual plaintiff actually be deceived. They do not require
reliance. They are strict liability statutes. They do not require bad
intent or scienter on the part of the defendant. They simply
require an injury and causation.
Under those statutes, I believe we have seen over the years, a
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paradigm of this kind of contact: the dealers go out and solicit or
recruit certain kinds of investors at certain times in certain parts of
the world, invest them in the same sorts of products, and then close
them out without giving complete information or complete risk
disclosures. In this type of situation not only are companies going
to be facing individual claims under these unfair and deceptive
trade practice statutes, but they are going to be seeing, for the first
time, class action cases brought under these statutes. Unlike the
difficult individual issues that may make these types of claims
unsuitable for class treatment, unfair and deceptive trade practice
claims are not only suitable for class treatment, but generally they
are written in a way that makes them class by definition.
In California, for instance, the unfair and deceptive trade
practice claim is class by definition, and if you win, you have won
for the entire class of people that the practice was conducted upon,
whether you brought it as a class action or not. So that is an issue
that is going to be rising in the future, particularly given how much
of the business in derivatives and the products that derivatives are
sold off is done in New York, both with American clients as well as
foreign clients.
Thank you.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Thanks. My job is to give you a flavor
of things that have not been said that only arise in bankruptcy
cases. Let me try to tell you a few stories where the gist or the drift
will get across.
Chapter 11, as you know-you read about it in the newspaper,
your friend Judge Mayo pushed Texaco into it-is based on a set of
public policies that put reorganization of a company to preserve
jobs, and to promote Gross Domestic Product, employment,
American enterprise, ingenuity well ahead of getting creditors paid
quickly. That is our national policy.
The other policy in Chapter 11 is that those people who end
up taking the hurt have to share it equally. So there is the equality
policy.
Now along comes a Chapter 11 or a Chapter 7 debtor that
owes a financial institution or broker or broker-dealer on a
derivative contract. The policies I just mentioned were determined
by Congress to be subordinate to another set of policies, really just
one policy. That is that the stability of the capital markets is
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supreme. And no matter what you have to do to close down a
business-fire everyone, make people share losses unequally-that
is all okay if you do it in the name of preserving the stability of the
capital markets. The fear is, obviously, that if one financial
institution cannot collect on an interest rate swap, or whatever the
derivative is, then that institution may default to another financial
institution, which will default to the next, and the domino effect
will bring down the wealth effect in a hurry.
So to carry out the stability of the capital market policy,
Congress inserted into the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, and has since
then spruced it up somewhat, a set of provisions designed to
insulate derivative contracts from the operation of the bankruptcy
laws. If they had done a complete job, then I could sit down.
The problem is that there are these little holes that people on
the panel tend to find and it becomes quite tricky. It also becomes
an area where ingenious lawyers can create some novel
commercial transactions, which I just want to give you a flavor of.
First, the normal bankruptcy statute in Chapter 11
automatically stays the action of a creditor to collect a debt. So
ordinarily, if you are a broker and a customer goes into Chapter 7,
Chapter 11 or Chapter 13, and you have any type of derivative
contract with that customer, you cannot do anything about
realizing on the collateral security or the margin account that you
have, because the automatic stay applies.
The essence of all of the Bankruptcy Code provisions that
were inserted to insulate derivatives from the Bankruptcy Code, is
that the automatic stay does not apply. Congress and several New
York law firms were fairly clever and realized that just because the
automatic stay does not apply, that does not mean the bankruptcy
judge will not issue a new injunction. They used belt and
suspenders, and there are provisions, such as Bankruptcy Code
Section 555, which says no United States court shall issue any order
designed to enjoin the enforcement remedies of certain entities on
their derivative contracts when the counter-party is in
bankruptcy.0
Now again, if they had done that completely, I could sit down.
But they did not. The only people who can benefit from the
10.

11 U.S.C. §555 (1994).
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insulation of the derivative contracts are enumerated in the
Bankruptcy Code, and it is a broad category: financial institutions,
broker-dealers, clearing agencies, forward contract merchants, and
the like.
So the first problem is to make sure that if you are doing this
and you want to protect yourself against counter-party bankruptcy,
that you do it in an entity that is specially protected under the
Bankruptcy Code. It is not hard. You just have to focus on it and
make sure you use that entity. They are not hard to create if you
don't already have one.
Parenthetically, you may note, this is not a particularly
profitable area of the practice. So let me warn you, even if you are
interested in this, you may want to think twice. Many issues arise
and are resolved in seconds.
When the High Risk Opportunity Fund (HRO) was in trouble
and it ended up in bankruptcy offshore, I got a call-and I wasn't
alone-from some money center banks. Usually the call stems
from the inside general counsel, and in short order the trader is on
the phone. The trader's attention span you are familiar with better
than me, and the decibel level of the voice- "Well, I got this firm
for two minutes, so what do I do? Do I glom onto the $50 million
offer of margin or what do I do?" If you give the right answer and
you save them $50 million, if you don't bill per second what you
normally bill per hour, it is not a lucrative practice. But that is how
these situations arise.
Now, once the bankruptcy starts, I told you that if you have
done it in the right entity-a financial institution, a bank-you are
insulated from the automatic stay. But Congress sort of left a
loophole there too. The automatic stay and the insulation from the
automatic stay apply to Chapter 7 debtors, Chapter 11 debtors, and
Chapter 13 debtors. They forgot about Chapter 9 debtors,
municipalities.
So when Orange County went into Chapter 9 under the
Bankruptcy Code, all of the big investment banks in New York
were ready to grab their collateral security, and many did. But
they did not realize that Section 555, which lets you override the
normal unenforceability of a bankruptcy clause, was not made
applicable to Chapter 9. I cannot tell you how many large
investment banks in New York wrote big checks to Orange County
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because they thought the automatic stay did not apply to them.
They thought that they could use Section 555 in Chapter 9, and it
just wasn't that easy, to put it kindly.
Now, another thing the Bankruptcy Code does is that it
protects the privileged class-the financial institutions, brokerdealers, et cetera-from avoidance actions, except for actions
based on actual intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors.
What does that mean? If you have a naked or an under-secured
account with a counter-party, and you are worried that it is going
to go into bankruptcy and you grab collateral at the last minute,
within ninety days of bankruptcy, ordinarily that is set aside as a
avoidable preference. Not if you are a privileged class and not if it
is a derivative contract. So is that good? Well, yes, that is terrific,
but that gives rise to all sorts of wonderful abuses.
The legislation goes so far to insulate derivative transactions
from the avoidance powers. It says, "settlement payments handled
through a securities clearing agency are exempt from the
avoidance powers." Well, when you do a standard leveraged
buyout, where a company borrows enough to make it insolvent,
then dividends the money out to its shareholders, if it does it
through the clearing agency, the circuit courts have said you may
not touch it under the avoiding power. It is not a fraudulent
transfer unless done with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud.
So what happens? People come to you all the time: "How do I
structure this so it will be invulnerable from attack in bankruptcy
as a fraudulent transfer?"
Now, the automatic stay is what secured lenders hate when it
comes to the single-asset real estate cases. They have a mortgage
on a building; on the eve of the foreclosure sale, the owner puts it
in bankruptcy; you cannot foreclose. Why put up with the
automatic stay if you can restructure the secured loan as a series of
derivatives contracts which are exempt from the automatic stay?
Now, are the bankruptcy courts going to go for this and let you
foreclose? The literal application of the law-there is something to
be said for that-should render the foreclosure exempt from the
stay. Bankruptcy types, like myself, say that that is really against
the spirit and the policies and is not going to carry much weight in
the district and appellate courts.
Finally, let me mention a novel theory attempted in the
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Orange County Chapter 9 case. Orange County is probably one of
the only entities to ever read the Constitution of the State of
California. And, lo and behold, there was a provision in the
Constitution that says a county is unauthorized to incur debt
beyond its annual revenues. Well, it lost so much money on its
derivative contracts, they said, "You have to give it all back. We
were unauthorized to enter into those contracts." That was settled.
All I can say to you is that you ought to read your state's
constitution. You might find something you never expected to see
there.
Those are actually all my comments. Thank you very much.
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DERIVATIVE SALES To FuNDs AND RESULTING LITIGATION
MS. JACKSON: Let's go ahead and get started. I am going to
introduce you to the moderator of the next panel. They are going
to be looking at derivative sales to funds and the issues that arise,
and they will probably even go beyond that.
I would just like to say a few words about David Morris. He is
a Partner at Fried Frank, where he is active as counsel to brokerdealers, hedge funds, and investors on deals and structures
involving a variety of derivatives, repos, CMOs, and other types of
derivatives, including swaps. David, I turn it over to you.
DAVID MORRIS:- Thanks. There are three topics that we are
going to talk about. One is the allocation of responsibility between
brokers, fund managers, investors, and the funds themselves.
Another topic is the significance of fund investments in illiquid
securities and, in particular, illiquid collateral. There was a lot of
talk this morning about the increasing importance of collateral, and
we thought we would focus on illiquid collateral, in particular.
And then finally, some of the effects that leverage is going to have.
The paradigm case that we think about is a fund that invests in
some kind of derivatives, things go swimmingly for awhile, and
then things don't go swimmingly anymore, someone loses a lot of
money, and then there is a lawsuit.
Three of us were involved in a case, called the Askin' case,
which is still ongoing. I was involved in that case representing
Bear Steams, and Peter Morgenstern and Eric Seiler represented
other parties. Let me ask them to introduce themselves and say
one or two sentences about that case.
PETER D. MORGENSTERN:** The Askin case which
David refers to actually consists of two dated, but separate actions.
Eric really primarily focuses on one side of the case, as attorney for
the legal successor to the Askin-managed funds themselves that
* Partner, Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson.
1. Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Steams & Co., 58 F.Supp.2d 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Primavera Familienstifttmg v. Askin, 113 F.R.D. 115 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); ABF Capital Mgmt. v. Askin Capital Mgmt., 957 F. Supp. 1308 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Primavera Familienstiftung v. Askin, 1996 WL 494904 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
**Partner, Bragar Wexler Eagel & Morgenstern, LLP.
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ultimately went into Chapter 11. The Chapter 11 plan created an
entity called the Litigation Advisory Board, which was empowered
to file claims on behalf of the bankrupt funds themselves which
Eric will discuss.
I represent a large group of investors who, together with other
groups of investors brought separate claims which have been, over
the four years or so of the litigation, whittled down to basically
fraud-based claims against not the funds themselves, because the
funds were in bankruptcy, but against the manager of the funds,
the investment advisor to the funds, and also against the brokerdealers who sold to the funds and who we allege aided and abetted
David Askin's fraud on his investors.
The investors collectively suffered losses of approximately
$500 million in the three funds that were run by David Askin,
which were purportedly market-neutral CMO funds.
The
continuing litigation that we are involved in now, involves fraud
claims against Askin as well as aiding and abetting claims against
certain broker-dealers for selling Askin unsuitable securities and
enabling Askin through the mark-to-market process to mislead his
investors about the value of the funds.
ERIC SEILER:*** It is interesting to hear David refer to it as
the "Askin case." It illustrates the point I am about to make. We
do not refer to it at the "Askin case" because we represent the
funds, and one of the big issues is are the funds charged with the
conduct of Askin. So we call it the "Granite case" because Granite
was the name of the Fund.
We really stand in the shoes of the trustee, the funds having
come out of bankruptcy-or liquidated, actually-with the only
residual asset being the claims against the broker-dealers. We
bring those claims standing in the shoes of the funds. So the issues
of suitability, which have been discussed most of the day today and
which we tried to make our issues, ultimately, at least at this stage,
are not our issues because, whether we were defrauded into buying
these securities or whether there was a fiduciary duty breach by the
fund manager, the court has held that we are, for those purposes,
the same as the fund manager, and so, in pari delicto, we cannot
bring those claims.
***Partner, Friedman Kaplan & Seiler.
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You would think, having heard everything so far today, that
there is not much left for the funds to do. But, as David pointed
out, the case is continuing as against some broker-dealers and it is
settled against others, including David's client; because the other
attribute of what happened here is that the funds went into
bankruptcy and they were liquidated. So an entire set of issues are
unique to this kind of fund litigation, relating to when can you
liquidate, what can you do when you liquidate, what do you have
left after you liquidate, and whose is it.
I am going to talk more about that as we go through the topics,
but those claims, which very much turn on the valuation of
securities, are alive. These claims have been settled for a lot of
money where they have been settled, and are currently being
pursued very aggressively. And, unlike what everyone else has
talked about, I think this case does get tried, both for the funds and
for the investors. It has been through virtually every kind of
motion practice you can imagine. The fund meltdown took place
before the Procter & Gamble and Gibson Greeting Card events,
which were in late 1994. This all took place in March of 1994. Fact
discovery concluded at Christmas and expert discovery is ongoing.
The trial is going to be in the spring, or the fall more likely, so it is
an active case.
One little footnote. There is a confidentiality agreement in
place, so there are things that we cannot talk about; and there are
adversary counsel who are present, so there are things we will not
talk about.
MR. MORRIS: There are spies, I think, behind every pillar.
Let me ask Michael Malone to introduce himself and talk about
what brought him here.
MICHAEL J. MALONE:**** I am not involved in the
Granite litigation, but I did want to briefly mention that I heard
David Brower on the last panel say that you don't see widows and
orphans investing in derivatives. Well, I am here to tell you that
America is a wonderful country, and in fact, in the early 1990s,
there were a great many litigations in the Southern District and in
the Second Circuit, and in some other circuits as well, that involve
funds similar to the Granite Funds-that include the Piper Jaffray
****Partner, Battle & Fowler LLP.
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funds, Blatt v. Merrill Lynch' in New Jersey, the Alliance Income
litigation, and the TCW/DW Term Trust litigations. All of those
funds were created by money managers who are expert at juggling
derivatives, at least as much as anybody is expert at juggling
derivatives.
In the early and mid 1990s, what you had in the markets was a
very substantial fall and then substantial increases in interest rates.
The fund managers who were juggling those derivatives found that
they did not always react in a way that was very beneficial to the
financial fortunes of those funds.
It created a lot of good old-fashioned securities class action
litigation. It didn't have the same elements as the litigations that
we heard about from the first panel. They were your basic breadand-butter claims that the prospectuses did not adequately disclose
the level of risks in these derivative instruments, the types of
hedging that were going to be used, the types of leveraging that
were going to be used, and the efficacy of those techniques.
I represented the Hyperion Funds in litigations of that kind.
The Hyperion Funds were affiliated with Louis Ranieri, who is the
highly recognized father of the mortgage-backed securities market.
In the view of some, Mr. Ranieri created that market back in the
early 1980s.
What those funds did was they took mortgage-backed
instruments that had a volatility when they were alone and they
put them into a cocktail that was, hopefully, going to neutralize the
volatile potential of each of the funds. Those funds were, in turn,
sold to the public, about $1.2 billion worth. In the very strange
interest rate environment that occurred in the early 1990s, they
dropped in value over $300 million. Without going on at any great
length, I would just say in situations like that, "plain vanilla"
litigators like me come in, and we look at the prospectuses, and we
try to litigate these derivatives cases like any other securities class
action litigation. That is, we focus on whether the disclosure was
adequate.
The suitability issues that have been mentioned also come up
in that context because, as you know, under the Reform Act'
2.
3.

916 F. Supp. 1343 (D.N.J. 1996).
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
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especially, you can, through motions to dismiss, put off the
discovery phase in litigations of this kind for several years. And
hopefully, as in our cases, you win on a motion to dismiss and the
case is over.
But during that two or three year period, while you are
battling to try to get the complaint thrown out on a motion to
dismiss, there are some resourceful plaintiffs who have enough
money at stake that they take the suitability route and go after the
brokers who sold them the funds containing the frizzy cocktail.
That is a very interesting tactical issue, because I don't think any
defendant who is dealing with one of these things in the Second
Circuit, or before a Federal District Judge, at a motion-to-dismiss
level wants a suitability case going through an arbitration, through
full discovery, and through the testimony of everybody involved.
I think that maybe one of the reasons that one of the
gentlemen who was speaking before said that most of these
suitability cases do not go the full distance is because the
defendants are likely to have a lot of other irons in the fire in these
cases. So to settle a single suitability claim is often a very wise
decision tactically.
MR. MORRIS: This morning derivatives were explained as
being mostly bilateral. One of the things about funds that buy
derivatives is that they are no longer bilateral; there are a number
of players-the investors in the funds, the funds themselves, the
fund managers, the dealers who sell the derivatives to the funds,
and the people who introduce the investors to the funds. So there
is a five-level series of players.
Let me now ask the panel to talk a little bit about the
relationship between your theory of what went wrong, or your
legal theory, and which of those various five players you can look
to pick up the bag at the end.
MR. SEILER: Probably the most interesting thing that has
come out of the Granite-related litigation on that question is that
there is no doubt in anyone's mind that the fund manager owes a
fiduciary duty to the fund and its investors. There is probably
equally no doubt that you could articulate a theory, if you have the
right facts. For instance, the broker-dealer community could
(1995).
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potentially aid and abet a breach of fiduciary duty if, for example,
they conspired with the fund manager to try and not follow what
the disclosure was to the investors or to sell inappropriate
securities to get large commissions. Whether that happens or not is
a factual question, but you could think that it is a core claim that
investors or the fund should be able to bring against the fund
manager or the broker-dealers.
The anomaly, or the interesting result, in the Granite litigation
is that the investors cannot bring those claims because they do not
have direct claims against the fund manager. They can bring a
claim of fraud against the fund manager, but they cannot bring a
fiduciary duty claim against the fund manager in their hat as
investors because they don't have standing to do so, and certainly
they cannot bring the claim for aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty against the brokers.
At the same time, the funds have been precluded from
bringing those same claims because they are charged with the
conduct of the investment manager, the fund manager, under the
in pari delicto defense. So you have an anomaly where there is a
recognition that there is a fiduciary duty that could be interfered
with, but neither the fund nor the investors in the fund can bring
that claim. At least that is an anomaly that exists absent further
judicial review.
You would have thought going into the case that it would be
one of the causes of action that would more likely stick as a matter
of pleading, where another cause of action that has survived might
have been more attenuated. So this is just one perspective.
MR. MALONE: Eric, I have not read those cases and I have
not been involved with them, but I do not understand why the fund
is not treated like any beneficiary of a trust, and why the advisor is
not treated like a drunken trustee. I mean, why should the trust be
precluded by in pari delicto from suing the investment advisor who
allegedly screwed up in putting instruments into the trust that were
not appropriate for the trust?
MR. SEILER: Probably in the context, of course, that the
investment advisor has no money, so the real issue is the aiding and
abetting of the breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the brokerdealer. But the analysis would be the same. I would say "Why
indeed, why not?" because that is the position we asserted. But the
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rationale is in the reported decision in this case that there is an in
paridelicto defense because the fund manager was acting on behalf
of the fund and he was cheating-and so it's your cheating, Mr.
Fund; it's not his cheating, it's your cheating.
MR. MALONE: I think David did some job in winning on that
argument. I think we owe him a round of applause.
MR. MORRIS: Well, I think what the judge was saying is that
in some sense you should not treat the fund as independent from
the fund manager, that the fund and the fund manager have exactly
the same interests, the fund makes no independent decisions, and
that it does not make sense to say that the fund has an independent
existence from the fund manager to be able to turn around and
accuse itself of having done something wrong. I think that is the
argument.
MR. SELLER: This is not an issue that is free from doubt from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It comes up, not in this context as
often, but in claims against professionals, and accounting
malpractice cases, where you have a company that has gone into
bankruptcy, and the question is whether or not the people who
were running the company for you were doing it for the company
or doing it for themselves. And, there is a whole doctrine-which
you could count the cases on your two hands, not in hundreds of
cases, and it is not free from doubt, but in this case that is one of
the things that came out.
MR. MORGENTSTERN: Unfortunately for the investors in
the Granite case, the court rejected our argument that the
investors should be able to accede those claims that were barred on
behalf of the fund's successor by the in par!delicto defense. So, as
Eric said, the anomaly was that it wound up just knocking out the
claim entirely from the case, although many of the facts and
circumstances that supported the breach of fiduciary duty claims
and the aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary claims survived
because they constitute the same sort of core facts and
circumstances that underlie the fraud claims that we are still
pursuing in the case.
MR. MORRIS: At the risk of trying to elicit some speechmaking, let me ask the panel this question: how much
responsibility do broker-dealers selling derivatives to funds have to
make sure that the derivatives they are selling are consistent with

114

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE
& FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. V

the funds' investment goals and the funds' strategies?
MR. MORGENSTERN: I will start. Well obviously, in our
case the brokers take the position, that they are in the business of
selling securities, and that is simply what they did with respect to
funds. We allege that there was more of a symbiotic relationship in
this case between the brokers and the funds which far surpassed
the ordinary relationship between a customer and its broker.
In our case, the brokers were financing Askin, they provided
certain analytic support for Askin, and were providing Askin with
a month-end mark which formed the basis for his monthly net asset
value reports to his investors. There are allegations in our case
that the broker assited Askin in reforming smoothed out and false
results to his investors.
I think you have to look at this sort of case as similar in some
respects to a lender liability case. You should look at the
involvement of the broker in its customer's business, the level of
their knowledge of and support provided to the customer. It is
certainly in many ways the degree of their involvement.
QUESTION: At what stage in the litigation did Judge Sweet
decide the issue of broker-dealer responsibility?
MR. MORRIS: The motion to dismiss on the complaint, just
on the pleadings.
MR. SEILER: This is a case that has the unusual aspect that a
tremendous amount of discovery took place before any of the
decisions and the motion to dismiss were decided. So you had
complaints that, while they were still being treated under the
standard of motion to dismiss, had very detailed factual allegations,
all of which is under seal because the court allowed the discovery
to go ahead, and there were a series of motions to dismiss. It is
unusual in that regard, so you might be able to read more into the
court's thinking about the facts since the facts are more
established.
QUESTIONER: I was just going to say that sometimes you
preclude yourself after a motion to dismiss, but then you've got a
viable cause of action and you run into summary judgment.
MR. SEILER: Right. I think that is often. I agree with that,
but this case is unusual.
MR. MORRIS: I am not sure the defendants would agree with
that.
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MR. SELLER: I think on this issue that they are likely to make
summary judgment motions.
But just to come to this point from another perspective, I think
that the broker-dealers, even if they could get out of this part of
the claim, the suitability part of the claim, if you go back to what
was said this morning, there was undoubtedly in this case a
breakdown in, if you want to call it, best practices. Whatever the
credit side of the firms had to think about-"should we be selling
to this guy, should we be financing it with 95 percent repo
financing"-was overridden by the desire of the people making the
products-and there were the esoteric tranches of an entire
spectrum of securities, and if you didn't sell this piece, you couldn't
sell the whole piece. They were making a ton of money on the
whole package.
Askin was buying the entirety, or virtually the entirety, of the
key tranche, and they needed him. In the dynamics, until it blew
up, the credit side was not in charge, the trading side was in charge,
or the new product side was in charge.
The sort of bitter lesson of it is even if you can throw out all of
the suitability claims, at the end you had a failed customer who was
riding an entire market, a market which melted down, even if they
never had to pay back another penny. In fact, they have had to pay
back another penny because the liquidation treatment at the back
end was done in a way that created a specter, at least, of liability
that has led to some substantial settlements.
So I think, from their own parochial point of view, the brokerdealers needed to do a better job with this customer because they
ended up paying a lot of money not having done that so far. I
don't think that is an unfair characterization.
MR. MORRIS: That is a fair characterization of the broker's
own internal, I would think, goals and needs. The problem from
an industry perspective is that if you make broker-dealers
responsible for enforcing the strategy of fund managers, you turn
the brokers and the dealers into fund managers. If a fund manager
comes and says, "I want to buy this derivative," the dealer then
needs to say, "Well, can I see your entire portfolio? What is your
thinking?" And then, if they have disagreements, I think the
plaintiff's theory would be you should say, "No, I won't sell you
these derivatives," and essentially you have reduced the number of
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investment advisors to be coextensive with the number of dealers.
MR. SEILER: I think that is a very fair point. But if these
guys had done their jobs perfectly and the firms had worked
internally, there still would have been the issue of, "Well, if you
have a good portfolio with me, you're a little long. What if you are
really long with everybody else on the street? How do I know
that?" We didn't get close to that in this case, but I think that is a
fair point.
If you are relying on regulating the brokers to regulate the
whole business, the brokers do not see the whole market, even in a
very narrow market.
JUDGE RAMOS: Judge Hellerstein and I have come to the
conclusion that we could rule on your case and save Judge Sweet
some time.
MR. MALONE: The funds were managed by people who had
to be expert because when the funds were still viable, before the
meltdown, they were turning around to the general public and
selling shares in these things.
MR. SEILER: Actually they were sold all to institutional
investors. Our investors are all institutions and not the general
public.
MR. MALONE: Okay. Nevertheless, they had to be experts
in trading the derivatives themselves. So I just find it hard to
swallow putting off the proper suitability of the instruments onto
the broker-dealer from whom they buy. It is like Leonardo da
Vinci going back and saying, "Look, you sold me the wrong paint."
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Speaking from the time when I was
a lawyer, which was not too long ago, there is another layer of
issues that comes into these cases. Because the brokers get
business, some of them will often assume responsibilities within the
firm, as was said before, of analysis and recommendation. In
addition, there are various private agendas that various fund
managers have to make appearances look better than maybe the
facts allow. The result of all of this is a blurring of the division
between who is the seller and who is the buyer.
I think that what was happening in this motion before Judge
Sweet-and I haven't talked to him, so I don't know-is an effort to
test, by a Rule 12(c) motion, a judgment on the pleadings, whether
the allegations take in as much as they can and state a cause of
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action. Judge Sweet held, apparently, that they do state a cause of
action. Sometimes you will take that theory because the facts are
so mixed and the case is so expensive, and you cannot hope to win
a motion for summary judgment. So you will take a chance of
winning, or trying to win a motion of judgment on the pleadings
that will assume the facts to be true and challenge the legal
sufficiency. It is a long shot, but it may be the best shot.
MR. SEILER: Maybe this is a good place to transition to the
whole issue of the illiquid securities.
MR. MORRIS: Sure. Why don't you just take that one and
run with it?
MR. SEILER: An issue that permeates our entire case is that
the securities were all highly illiquid, so there was no readily
ascertainable market. Often, Askin bought a tranche and held it
until the fund blew up. So if you don't believe that there are
comparable securities, you have a hard time figuring what the
securities are worth.
And, as they had to, the brokers marked the securities every
month, as they do for lots of other funds. The brokers marked
them every month for the fund manager, because the fund
manager, in turn, had to report to the investors how the portfolio
was doing. There are a number of allegations in this case that the
process was corrupted by the fund manager's desire to have a
certain result and by the brokers' willingness to cooperate in that
process.
That is a set of claims that exists in the case, but it also created
issues at the back end of the case, because all along they had been
marking them a certain way, and now, suddenly at the end, they
get nervous because the market has moved a little. They are
nervous about what each other broker is going to do, and there is
dramatic marking-down of these securities, leading to margin calls.
If you looked at the slides that were up earlier-the bid side,
the ask side, the middle-and then you were over here somewhere
below where the bid had been hours ago, and there was no real
move in the market. So even if you do not look at the end-of-day
price, you just look at the consistent marking that they were using
for their own securities, the question is whether there should have
been a margin call. But then, taking the last step, you have seized
all the collateral because the margin calls are not met, and now you
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say, "I am going to give you credit based on what I say they are
worth." Then you go out and resell them, if you are a brokerdealer, let's say hypothetically, that very afternoon for markedly
more money. Then the funds come and say, "Wait a minute, that's
my money, not your money." That is the core of the fund's case
that is still left, which is what we call the liquidations part of the
case, which is a $100 million claim altogether between the different
broker-dealers, or a little more, so it is real money that is at issue.
None of that would happen if these were securities that had readily
ascertainable prices at. You would have a bid-ask spread on them,
but you at least could have a number.
QUESTION: Were these all derivatives products or were they
actual securities?
MR. SEILER: They are all derivatives-inverse 10 floaters.
They are 99 percent derivatives off of Ginnie Mae-type securities.
MR. MORRIS: So in some sense they are government
securities; they fit in the box of government securities.
MR. SEILER: There was no underlying risk or loss of value of
the securities. The securities were paying the coupons every
month, and principal and interest, like clockwork. It was all a
change in the valuation because of moves in the market.
MR. MORRIS: One of the important things that issues related
to collateral should mean to the industry, is when you are relying
on collateralized derivatives, your credit is only as good as the
valuation process you have on the collateral.
One of the questions to ask is, where are those marks coming
from and exactly where are they? I can think of four different
meanings for what a mark is. A mark could be 1) what the dealer
who is giving it to you is willing to pay for it today in ordinary
markets; 2) what he would pay for it today if there were an
immediate forced liquidation; 3) what someone else might pay for
it today in ordinary markets; and 4) what the dealer predicts
someone else might pay for it today in liquidation. Those numbers
in an illiquid security could be 25 percent or more apart from one
another. That is a huge difference if you are relying on that
security as the credit support.
JUDGE RAMOS: There is another variable too between a
liquidation in an ordinary market and a liquidation in a panic
market.
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MR. SEILER: I think it is safe to say that the issues of what
duties the broker-dealers have under all those circumstances, both
marking for margin purposes and liquidation and how can a
liquidation be conducted, is a relatively undefined area of the
contract law.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: There is an analogy for secured
debt that has been working. Namely, that the creditor can take the
security-and most agreements will allow this to happen-and,
either in a public or a private sale, sell it off and any excess goes
back to the debtor. It is a fiduciary obligation of the seller to act in
a judicious or a commercially reasonable manner.
The problem is that when you get into a market where there
are few buyers and sellers and it is highly volatile, it is difficult to
establish value. But there are not many applications in terms of
derivatives and in terms of working different kinds of exchanges.
The derivatives you are talking about match a highly illiquid part
of the deal against a liquid part of the deal, with an over-pledging
of one end to sustain a speculation on the other end, very broadly
speaking.
So if the market collapses, the broker has the ability to grab
the liquid part of it. If he is over-secured, the broker can protect
himself as against the rest of the world, and other creditors
complain. That was an aspect of the Orange County debacle as
well.
If the broker is protecting himself with relatively illiquid
securities and the broker is probably the only one making the
market, he will take it in a private sale and then the valuation is
anybody's guess.
I don't know if there are really different things that you can
say about the law that are applicable to this kind of verified
transaction as against the common run of transactions. Judges,
even those of us who are brilliant, tend to apply what we have
learned a long time ago to new situations, until we are shown that
it does not really work and someone is getting a really rougher end
than he should get and another party is getting a big benefit out of
it-especially if the morality of the dealings have been corrupted in
some kind of a fashion. Then we try to make rules that fit the
situation.
MR. MORRIS: One of the differences, Judge, between the
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markets, just for example, the financial markets and the real estate
market or the other kinds of secured loans is Congress' concern
expressed in the bankruptcy context of the ripple effect. To have a
sale on the courthouse steps with notice measured in weeks, or
even days, I think Wall Street at least would say disrupts the
financial markets.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: It would. There are a whole range
of brokers-and I represented one-who before the Orange
County debacle was able to take in their security and come out
whole. Others got stuck and could not and had to wait a long, long
time. There is a mixed effect on this.
But there is another analogy in the Uniform Commercial
Code, where you can have a private sale. Most of the time the
Uniform Commercial Code deals with products where there is
some ascertainment of value, however rough or difficult, in the
area that we are talking about.
MR. MORRIS: There is a question over here?
QUESTION: Any thoughts about the illiquidity that comes
from what the dealers recently experienced, which is the GKO
market in Russia that just tanked in the fall of 1998, and that
created some interesting valuation issues that were, I think,
somewhat different than what happened in Askin?
MR. SEILER: I think that part of the brokers' position is that
there was a dramatic market move even in Askin, and so they were
fairly valuing the securities. It was just that they had lost a
tremendous amount of value. I think that is a better argument
when you are talking about the Russian bond market than it was
when we were talking about derivatives off of Fannie Mae's or
Ginnie Mae's, because there was a preexisting methodology that
the firms used. Sometimes it was relative-depending on the
particular security, it was either very sophisticated or less
sophisticated.
But if you use it every day and then on Tuesday you say,
"Well, I am just knocking everything down by 30 percent," that at
least raises a question as to whether that is commercially
reasonable. Especially if on Tuesday you know you are marking it
down because you are going to own it, and you are basically setting
the price at what you are buying, that is a somewhat different
methodology than you used the day before.
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I think the brokers would like to be able to defend this
valuation issue by saying that it was just a result of the spreads
widening in the Treasury market. I think that is a factual question.
If they could prove that, that would be good. If they cannot, that is
a problem.
I think with Russia there was clearly a dramatic widening
between other debt securities and Russian debt securities, so I
think it is a different situation, and I am not aware of any of these
issues being raised in any litigation coming out of that.
JUDGE RAMOS: Well, in the Russian situation, for awhile
there was no official exchange rate. The Russian banks were not
quoting the ruble.
MR. SEILER: I think they would have a harder case if Askin
had been investing in the Russian market in 1998. They wouldn't
have gotten any money from Bear Steams.
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TOTAL RETURN SWAPS AND SWAP CONTRACT LITIGATION

JOHN D. LOVI:* I should just explain briefly how I came to
this position. When I started in practice, right out of law school a
number of years ago, I was able to explain to a partner at the law
firm the difference between a put and a call. As a result, I was put
in the securities litigation department. Today, I represent, on the
dealer side, a number of sophisticated hedge funds and dealers
who create OTC derivative transactions that, unless you have a
supercomputer, you wouldn't even begin to understand.
How I wound up representing end-users-and that is really
what I am here to talk about-was odd, in the sense that I was
always, as other speakers have mentioned earlier, a bit skeptical of
end-user claims. Beginning with the Bankers Trust cases, I have
always represented the dealers and the dealers' interests
throughout this period.
In early 1998, the most profitable bank in Korea-that was
before they ran into a little bit of a derivatives problem-called me
and asked if I would represent them because they were the enduser guarantor on a transaction that created well over $300 million
in losses, and they thought this was a risk-free trade.
So I flew all the way over to Korea-it is a sixteen-hour flight;
I don't wish that upon anybody-and I was expecting to see the
most profitable bank in Korea. Just to give perspective about what
a sophisticated investor is-the most profitable bank in Korea or
the third-largest life insurance company in Korea may sound on its
face to be extremely sophisticated. It is not; far from it.
I was introduced to the individuals at the bank involved and
they took me through their understanding of the transaction with a
grease pen on a bulletin board and, I swear this is a true story-an
abacus, that's right-an abacus. They gave me their abacus as a
souvenir, and my children now have it. They thought they
understood this transaction by flipping those little beads back and
forth and diagramming it with a grease pen. And they swore that
they understood the transaction cold and could not understand
how it is that one day J.P. Morgan writes them a letter that says
*
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"you owe us $300-some-odd million; by the way, send us a check
tomorrow." That was Christmas Eve, 1997. In any event, that
really did change my perspective about what can be done for endusers in litigation. That case has now settled.
I am currently representing what used to be the third-largest
life insurance company in Korea, now taken over by the Korean
government because they had some financial difficulties, in
another derivatives transaction.
We have talked about, and you have already heard a number
of causes of action that arise out of OTC derivative transactions,
and my current lawsuit states a number of those as well-fraud,
suitability, breach of fiduciary duty, ultra vires, illegality, and
numerous variations of those same causes of action.
However, what I want to focus on in particular are two
common elements of nearly all large derivative loss cases and
demonstrate how the application of common law principles of
contract ought to provide the rule of decision in each case. By
applying the common law in these cases, the courts vil be
providing the parties with a "bargained for" regulatory scheme
that will greatly and immediately enhance the overall efficiency of
the derivatives markets.
One of these elements I refer to as "information asymmetry."
I think Denis Foster put a finer point on it by saying that one party
knows a whole lot more about the transaction than the other guy,
and that is known as "superior knowledge." The other common
element in these kinds of derivative loss cases is known as "event
risk." My clients refer to these elements, event risk and
information asymmetry, as, "Oh my God, I didn't expect that to
happen." That, is event risk; or "Oh my God, I didn't know I
could wind up losing that much money." That is known as
information asymmetry. Clients also have an uncanny habit of
finding religion when they are staring at a $100 million derivatives
loss.
Event risk, as the term is used in the derivatives or risk
management context, usually refers to the risk that an occurrence
will happen that falls outside of the predicted set of outcomes.
You have heard of sensitivity analysis and the like. Typically,
dealers perform sensitivity analysis, usually internally, very rarely
shared with the end-user, based upon a two-standard-deviation
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movement around the mean. Therefore, bankers analyze the
range of values in only 95 percent of the possible outcomes. Now,
for those of you who are still in law school here-I don't know how
many of you that might be-this is the bell curve, and two standard
deviations describes the area that is covered by 95 percent of the
curve.
The problem is that, by using a two-standard-deviation
analysis, a dealer may think that the worst-case scenario is
described in a situation that is likely to happen only nineteen out
of twenty times. What the two-standard deviation analysis does
not do is tell you how bad things get in that one in twenty chance
that falls outside of two standard deviations. One may say, "Well,
one standard deviation, or 50 percent of the outcomes, you've got a
$1 million loss, and two standard deviations, 95 percent of the
predicted outcomes, it is a $5 million loss."
But what happens in the situation outside of two standard
deviations? Is it a $8 million loss? Is it a $15 million loss? Is it a
$100 million loss? Is it a $200 million loss? The model does not
tell you that. This is known as the "long-tail" or "short-tail"
problem, and I will spare you the details on that.
But event risk-such as the Mexican devaluation of the peso
or the Thai government's abandonment of the baht basket regime
in 1997-is responsible for billions of dollars of losses in the
derivatives market.
Now, it is my legal view, and it is the purpose of my discussion
here, that these common elements, event risk and information
asymmetry, have their analogue in the common law. Event risk
finds its common law counterpart in the doctrine of frustration of
purpose or commercial impracticability. That is, I think, a cause of
action that no one has talked about yet today.
Under this theory, commercial impracticability or frustration
of purpose, an obligor is discharged from his duty to perform a
contract where the failure of a basic assumption of the parties
produces a grave failure of the equivalence of value of the
exchange to the parties. Basically, both parties assumed something
was going to happen or something was not going to happen, and
then something else happened instead.
The best application of this doctrine in a setting analogous to
certain types of OTC derivative transactions is a case called Alcoa
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v. Essex Group.' In Alcoa the parties entered into a contract
whereby Essex would supply Alcoa with alumina, which Alcoa
would convert by a smelting process into molten aluminum and
send it back to Essex for further processing. The price provisions
of the contract contained a complex escalation formula that varied
depending on the Wholesale Price Index of Industrial
Commodities, what was called WPI. Alcoa wanted to use the
formula in order to achieve a stable net income of about four cents
a pound for converted aluminum. Essex sought to assure itself a
long-term supply of aluminum at a favorable price.
The contract was really very similar to a swap transaction that
might be done today. The contract was to run from 1967 to 1983.
Unfortunately, in 1973 OPEC oil prices skyrocketed as a result of
the embargo, causing electric costs to increase dramatically.
Electricity, as many of you know, is heavily consumed in the
manufacture of aluminum. As a result, Alcoa's electric costs rose
much higher than the WPI, such that Alcoa was losing buckets of
money on its contract with Essex.
The court found that both parties had intended and expected
that the WPI as employed in the contract formula would operate as
it had historically done to achieve the essential purpose of the
contract, which was stable cost/price adjustments throughout the
term of the deal. When the WPI ceased to work in that fashion,
the purpose of the contract was frustrated, and Alcoa was
discharged completely from the obligations under the contract.
This outcome resulted despite the fact that any fifth grader
knowledgeable in long division could see from the WPI formula
itself that just such an outcome was possible. It is just math. You
can plug a large number for one of the variables in the formula and
you could see that, under certain circumstances, somebody would
get walloped.
Now, the facts in Alcoa are even better than in your typical
derivatives debacle case. Alcoa was the party that came up with
the WPI formula, not Essex. And Alcoa, obviously sophisticated
in the world of aluminum costs and pricing, came up with the
formula with the aid of what the court referred to as "the eminent
economist Alan Greenspan."
Yes, believe it or not, Alan
1. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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Greenspan came up with the formula for Alcoa. Even though it
was Alcoa's formula, devised for Alcoa by Alan Greenspan, the
court let Alcoa, a sophisticated counterparty, off the hook
completely by applying the doctrine of frustration of purpose.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Where was Alcoa's central place of
business?
MR. LOVI: Pennsylvania. However, Your Honor, this is a
universally and well-regarded concept of contract law.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Where in Pennsylvania, the
Eastern District or the Western District?
MR. LOVI: The Western District. The logic of this opinion
however, comes screaming through with the utmost clarity. It is
important to note that the sophistication of the parties is of no
relevance in applying the common law doctrine of frustration of
purpose. It does not matter that two sophisticated parties agreed
to a contract that eventually goes badly for one of those parties. It
does not matter that you were sophisticated or could do the
math-it doesn't matter.
So we have talked about and you heard earlier, the problem of
sophisticated counter-parties and whether a foreign bank is
sophisticated. That problem should not be one that comes into
play with this cause of action.
Now, the common law doctrine can and ought to be applied in
derivatives cases where there has occurred what I have called event
risk. For example, in early 1997, a number of Korean financial
institutions entered into certain derivative transactions with J.P.
Morgan that were supposed to provide the Korean parties what
was called "synthetic low-cost yen financing." Believe me, just
take my word, that is what it was called.
The yen financing aspect of the deal was expressed as a nondeliverable yen forward. In effect, the Koreans were shorting yen.
In order to hedge against possible yen appreciation, the deals also
included a long Thai baht forward position leveraged five times
because it was understood by the parties-that is, both parties,
Morgan and the Koreans-that in these transactions the offsetting
forwards would work as a hedge because the baht was a managed
currency and had been so for fifteen years.
Now, it is obvious from the transaction formula that if the baht
ceased to be a managed currency, the baht forward leg of the
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transaction would not operate as a hedge. In fact, the baht leg of
the transaction would start generating huge losses for the Korean
parties, the exact opposite of a hedge.
The Koreans began suffering horrendous losses when the baht
basket regime collapsed on July 2, 1997. You can see that the
abandonment of the baht basket regime in the Morgan deals,
frustrating the purpose of the baht forward as a yen hedge, is
precisely analogous to the OPEC oil embargo in the Alcoa deal,
frustrating the purpose of the WPI formula as a cost/price
adjustment mechanism in the sale of aluminum.
The key issue in both cases is: what was the understood
expectation of the parties underlying the purpose of the deal?
Now, in the Morgan-created derivatives case, the court needs to
decide whether the Korean counter-parties and Morgan
understood that the baht forward was to be a hedge against yen
appreciation; or, conversely, were the Koreans knowingly taking a
naked gamble on whether the baht basket regime would remain in
place for the one-year term of the deal? I mean, you could do a
deal like that. It's called gambling. You might as well bet on
whether Darryl Strawberry is going to get a year's suspension or a
month's suspension. That would be gambling. But if you say,
"Well, it is a baht and a yen, we'll do this and we'll do that," it
looks like an OTC derivatives transaction.
Said another way, were the Korean counter-parties buying a
limited up-side of approximately a 9 percent rate of return and
selling unlimited down-side risk? If the legal issue is presented this
way, the question left to be answered is one of fact for the jury to
decide. But the effect on the derivatives market of framing the
legal issue this way, however, would be immediate and striking. I
propose that no self-respecting investment bank will take a $100million-plus gamble on a jury of its peers. That case would settle
quickly.
The broader derivatives market, however, will respond in a
rational and efficient manner to eliminate this litigation risk. And
this is how they will do it. Remember one of the principal
purposes of derivatives is to limit risk or better manage it. I would
expect that all future OTC derivative transactions will clearly state
on the face of the contracts the intention of the parties with respect
to all risks inherent in the transaction, thereby avoiding an Alcoa-

128

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE
& FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. V

type fact issue for litigation. With a clear statement of risk
intention included in derivative contracts, the derivative markets
achieve greater risk disclosure and deal transparency, without the
need for a cumbersome regulatory scheme, such as the SEC or the
CFTC.
The beauty of the common law is that, in itself, it is a
regulatory scheme governing contracts, one that, if properly
applied, can achieve in an efficient way all the goals of a more
cumbersome statute-based regulatory scheme.
I've got lots of other remarks, but I am going to cede the floor
to the honorable justices. Thanks very much.
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A VIEw FRoM THE JUDCIARY
PROF. FELSENFELD: It is no longer a secret to anybody
here that we have two distinguished judges from our local courts,
Judge Alvin Hellerstein from the U.S. District Court and Justice
Charles Ramos from the New York State Supreme Court. Judge
Hellerstein, after some thirty-six or -seven years with Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan, joined the court in 1998. Justice Ramos, having
graduated from this law school, joined the court in 1988. They
have both done much too much for me to tell you, other than to
summarize for both of them that they are distinguished and
respected members of the local community both on and off the
bench.
Our plan was to have a number of lawyers speak on various
litigation issues and then have the two judges come up here and
comment on the presentations. I have a feeling that the plan has
absolutely fallen apart. Let me invite both Judge Hellerstein and
Justice Ramos to come up here and spend a few minutes talking
about whatever they want to talk about.
JUSTICE RAMOS:* Alvin, I think the only advice we can
give the end-users is to make motions for changes of venue.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN:** I have a chief judge who is
concerned that our dockets are decreasing relative to the number
of newly appointed judges. He would like us to work harder, so he
would veto what you are suggesting. He is against arbitration; he is
against alternative dispute resolution. He is for judges working
hard.
JUSTICE RAMOS: I'll send you some cases.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Well, you don't have that power,
you know. I do. It is called limited jurisdiction, motions to
remand. I just sent one back to your court yesterday.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Yes. We call it leftovers.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: I love listening to John Lovi
because it is an example of some of the better part of my job.
When Fritz Schwartz and John go off against each other on this
*
**
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wonderful derivatives case, which manages to come into my court
about once every week and a half, it is a pleasure to see them and
to argue with them and to decide. You know, it is the ultimate
power. If you are not getting paid, you should have power.
JUSTICE RAMOS: We are not getting paid? Or was that
unsaid but understood?
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Yes. Justice Ramos and I had
lunch yesterday and we were talking about what we would say to
you. I think we have seen a lot of specialists here who really know
their field very well, and we have been asked to come and make
intelligent comments to a panel where we know an infinite fraction
of what they know. And actually, that is really one of the points
we wanted to make to you.
As judges, we are generalists. We don't know much about
derivatives. It's hard enough to know what securities are. We
know the law of contracts, the law of torts; we know big papers
when we see them, and derivatives mean big papers.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Big complaints.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: One of the points we want to make
to you is that if you have a litigation with derivatives, you have to
pay attention to whom you are writing for. Are you writing for
your client, or for newspaper publicity, or are you writing for the
judge?
A complaint is a very important document. It is a document
that resides with the judge throughout the case. At every flash
point in the case, the judge will want to consult the complaint to
see what is alleged, to see what is in issue, to test the theory. If you
have an eighty-five-page complaint, it is very difficult to do that,
and the tendency then is not to read the complaint, but rather to
rely on your law clerk's summary, or your own recollection, which
is even worse.
The first point that I thought I would like to make is to write
the complaint not for the client, but for the judge, to state your
theories properly, to give the judge an understanding of what is
involved, but to avoid the expletives and the rhetoric. Just boil it
down. If you can do it in twenty pages or less-and I think you
can-it becomes a much more useful document and, therefore, a
document that better serves your client's interests. That is my first
point.
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JUSTICE RAMOS: I have noticed recently in the complaints
that complaint number one is three causes of action long, then the
next action comes along and it's those three causes of action plus
two more that are added to it, and so on and so forth. It does not
add anything to the case. Either the case is a good case or it is not.
What do I want to say as an overview? I guess we can't
apologize for being New York judges or New York lawyers. The
venue problem is an interesting one, but most of the contracts I see
in the Commercial Division specify not only that New York law
applies, but that jurisdiction is in either the Southern District or the
Commercial Division. In fact, many parties now are putting
Commercial Division and Southern District in their contracts
almost exclusively. It used to be London sometimes on derivatives
and securities transactions of this sort, but now it tends to be New
York.
We look at cases, not as cases, but as individual issues within
the cases. I do not think you are going to see a separate law of real
and apparent authority develop out of a line of cases on
derivatives. It is going to be the law of real or apparent authority.
The only thing that derivative litigation, to me, has of a
compelling nature is that the losses are generally tremendous.
Judge Hellerstein and I were kind of joking about the reference to
the Alcoa case and where they are headquartered and where did
that case come from. But when there is going to be a catastrophic
loss either to a national industry or to a local industry, yes, you
might find that the judges get creative as well and carve out some
exceptions. But, by and large, it is difficult to see how in this area,
unless you have something like the problem we had in 1998, where
anything is going to be done, at least on the judicial level. I mean,
there you had a bailout of a hedge fund essentially by the financial

community.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Not by the court.
JUSTICE RAMOS: That's right. It is conceivable, but I don't
think it is going to happen, at least not in New York. We are not
that parochial. So I think you are going to find that the general
principles of law are going to apply.
I said to Alvin as we were just sitting here, that it is amazing
how creative lawyers can get when the loss is $100 million, when
you know that the same rules apply-that's out of Contracts 101-
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whether it is a multimillion-dollar plaintiff or someone in small
claims court. The law is the law, and it is not going to change just
because the losses are great, notwithstanding the courts in
Pennsylvania or Texas.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Going back to this issue of
authority, the disparity of knowledge point that several speakers
have made-what do you call it, John?
MR. LOVI: Information asymmetry.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Information asymmetry. That's
wonderful. That creates attention that I think will create at least
some marginal sympathy on the part of the judge. But I agree with
Justice Ramos that in the final analysis, where you have a
jurisdiction like New York which has developed law on more
subjects than most other jurisdictions, it is going to be very hard to
translate that sympathy into a ruling.
We look to do justice, but we also look to see where we are
going to be affirmed and where we are going to be reversed. If you
push your theories because you are sympathetic to a particular
theory, then you risk reversal. I do not think we are very much
interested in doing that on a case where the law is there.
For example, in much of the derivatives litigation-it was in
the Orange County case, which I am more comfortable talking
about because I don't have to sit in judgement on that-the
argument was made that you had a treasurer of a county who was
looking for his own agenda to dress up his financial statements at a
time when it was very difficult to earn income.
There was terrible pressure in Orange County. To translate it,
the County had needs. It did not want to tax. They had various
propositions in California that limited the ability to tax. So there
was tremendous pressure to gain as much income as possible out of
the securities that the treasury held. You couldn't get much income
out of the government securities that the treasury held because of
the low interest rate at that time. So there was pressure to do more
with it-hence, leverage. Securities, derivatives, all these things,
are games of leverage. By indulging in these games, for awhile he
was able to boost the income return to the County.
But the concomitant of additional income is additional risk,
and he was willing to take on additional risk. The one chance in
twenty that John talks about in terms of the bell curve is often a
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tolerable risk to a politician because that one chance in twenty may
come when the next guy is in office and he is out and he has a good
record. But the payday comes and then there is difficulty.
The difficulty of using doctrines like ultra vires or lack of
authority, even if the fellow who is making these investment
decisions, for example, is a country bank, is not very sophisticated
and the seller is sophisticated, is you run up against doctrines that
are well pronounced in New York. For example, as someone said
earlier, the contract in its four comers defines the risks and
rewards, defines the differences in rights and liabilities. Or, if
someone sets up a person with authority, that person has apparent
authority to act. You are not going to find too many judges in New
York who will change those doctrines because of a particular
derivatives case.
JUSTICE RAMOS: I suppose both of us do have to apologize.
There are a lot of specific issues that we really cannot opine on
here because we have cases before us and we are somewhat
restrained in terms of what we can say, unlike the attorneys. I
think we could say we have never been as well ex-parte'ed for as
long a period of time as we have been this afternoon. We heard a
lot from end-users. There is an interesting story also to be told
from the point of view of the producers. We understand that, we
do.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: I think we had some producer
interest as well.
Here is another couple of points that we wanted to talk about.
These cases rarely, as someone else said today, get to judgment.
Because the aggregate numbers are so huge, at some point along
the way there will be a discount, which wil be called a settlement.
People will go home, and that will liquidate the various risks and
rewards that have been taken on by the parties and the debacle
that has been suffered by one or another of the parties.
So the game is getting there. You start with a complaint that is
filed, and then you are going to have various motion practices.
You are going to test the complaint and knock off some of the
theories, just as was done with Judge Sweet's case. And you will
also engage in discovery. Discovery presents some very difficult
problems, especially in a state court setting, but even in a federal
court setting.
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In a case that John had, in which he settled with Fritz Schwartz
of Cravath and many other parties, there were very difficult
depositions that had to be taken. They were difficult not because
of the questions and answers, but difficult because many of the
protagonists in the parties had moved on and they were not very
much interested in coming to a discovery. If you ask any nonAmerican what he or she hates most about our system, it is our
discovery; and what any American lawyer loves the most, it is
discovery. So you have a difficulty in getting to depositions.
Key witnesses no longer were with the parties, or were said to
be no longer with the parties. With the profusion of entities that
are involved in these kinds of cases, you never know who is the
party and who is not the party. You have special-purpose entities,
you have affiliates, you have minority control-you have all these
kinds of things making it very difficult to know who was under the
custody and control of the party.
You try to get the witness to come to the States. He makes an
appointment, then he's got a pressing business engagement, then
he does something else, and so on. He never shows up. So the
judge will say, "Okay, take the deposition in the country of
residence"-Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia,
wherever.
Then you run into some very acute systems and problems.
Except for the Commonwealth countries, almost every other
country in the world is on the French system or the German
system; a civil code. Depositions are taken by a magistrate judge.
There is no verbatim transcript. The judge will ask the questions.
Between the time of making the request in a letter rogatory from
the State Department to the Ministry of Justice in some other
country and the appointment of a judge to convene the deposition
and interrogate the witness, many months can elapse. And then
the magistrate will ask the questions; you are not permitted to ask
a single question. In some countries, if you take a clandestine
deposition voluntarily, you are violating the law and can go to
jail-civilized countries, Switzerland and France, for examplecreating special difficulties with discovery and requiring a very
attentive judge.
Another issue is that, since the amounts are huge, lawyers
work, and when lawyers work they start to fight, and when lawyers
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fight the fighting gets more and more acrimonious, and the
professionalism with which everyone begins the case soon
evaporates. We were talking about this at lunch, too, and we both
have special procedures that result in getting you quick and
responsive rulings-maybe not right, but responsive.
JUSTICE RAMOS: The term draconian comes to mind.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Not from my end. It may be for
the end-users. But we try to give you prompt rulings. Our
experience is that when you have a ruling, the lawyers will abide by
the ruling and they will not fight about that particular point
anymore, and I think it helps to enhance professionalism. That is
another end of it.
But discovery is very difficult in these kinds of cases, and
probably it justifies coming to court rather than doing arbitration.
A lot of arbitration clauses creep into the contracts because
commercial people do not like litigation, they do not like juries,
and they want arbitration. They wiU pick London or pick Geneva.
They pick nice places usually, London in the theater season,
Geneva in the springtime, and go back and forth. Maybe Aspen is
another site. But you cannot get good discovery out of arbitration,
and I think, as any lawyer who has been involved in these cases
knows, the discovery process is crucial.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Alvin, during lunch I was trying to cut
down our caseload, so I was talking to some attorneys who were
with American Express and Chase Manhattan and encouraging
them to put arbitration clauses in these contracts. No, they don't
want to do it because arbitration is becoming as expensive as
litigation, because now you are getting discovery in arbitration, the
arbitrations are being held in expensive locales, and they are
resisting it, which is somewhat frustrating.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: And many of the arbitrators are
amateurs. We are professionals. We get reviewed.
JUSTICE RAMOS: We are professional amateurs. You
know, "I am an expert in derivatives; I had a couple of cases."
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: We have to write opinions, we get
reviewed, we get reversed.
JUSTICE RAMOS: That is true. They have appellate rights.
Interestingly, we did not discuss the problems of my particular
case, the SEITA case, in terms of the discovery that went on there,
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but, as Ms. Jackson knows, we had exactly all of these problems in
getting the testimony of the key witness in the case. Thank God
we didn't have to try the case. You heard Ms. Jackson explaining
some of the complexity with regard to the swap transactions that
were involved in the Salomon Brothers/SEITA deal. Can you
imagine trying that before a jury? I think their hearts would stop.
I mean, there is no way they are going to follow that. It was kind
of fun to watch Frank Barron trying to explain it to me.
It is very difficult for litigators to be as expert as Ms. Jackson is
in terms of how these transactions work. This may be a good thing,
because I think simplifying the dispute helps the judges-not just
because we have small minds, but because, again, we are going to
look at those issues and those principles that are common to all
kinds of litigation.
Are the elements of fraud present? I cannot imagine a
derivative action being brought without at least one cause of action
alleging fraud, another one alleging some sort of constructive
fraud, a negligent misrepresentation, a failure to disclose, a breach
of fiduciary duty-they are all there. But these are not surprising
concepts to us, and if you can simplify them, and if you can get
away from some of the complication of the transactions
themselves, you might be effective.
Understand, at least from the end-user's point of view, the
playing field is not a level one. I know there are some small
players in this field, but, by and large, the end-users are going to be
large, they are going to be sophisticated, they are going to have
done this before. This was true in my case; the end-user had
already paid $30 million and had written off the loss, and then the
new management came along and basically said, "Wait a minute,
let's rethink this." They changed their minds.
It is a difficult, difficult case to win from a plaintiff's
perspective, at least in a court that is going to give everybody a fair
shot, because the principles of law-think of the things that do not
apply. If you are just dealing with OTC products, you do not have
any real regulation, it is contract only. It is not like a public
offering; rather, it is like a private placement, and due care is
placed on the plaintiffs-that is the plaintiff's responsibility.
PARTICIPANT: It is caveat emptor.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Pretty much. And it is easy from a
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plaintiff's position to talk about the greed of the brokers, but, quite
frankly, the only reason these end-users are in the transaction is
because they are greedy. They don't want to get 6 percent on a
Treasury bond, or whatever the rate is today. I don't know what is
going on.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Well, that puts an epithet where it
may or may not be applicable.
One point I was interested in on the analogy of the case that
John Lovi cited from the Western District of Pennsylvania is, why
aren't these cases brought under different systems of laws? For
example, are Korean Life and Morgan both amenable to the
jurisdiction of the courts in the Republic of Korea? Was that an
option?
JUSTICE RAMOS: There is litigation going on.
MR. LOVI: Well, Your Honor, without disclosing any
attorney-client communication or attorney work-product or
strategy of any pending matter, I can answer hypothetically that,
one can imagine that Korean Life Insurance, which is now taken
over and operated by the Government of Korea, that the
Government of Korea could pick up the phone and order Morgan
to pay them back the $100 million or threaten to throw them out of
the country. But I think that would jeopardize Korea in the capital
markets, which they need to access going forward. But if they go
to Morgan's hometown and get justice there and win, who can say
that the Government of Korea used undue force?
JUSTICE RAMOS: The bottom line is they need us more
than we need them.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: I could think of some ideas. The
American system of justice is perhaps more advanced than in some
of the third-world countries, or there is more experience in dealing
with large commercial cases, or this idea of greater acceptability
and fewer political pressures on the government. I do not know.
But there was litigation in the earlier case you had in Korea, as I
understood.
MR. LOVI: There was litigation in both Korea and in the
United States in the case that was settled.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: What was happening in Korea at
the same time?
MR. LOVI: They have a totally different system. There is no
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discovery. They go to the court every month or so and give the
judge more information. Then the judge at some point says, "I've
heard enough, I think I know the answer"-you never know when
that is-and then he gives a ruling.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: So are we moving faster than they?
MR. LOVI: Yes. That may have been totally stalled as a
result of the operation of the system as opposed to the parties
participating in the system.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: It is very difficult. My experience
as a litigator was that our system was a system that was better for
litigants, better for consumers. The transaction costs, though very
heavy, were less, and the ability to get discovery was greater.
JUSTICE RAMOS: But to give up home field advantage?
That is a political step, it has to be. It has to be a political
determination that "we are not going to sue Morgan in Korea
because we want Morgan and the Morgans of the world to come to
Korea and fund what we need funded, so we will play in London or
in New York."
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: It's interesting.
Do people in the audience want to ask questions?
JUSTICE RAMOS: Please. We are here to inform you.
QUESTION: I want to jump in to say that, in some sense, the
U.S. judicial system is an asset that we sell. I was involved in a
transaction between a Hong Kong entity and a Taiwan entity.
They went shopping for a U.S. intermediary because they wanted,
if there was a dispute, to have it resolved by the New York courts,
in particular, rather than have to rely either on the Chinese courts
or the Taiwanese courts, or even other financial centers they could
have picked.
MR. LOVI: Aren't the Chinese courts and the Taiwanese
courts the same court now?
QUESTIONER: In some sense, it is one of our exports, like
Delaware Chancery is for the State of Delaware and the courts on
which the two of you sit. I don't think many Americans value our
legal system that way, as a national export.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: In my court that would not be an
option because a lawsuit between a citizen of one foreign state and
another foreign state does not create diversity of citizenship.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Are you going to move sua sponte to send
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the case to me?
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Nothing would give me more
pleasure.
JUSTICE RAMOS: In fact, I had a case that was just resolved
recently between two Russian banks suing one another. That was
it. They agreed to come to the Commercial Division in New York
County, and we will take it.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: I think it is a stated policy of New
York State to provide that.
JUSTICE RAMOS: It is.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Judge Kaye, who I think is perhaps
the finest Chief Judge in recent history, has set up this Commercial
Court in which Justice Ramos is one of the leading participants
precisely to give a better brand of justice, to compete with the
federal courts, and to attract people to the judicial system.
JUSTICE RAMOS: For those of you who are not aware, I will
give you a little unpaid advertisement. The Commercial Division
consists of five judges in Manhattan and we work only on
commercial cases of substance. Each of us has the right to transfer
out to other justices cases that we do not consider to be important
enough, so that we basically vet our own cases. We keep a case
load of about 450 cases, and they are interesting. They are good
cases, they are interesting cases, they are well litigated, they have
wonderful attorneys, most of whom are here. It is a delight to sit in
the Commercial Division.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: The comparison in the Federal
Court is that my civil docket is about 300 cases, my criminal docket
is about eighty/eighty-five cases, which turn over more quickly, so
you would weight them in a higher number. The diversity of the
civil cases is probably wider than for the Commercial judge.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Oh, yes.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN:
A lot of employment
discrimination cases, a lot of pro se cases, a lot of cases involving
constitutional liberties, and the gamut, in addition to very
complicated statutory cases.
But I think we each feel
extraordinarily privileged to be able to sit in our courts. It is really
a wonderful experience.
QUESTION: How far does the concept of caveat emptor go?
What if the dealer knew for certain that the customers did not
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understand the derivatives that were being sold? What if the
dealer was lying-not giving a mis-estimate, but lying about the
facts?
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: I am not going to answer your
hypothetical because I have cases that deal with that sort of thing.
That is point number one. Point number two, the question really
should be put to Charlie, because I only apply New York law. He
is more expert on New York law.
JUSTICE RAMOS: That's the good news. The bad news is
that I made it and the Appellate Division agreed with it.
Well, if we look at the SEITA case, there the end-user was
alleging that they didn't have proper information and that they
were unable to value the swaps accurately and, therefore, they
were short-changed. So, first, they wanted out of the deal; and
second, they just wanted to recover some of the money. You have
a big reliance problem. That is the difficulty SEITA had. I ruled,
and the Appellate Division ruled, that there simply wasn't
reasonable reliance. They had the capability, a means, of getting
this information themselves. Now, that is not necessarily going to
be true of every end-user, but we made that factual finding with
regard to SEITA.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: The law to be applied is rather
interesting also. Short of a choice of law clause in the contract,
what law do we apply? If it is a deal that is made in an emerging
country, what are the contacts in that country? And, is the product
bundled in the United States and sent abroad, in a sense? Where
is the collateral? What is the risk? All these things come into play.
So what law do you apply? And, even if you have a choice of
law in the contract, when you raise issues of fraud and other tort
theories, the choice of law clause may be background information,
but may not be dispositive of the issue.
So what do you apply? There is no federal common law that
deals with this sort of thing. There are various types of notions
that you apply a sort of generalized American law. I have a case in
the insurance setting where I am instructed to apply "the customs
and practices of the United States," as compared to the London
insurance market. There is an insurance market in the United
States, there is an insurance market in Kansas City, there is an
insurance market in New York. Insurance is supposed to be a local
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product rather than a national product.
These things are very interesting, and there is no good
teaching on this particular point. Often, lawyers do not brief the
issue because they also do not know what they want in this
situation. It is too complicated, so the judge applies the law with
which the judge is familiar, New York. But it is interesting.
MR. LOVI: On some issues we have to go with the common
I
law rule of the system.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Whatever that is. What is the
common law in Korea, for example? There is a law merchant.
There is sort of a brooding international law merchant. That used
to be a lot more important in the 19th century than now. You can
dig that out of maritime cases, Warsaw Convention cases, and
other kinds of things like that, but it doesn't take you very far.
That issue tends to get suppressed because who wants to go
find what the law of Taiwan is on a particular point, or the law of
Malaysia? Many of these countries have a history of being in
existence only forty to fifty years, so there is not much time to
develop law. And then, not too many of us know how to read
Chinese ideograms either, or ideographs, whatever they are called.

Professor Felsenfeld probably knows about that.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Yes?
QUESTION: I just wondered if you had any practical
suggestions on how to present a complicated case of this type to a

jury?
JUSTICE RAMOS: Oh, my God. Don't. Waive the jury.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: I do not agree with that. I have
never tried a derivative case either from a lawyer's part or a judge's

part, but I have tried complicated cases. John gave a presentation,
David gave a presentation, others gave presentations. There were
a good many of them. They were well presented. They could be
followed. I think that most of us who practice before juries feel
that juries will rise, not to the lowest common denominator, but to
a rather high common denominator. You have to make a special
effort to present them with diagrams and charts and the like, to
boil down the proofs so that they are just the essential proofs, and
to be able to communicate in an effective way.
You tell your spouses about these cases, and often your

spouses are not lawyers.

You tell your friends; they are not
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lawyers. Even if they are, they are not interested, so you've got to
boil it down. I think you can do it.
JUSTICE RAMOS: It just would be interesting to see if you
could get to a jury in one of these cases, at least in New York.
When I think in terms of what can happen with dispositive motions
-I mean, after you have gone through the kind of discovery that
you all do with these sorts of cases, there is not a great deal that is
really actually in dispute. In SEITA we really didn't have that
many factual disputes. It was more legal. The attorneys could
present to me very, very finite and nicely defined issues and I could
rule as a matter of law. It takes perhaps a couple of years of
discovery to get there.
If it boils down to a true factual issue of what was told to an
end-user by a broker and there wasn't a tape, that would be an
unusual case. Then, of course, you are going to go to a jury. But
then it is a simple issue for the jury. The jury does not have to
figure out how to value the swap. The jury-or the judge evencan listen to expert testimony on that and you can agree on what
the damages will be. If the jury finds this way on a particular issue,
the consequences will be so much-we know what it is, because it
is just an arithmetic computation.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: The New York rules are more
liberal towards summary judgment than the Federal Rules.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Oh, yes.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: The trial judge will be upheld more
often on summary judgment calls in the state system than in the
federal system. The rules are pretty much the same.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Because we have interlocutory appeals,
so there is a kind of a check and balance there. And, the Appellate
Division is not reluctant to affirm us, to dismiss a case, if we have
really touched all the high points and given them something clear
on it. They will either tell us we are right or wrong, but it is clear.
Dispositive motions also will simplify a case.
Judge
Hellerstein was talking about that, and I really applaud that.
Sometimes we get these complaints with dozens of causes of
action, most of which are just garbage. And we are offended by it,
because we should not have to parse out what is reasonable in a
complaint. And it is always a good idea to make those preliminary
motions either at the dismissal stage, or even summary judgment,
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and get rid of the nonsense, so at least we can deal with what is
really important.
QUESTION [PROF. RECHTSCHAFFEN]: One of the
things that we talked about in my class, and I was talking about this
with Denis Forster during the break, is in terms of this complexity
issue. What has been done generally is to allow the experts to be
as complex as possible, making the transaction as complex as he
can, but making the legal issues very simple.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: I don't really agree with that. The
real purpose of an expert is to have a mini-summary in the middle
of the case. If you think about a jury case and what you are using
an expert for, you want the expert to persuade the jury. The
experts give opinions, and the opinions have to be credible and
persuasive, so you want the jury to be able to understand the
expert. Therefore, if you are trying to win a case as a plaintiff, it is
critical that the expert be able to communicate in a way that the
jury understands.
JUSTICE RAMOS: But what if the expert wants to convince
the jury that no one could understand the transaction?
QUESTIONER [PROF. RECHTSCHAFFEN]: That is the
point I was making, from a strategy point of view.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: I think a cross-examiner can break
that expert.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Which is why I always require expert
depositions. State law does not provide for it, but I insist on it,
because that is the only way you are going to get to the heart of the
matter fairly quickly, is to have them deposed.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: And also, you have the opposing
expert. I think the analyses that we are making of risks and risk
management really come down to the proposition that people are
looking to make a buck in different ways. The best use of your
expert is to: 1) analyze the structure to see where the buck is made,
2) analyze the risks as foreseeable or unforeseeable, or 3) analyze
the risks as contemplated by the parties or not contemplated by the
parties. Thereby you structure your factual presentation in terms
of what the legal presentation would be.
Those of us who have been around a lot and listened to Irving
Younger, whose untimely death was a real blow to the whole
profession and academia, remember him saying one thing: when
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you structure a case you begin your preparations with what you
want to leave with the jury at the end of the case. You structure
your whole case-and derivatives cases are no different from any
other case-based on what you want the jury to remember when it
is time to deliberate. Everything starts to arrange itself in that way.
You know what you want to leave the jury at the end and you
structure your case, and, most of all, your experts, to state a theme
that is going to resonate from the beginning to the end. That's how
you do it.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Just a thought about complexity. The
motivations for an end-user getting involved in a derivative
transaction can be as complicated as the transaction itself. That is
something that I don't think is touched upon a great deal, but in
terms of the defense perspective, particularly when you are dealing
with sophisticated end-users, it can be a very interesting area.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Every one of these cases had endusers who were trying to make a little more. In a very difficult
market, they were trying to make a little more.
ATTENDEE: And they were successful for some time.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Judge Hellerstein, this is really directed towards
you on the question of caveat emptor. A lot of these cases are
brought under the federal securities laws, either under suitability
claims, or they could be brought as straightforward 10b-5-type
claims.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Is this where there is an actual
security that is purchased, as opposed to a product?
QUESTIONER; Yes, or an option, an option to purchase a
bond.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: A derivative is a security, I think.
QUESTIONER: Yes. A put or a call can be a security, and
often is.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: As opposed to an OTC derivative.
QUESTIONER: It could be an OTC put or a call.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: It wouldn't make any difference
for this purpose. For 10b-5 purposes it would not make a
difference.
JUSTICE RAMOS: It would still be covered.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: It is either a contract or a security.
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But, of course, the question is which. I don't want to be put down
as saying I believe in caveat emptor. Much depends on the total
relationship of the parties. The question I put earlier, in terms of
how a seller can become, in effect, part of the buyer, has to be
thought about in terms of a caveat emptor standard. Obviously,
caveat emptor will not apply in that kind of context. But in the
securities context, you also have a change. Securities laws helps
you get around the very difficult issue in fraud cases: is there a
relationship that requires a disclosure on the part of the seller to
the buyer? A seller, if he keeps his mouth shut, can sell a mule
instead of a horse and leave it to the buyer to distinguish between
the two. A seller of securities has a more difficult problem, but
even under the securities laws, if the seller keeps his mouth shut,
he does not have to say anything and it is caveat emptor.
The problem comes up because most sellers do not keep their
mouths shut. They say something, and once you say something,
you have the law of nondisclosure, namely, that the thing you say is
incomplete and fraudulent because of your failure to say
something else. So the law of nondisclosure deals with that which
has to be said in order to make that which you said not fraudulent.
The law is quite helpful in the 10b-5 context and I think it is a
viable alternative. However, there has been an effort by many
plaintiffs to stay away from federal securities laws because of the
special restrictions that have been built in, not so much on a partyto-party basis, but on a class action basis.
QUESTION: I have a question about enforcement of foreign
law by way of not enforcing a derivative contract. It was suggested
earlier that U.S. counter-parties make an effort to do some due
diligence as to the enforceability of a transaction under local law.
How would you do that under varying hypotheticals-whether
there was awareness of the problem of global law, there is no
awareness, that the local party was aware, those kind of issuesbecause that would be a serious transactional problem to do that
kind of due diligence?
JUSTICE RAMOS: I think one of the earlier speakers spoke
about the problem of what happens if this transaction takes place
in part within the foreign jurisdiction. Then you may have a
problem of foreign law. Then you've got choice of law issues.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Orange County-Merrill Lynch
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and other dealers in New York were selling securities in a
complicated repo way to Orange County. Like many counties, like
many banks, there is a requirement in California written into the
constitution that you cannot guarantee someone else's debts. It is
in bank charters all the time, it is in many corporate charterscannot guarantee a debt. A pledge used in effect as the instrument
by which one is induced to borrow or lend or do something with a
more speculative security or something else is a form of guarantee.
The argument was made that guarantees were, therefore, ultra
vires, under the charter of Orange County and under the
constitution of California.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Regardless of where the contracts were
made, even if they were made in New York?
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Regardless.
JUSTICE RAMOS: Because they didn't have the authority?
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: And, as it were, much of the
litigation was in California. Now, the secret and special power of
that doctrine is that it trumps apparent authority. So if it is illegal
in the area of the transaction, then it is illegal. Of course, this
could be perfectly legal everywhere else, and Merrill Lynch was
doing nothing different than any other dealer, and it was
essentially the market and the like.
This was a very powerful issue that ultimately was discounted
in some fashion by the settlement. The defense lawyers thought
very little of the likelihood of success, but you were outside the bell
curve if in that one out of twenty or one out of fifty cases you lost,
because the price of losing was your ability to stay in business.
That drove the settlement.
JUSTICE RAMOS: But, Alvin, that was such a powerful
issue. I just can't imagine that if you had private counterparties
who didn't have an ultra vires problem, but just a conflict between
local law and New York law with a choice of law provision in the
contract that says "this contract shall be construed as if it was
performed in New York," that you would get the same result.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: But that is one issue. That does
not trump anything, because there is very little law that says that a
choice of law clause will override a policy of illegality. Take the
Korea Life situation.
JUSTICE RAMOS: What about gambling cases? Gambling is
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legal in Nevada; it is not legal here.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: We get around the gambling a lot
because-I don't know.
JUSTICE RAMOS: We got around it. We fudged it.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: But it is probably the same thing,
and it probably will stand up the same way that everything else
does. I am sure that Korean financial institutions have the same
clause having to do with guarantees, forbidding a financial
institution to guarantee. If this is considered a guarantee and not a
regular financial transaction, then there is an issue.
JUSTICE RAMOS: But they may not raise it because
politically it would be too dangerous for them.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Possibly.
JUSTICE RAMOS: They would rather lose.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: Or they may just look at the
gambling part of it. I mean, there is a small chance, and I think
every pleader will understand that it is a small chance, that this
issue of illegality will create a problem in what is going on in a
worldwide way. But that small chance discounted against the
billions of aggregate dollars that go into these kinds of deals is
worth something. I think that is what is at play here.
Someday someone is going to forget and the case will go and
some judge is going to say the transaction shouldn't have been
done or the transaction should have been done. It doesn't make
any difference or it makes a lot of difference-I don't know.
Nobody knows the answer to these kinds of things.
JUSTICE RAMOS: That is why you should settle.
JUDGE HELLERSTEIN: I mean, on one hand, you have a
worldwide market, there is globalization. Globalization trumps
environmental laws. Globalization trumps labor laws, so you can
have someone in Malaysia working at five cents an hour to make
the sneakers that I wore to play tennis last night and it is legal,
even though if it were five cents an hour in this country, the
employer would be thrown out of the world, he would be exiled to
some place up in the universe. What is legal in a situation of
globalization? Who knows?
PROF. RECHTSCHAFFEN: Judge Hellerstein, Justice
Ramos, we want to thank you very much for being here.
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